

Codification of Physical Development
at the
United States Military Academy

LD720

The American Military Experience and The United States Military Academy

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“West Point has a *proven system* to develop the best leaders in the world. Trust us and trust our system,” were the solemn words of Superintendent Christman to the parents of the West Point Class of 2003 on R-Day. The United States Military Academy codified this “system” in the 1993 publication of its strategic guidance, *West Point 2002 and Beyond*. This document formally acknowledged a three-pillar model simply called The West Point Experience.¹ (see appendix A) This developmental experience ultimately accomplishes the Academy’s mission by producing “leaders of character.”

The prominence of the academic and military pillars has always been the backbone of the institution’s symbol of excellence since its conception in 1802. Likewise, its sacred honor system is the bedrock of West Point. For these reasons the Academy chose these developmental aspects in the formally codified West Point experience. The third pillar, physical development, however, does not possess the historical significance as its fellow pillars in this developmental process. Why and how in 1993, did the Academy place physical development into this codified model along side academic, military, and moral-ethical development? Its codification as a pillar of the *West Point Experience* is the result of three evolutionary events in the 20th Century: the formalization of physical fitness programs, the maturation of the Department of Physical Education, and the Academy’s formation of an integrated leader development program.

To understand the evolution of physical development in the 20th century it is important to acknowledge that physical training has always been an element of the training regime at the United States Military Academy. Prior to the Civil War,

¹ *West Point 2002 and Beyond: Strategic Guidance for the United States Military Academy* (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1993), 2.

swordsmanship, riding, drill and dancing were considered “intrinsic to the military character and necessary to accomplish the mission of the school.”² As a result, the cadet curriculum devoted an extraordinary amount of hours to these physical endeavors. In the years prior to the formalized physical education program, cadets between the years of 1846-1860 spent 520 hours during their four years in physical training, compared to 142 after its formalization in 1885.³ However, despite the enormous amount of hours spent on physical training prior to 1885, there was not a formal physical education program at West Point. To evolve into a codified program, physical education would first require formalization.

It was the arrival of Herman J. Koehler in 1885 that brought stability and direction to the physical education program at West Point. Between 1885 and 1923 Koehler formalized the physical fitness program at the Military Academy by standardizing the physical education curriculum and publishing the Academy’s first physical fitness manuals, to include *The Theory and Practice of Athletics at the Military Academy*.⁴ This formalization of the physical fitness program earned Koehler the title of “Father of Physical Education” at West Point and was the first step toward the codification of physical development at West Point.⁵

There were two significant events in the formalization of the physical education program which set the conditions for the evolution and eventual codification of physical

² Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 18.

³ The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 1802-1902. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 897.

⁴ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 28.

development at West Point. The first was Koehler's insistence that the Academy require all classes to participate in physical education. He was disheartened as he witnessed the drastic decline in cadets' physical fitness during their final three years at the Academy.⁶ Koehler was a visionary, and understood the importance of physical fitness on the battlefield and benefits of a lifetime of physical exercise. Pleased with his courses instituted for the fourth class, he saw "the fruits of his program going to waste," during the cadets' stay at West Point. Koehler expressed his concerns eloquently in the Academy's official history of its first one hundred years, *The Centennial*:

It (physical education) has not yet reached the limit of its usefulness and will not reach it until every member of the Corps of Cadets is permitted to enjoy its benefits during the entire time of his stay at the Academy. This is a question of serious importance, not only to the individual or the institution, but to the Army and the Country.⁷

Koehler's reputation and insight earned him the support of the superintendent, commandant, and Association of Graduates.⁸ However, despite his forceful and dynamic lobbying, he was unable to effect change in the policy as the Academy began its second century of developing leaders for the Army. Finally in 1905 Koehler's twenty-year campaign came to fruition, when President Roosevelt ordered all classes at West Point receive instruction in physical education.⁹

⁵ David J. Yebra, *Colonel Herman J. Koehler: The Father of Physical Education at West Point*. (LD720 Paper, 1998), 1.

⁶ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 41.

⁷ *The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 1802-1902*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 899.

⁸ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 41.

⁹ *Ibid*, 42.

Koehler's second major contribution, which directly supported the formalization of physical education, was his dogged appeals for a modern gymnasium. In only four years, Koehler demonstrated his formal physical education program was an essential part of cadet development and won approval for a gymnasium to support the formalized physical education program. In 1889 Congress appropriated the funds for the Academy's first gymnasium. When work was completed in 1892, Koehler described the building as "superior to any in the world."¹⁰

Koehler extended his philosophy of the physical fitness beyond the gymnasium and stressed the importance of athletics in the education of future military leaders. Prior to World War I, he wrote the superintendent that, "the only fault with athletics at the Military Academy is the number participating in them."¹¹ After World War I, another progressive leader, Douglas MacArthur, joined Koehler in his push to elevate physical fitness in the development of the nation's leaders.

MacArthur became the superintendent in 1919 and brought back a number of lessons from combat in the World War. The importance of competitive sports taught to him by Master of the Sword Koehler, as a cadet "had been portrayed vividly on the battlefields of France."¹² His war experience validated his belief in the value of competitive sports to the soldier.¹³ Koehler's formalized physical education program ensured continued education in physical fitness, but only a small number of cadets

¹⁰ The Centennial of the United States Military Academy at West Point, 1802-1902. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1904), 901.

¹¹ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 67.

¹² Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1964), 77.

¹³ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 55.

benefited from competitive sports through inter-collegiate athletics. MacArthur, like Koehler, saw the missing link in the physical development paradigm at the Academy, and instituted compulsory intramurals to the formalized cadet physical education program.

Koehler's standardized curriculum and MacArthur's concept that "Every cadet an athlete," required a staff and instructors to support and teach this formalized program, which had become an undeniably important facet in the development of modern battlefield leaders. This organization became known as the Office of Physical Education (OPE). MacArthur's famous opinion on athletics, that, "upon the fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that upon other fields, on others days, will bear the fruits of victory"¹⁴ had far reaching implications that would cause a struggle during the maturation of OPE.¹⁴ The seeds sown by these enlightened men sprouted a tree bound by an institution unprepared for its growth and need for expansion. The evolution and maturation of the Office of Physical Education (OPE) began to sprout its limbs and grow, in search for autonomy and self-identity. This maturation became the next vital step toward codification of physical development.

The evolution and maturation of OPE would waxed and waned and span the next fifty years. In 1928, the organizational structure of the Academy placed OPE as an office subordinate to the Department of Tactics. As a result, the Academy did not bestow permanent professorship on The Master of the Sword. This lack of permanency in the position resulted in OPE seeing nine Masters of the Sword between Koehler's retirement

¹⁴ Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992), 127.

in 1923 and the Second World War.¹⁵ Despite its formalized program, its stated importance, and allocated time of instruction, the Academy did not give OPE autonomy nor recognize OPE as an equal in the Academy's circle of decision makers.

Prior to World War II, there were moves to establish an independent Department of Physical Education. In 1937, LTC Jacob Devers, Graduate Manager of Athletics, sent a proposal to the superintendent outlining the establishment of the "Department of Physical Training."¹⁶ The recommendation included the head of the department be a member of the Academic Board. Without consulting the Academic Board on the issue, Superintendent William Connor issued General Order 37 on 1 December 1937 establishing the department.¹⁷ Quick to respond to this breach of Academy policy, the Academic Board immediately opposed subversive attempt and challenged the superintendent's efforts. The issue was left to the War Department to settle, which it did on 22 December 1937 when the Adjutant General denied the request:

Careful study has been made...the disadvantages of the establishment of a Department of Physical Training outweigh any advantages...the Commandant of Cadets commands the Corps of Cadets and is charged with it military training. To relieve him of all responsibility for the physical training of the cadets is to relieve him of a very important part of military training. To introduce another department and hold it responsible...violates a fundamental concept of command...and lays the foundation for constant friction and interference in the orderly and efficient conduct of military instruction of the Corps of Cadets.¹⁸

¹⁵ Historical listing of USMA Master of the Sword, 1814-1974, (USMA Archives, Source unknown), 1.

¹⁶ Jacob L. Devers, Memorandum for the Superintendent, 29 April 1937. (Found in USMA Archives, File # 351.051 Physical Training)

¹⁷ General Order No. 37, Major General William Connor, USMA Superintendent, 10 Nov 1937. (Found in USMA Archives, File # 351.051 Physical Training)

¹⁸ Major General A. Couley, Adjutant General, Memorandum for Superintendent, 22 Dec 1937. (Found in USMA Archives, File # 351.051 Physical Training)

The AG's denial of the request demonstrated two historical patterns in the Academy's inability to change: the power of the Academic Board over the superintendent and the "old grad" mentality to resist change. The issue of an independent OPE, for the time, was dead. World War I had validated the formalization of physical education, it would require another eye-opening experience to force the issue that OPE and physical education required a more influential role in the development of the Army's future leaders. As a result, OPE maturation stagnated during the inter-war years.

On the eve of World War II, General George C. Marshall stated to a Congressional Committee:

I saw 27 different divisions of ours engaged in battle [during WWI], and there were more reliefs of field officers, those above the rank of captain, due to physical reasons than for any other cause. But by that I do not mean that they were definitely relived because of physical limitations, but because their spirit---their tenacity of purpose, their power of leadership over tired men---was broken through physical fatigue. They became pessimistic...they became nervous... impossibilities in positions of leadership. A man must have a great deal of stamina to stand the racket of campaign. Many of our mistakes were due to physical deficiency and as I remarked, the majority of the reliefs were due specifically to physical exhaustion.¹⁹

Marshall's enlightened views about physical fitness was a foreshadowing for what the rest of the Army would learn, often times the hard way, during World War II. The World War II brought new insight into the importance of physical fitness on the battlefield. Its effects sent alarming signals, not only to the Army, but also to all walks of life. As America put over 4 million men and women in uniform, the lessons of physical endurance under stressful situations was a lesson taken back to society as a whole.

¹⁹ George C. Marshall, "Selected Speeches and Statements of General George C. Marshall," *Speech before Committee on Military Affairs*, 9 April 1940. (Found in USMA Archives, File # 351.051 Physical Training)

Nowhere was this more evident than at the institution responsible for producing the leaders of the Army.

World War II stimulated the stagnated evolution of physical education at West Point. Prior to 1942, a cadet deficient in physical education received additional instruction, but was not and could not be dismissed for physical deficiency. Master of the Sword John W. Harmony (1940-43) embarked on a campaign to separate cadets who were deficient in physical efficiency. His efforts required the Academy to establish standards in physical education grading and establish quantifiable testing procedures. After two years of development, testing, and validation the Academy establish minimum physical fitness standards for graduation. In 1944, Superintendent Francis Wilby signed General Order 13, which required cadets to pass Military Physical Efficiency Tests as a graduation requirement.²⁰ The first cadet dismissed for deficiency in physical fitness was discharged that same year.²¹ This was a substantial step in the maturation of OPE and the most significant milestone toward codification since Koehler's formalization of physical education. Previously, the codified programs of academics, military (disciplinary deficiency), and honor reserved the ability to recommend a cadet be separated from the United States Military Academy. Just as a cadet was "found" for deficiency in Engineering or French, deficiency in physical fitness resulted in being "found" unfit for commissioning due to substandard physical fitness. This elevated OPE in importance and strengthened its position as a substantial element in the developmental process.

²⁰ General Order No. 13, Major General Francis B. Wilby, USMA Superintendent, 21 April 1943. (Found in USMA Archives, File # 351.051 Physical Training)

²¹ Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States Military Academy*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 67.

Upon his return from the battlefields of World War II, General Maxwell Taylor assumed the superintendency in 1945. As commander of the 101st Airborne Division he had seen, as MacArthur in 1919, the importance of physical fitness on the battlefield. He whole-heartedly supported the initiative to test physical efficiency and make it a graduation requirement. Taylor also supported and pushed through the Academic Board, Master of the Sword Francis Greene's initiative to include the physical efficiency grade into the overall academic grade. This was another significant milestone in the maturation of OPE and the physical education program. Just as the ability to recommend separation of a deficient cadet was a powerful stick for OPE to wield, the ability to influence a cadet's academic class ranking was also an influential carrot to dangle in front of the cadets. No longer could cadets take physical education for granted, it now affected the order of merit list, thereby affecting branch selection, post assignment...West Point housing draw, and Michie stadium football seats.²²

The legacy of World War II caused these two seemingly insignificant events at the time to elevate the level of importance of physical education in the West Point experience. The physical efficiency graduation requirement and the physical education grade computed with academic grades marked the most important stepping stones to the eventual growth and complete maturation of OPE and eventual codification of physical development at West Point.

The permanency of the director of OPE was the next significant maturation issue and step toward codification of physical development. In spite of Master of the Sword Francis Greene's recommendations (1944-53) and continued recommendations from the

²² Roy K. Flint, Speech to the Class of 1991, West Point New York, August 1987.

Board of Visitors from 1945-1952, the permanency of the Master of the Sword was not accomplished until 1953.²³ That year, COL Frank J. Kobes became the first permanent Master of the Sword, and served in that position until 1974. Throughout his tenure OPE and the physical education program grew and matured. "Colonel Kobes initiated numerous actions leading toward the modernization of the department. He kept the physical education curriculum current with the ever-changing views of society and the Director's role took on a scope of greater magnitude ..."²⁴ Kobes provided the stability and direction once provided by Koehler. Kobes established OPE's program as one of the premier physical education programs in the United States.²⁵ His emphasis on tough, challenging, realistic physical training supported by the Koehler-MacArthur formalized program and the revolutionary changes of 1942-46 in the physical fitness evaluation system, set the stage for the emergence of OPE as an independent office.

In 1974 COL Jim Anderson succeeded COL Kobes as director of OPE. COL Anderson's tenure as Master of the Sword, 1974-1995, was marked by "sweeping changes at the Academy."²⁶ Many of the changes initiated were based on the 1976 Borman Report, the 1977 West Point Study Group Report, the 1986 strategic planning project, and the 1987 Self-study in preparation for the 1989 Middle States accreditation review. The findings and recommendations of these studies resulted in the strategic guidance produced in 1993.

²³ Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992), 148.

²⁴ Ibid, 148.

²⁵ John Nerber, ed., "The Greatest Physical Education Program in the World," *Physical Education and Scholastic Athletics Newsletter*, vol I, 20 February 1957.

²⁶ Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992) 148.

Anderson was present for this final phase of OPE maturation and led the organization on the final leg of the evolution to codification of physical development. The last stage of this evolutionary process occurred during the turbulent years of the 1970's at West Point. After the EE304 cheating scandal, the Secretary of the Army initiated an external review of the Academy's Honor Code. In the review the Borman Commission studied the environment of the Academy in an effort to capture the nature of the cheating scandal. The Borman Report noted the directors of OPE and the Office of Military Leadership "have not served as full members of the Academic Board. As structured, therefore, the Board may exclude these individuals from discussions of scheduling and curriculum."²⁷ The fact the director of OPE heads a program "that significantly impacts upon cadet's daily schedule," the report recommended the permanent director of OPE be a member of the Academic Board.²⁸

In light of the Borman Report, The Chief of Staff of the Army initiated the 1977 West Point Study Group, to examine the entire Military Academy "in the climate of healthy self-examination [providing] the opportunity to make such changes as might be found necessary."²⁹ The Chief of Staff charged the Study Group "to study, not simply those aspects pertaining to Honor...but with a thorough review of all aspects of the Academy."³⁰ During its review, the Study Group made recommendations for reorganizing the Office of the Commandant. Historically, the Department of Tactics under the commandant consisted of: OPE, the Office of Military Leadership, and the

²⁷ Special Commission on the United States Military Academy, Report to the Secretary of the Army (Borman Report), (Washington D.C., 1976), 79.

²⁸ Ibid, 80.

²⁹ Final Report of the West Point Study Group. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977), i.

Office of Military Psychology and Leadership. The Study Group recommended the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership (later renamed Department of Behavior Science and Leadership) become an academic department, and transfer responsibility of its control to the Dean. The remaining offices under the commandant became independent departments, all headed by a department head (0-6). Regulations were revised in 1978 and the heads of OPE and OML became members of the Academic Board.³¹ Membership on the Academic Board and recognition as a full-fledge department completed the final phase of OPE's maturation. Its maturation set the stage for the Master of the Sword to lead his program to codification during a period of strategic planning and the Academy's attempt to produce a comprehensive and integrated leader development model.

The strategic guidance, which portrays the codified physical development program, grew out of the internal and external studies of the Academy in the 1970's. Superintendent Andrew Goodpaster expanded upon the Chief of Staff's internal study one step farther, initiating working groups to study specific areas of the Academy's programs. His purpose was "to develop a series of papers, *Basic Concepts for the U.S. Military Academy*, for identifying Academy concepts related to the intellectual, military moral-ethical and physical development of Cadets."³²

In 1978, as part of this study, the superintendent initiated a Physical Development Working Group (PDWG), chaired by COL Edward Saunders, Department of Physics. This working group laid the foundation for Anderson's program of physical development.

³⁰ Ibid, i.

³¹ Ibid, 106.

Anderson's influence on the working group's product was evident and his battle cry – *Every cadet an athlete, Every athlete challenged!* – was the theme of the concept paper.³³ The superintendent's Special Assistant for Policy and Planning was the proponent for this action, which provided unbiased validation and credibility to the DPE program and provided Anderson further support in his efforts to take the formal physical education program and codify it as a physical development program.

In October 1978, the PDWG produced the "Concept for Physical Development" and in 1979 the Academy published it as part of the *Basic Concepts for the United States Military Academy*.³⁴ The significance of the concept paper is that for the first time in its evolution, the physical education program was referred to as the physical *development* program. This was not simply a case of semantics, but a significant step toward codification as part of the Academy's leader development model. The Master of the Sword had evolved from the head of the physical education program to the director of one of the Academy's *developmental programs* in 1978. Its codification, however, was not completed due to the Academy's inability to integrate Goodpaster's initiatives into a comprehensive leader development model.

LTG Dave Palmer became superintendent in 1986. From 1986-1991 he integrated the studies, reviews, and reports from 1976-1981. He accomplished this by establishing the strategic planning project, Project 2002, in 1986, and initiated another institutional self-study in 1987 in preparation for the 1989 Middle States accreditation

³² Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992), 14.

³³ Edward A. Saunders, "Concept for Physical Development", *Report of the Physical Development Working Group*, 20 June 1979.

review.³⁵ Project 2002, produced a new mission statement and purpose for the Academy. From this strategic integration, physical development was “established...as an integral part of cadet life by its inclusion as one of the three major programs which make up the *West Point Experience*.”³⁶ The Academy now had a model for how it produced its leaders with the attributes necessary for successful military leadership. The Academy identified physical development in its “appropriate relationship to the other two major components of the West Point experience, the academic and military programs.”³⁷ The strategic planning guidance in 1990 stated, “The way to achieve the newly stated Academy purpose is marked and measured along three distinct but intertwined developmental roads---intellectual, physical, military---with moral-ethical development inextricably integrated in all three.”³⁸

In 1993, the United States Military Academy published the strategic guidance for West Point in the 21st Century. The guidance portrayed a codified *West Point Experience* with a three pillar developmental process, supported by a moral-ethical environment. To complete the codification, the Academy produced the publications that support the integrated developmental process. Based on the “Redbook” concept, each codified

³⁴ Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992), 53.

³⁵ *Ibid*, 14.

³⁶ *Interim Report of the Middle States Accreditation Steering Committee*, vol II (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1988), 15-19.

³⁷ Mary L. Remley, *Physical Education at the United States Military Academy, 1966-1992*. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1992), 14.

³⁸ Larry R. Donnithorne, *Preparing for West Point's Third Century: A Summary of the Years of Affirmation and Change, 1986-1991*. (New York: USMA, 1991), 93.

program produced a supporting document describing the program and linking it to the Academy's new mission, purpose, and strategic vision.³⁹

The "Redbook" is the historical document produced to support the academic program at West Point. The strategic planners charged the program director of the military pillar and physical development pillar with the mission of producing the validation documents for their programs. The result was the military program's "Greenbook" and the physical program's "Whitebook."

As director of the physical development program, COL Anderson used the Physical Development Working Group's concept paper from 1978, blessed by him and approved by the commandant and superintendent, to write the Physical Development Whitebook, which validated the codification of the program.⁴⁰ The Physical Education Whitebook laid out in detail the four-year developmental program in physical education. It supported the Academy's effort to codify its leader development model, as a result of the accreditation committee's input in 1989. The Whitebook links physical development to the West Point mission, purpose, and vision.⁴¹ *The West Point Experience*, laid out in the strategic guidance "codified" physical education as a pillar in the development of leaders; the White Book is the explanation and support for the pillar. Its publication completed the 20th century evolution of the codification of physical development at West Point.

³⁹ Jeffery M. Weart, interview by John B. Richardson IV, 20 November 1999, Michie Stadium, West Point, New York.

⁴⁰ Jarold L. Hutchison, Deputy Commandant, *Memorandum for Special Assistant to the Superintendent for Policy and Planning*, 13 October 1978.

⁴¹ James L. Anderson, "Physical Development Program," *The Whitebook* (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1995), 3.

The results of an evolutionary process are difficult to prove and can be easily discounted as a natural progression in the life of an organization. The fact that evolution of the physical development program is evasive, opens it to the argument that the codification of physical development was not a natural evolutionary event, but part of a knee-jerk reaction to a hastily produced strategic guidance, created to pacify the dissatisfied accreditation committee. It begs the question whether this "codification" is but a catchy pictorial view of a system that has been part of the West Point experience since Cadet Swift, the Academy's first graduate, "hurried off to the field of sport in 1802 upon completion of the days' studies."⁴² Despite the refutability of an evolutionary process, the codification could not have come to fruition without the three sequential events of its formalization, maturation, and recognized developmental importance. This chain of events are dependent on the previous event making it an evolutionary road to codification, rather than part of a knee-jerk reaction in the production of a vision for the United States Military Academy for the 21st Century

The initial formalization of the physical fitness programs by Koehler and MacArthur established the foundation for the future codification of physical development at West Point. The lessons learned about physical conditioning in World War II forced the Academy to establish standards to measure physical fitness. By 1944, failure to meet the minimum physical fitness standards for commissioning resulted in the recommendation for the cadet's dismissal. OPE's level of importance and influence increased significantly after implementation of the physical education grade in the OML in 1946 and again when the director of OPE became a permanent position in 1953.

⁴² Robert Degen, *The Evolution of Physical Education at the United States*


Because of these maturation factors, coupled with the recommendations for autonomy by a number of internal and external study groups in the 1970's, OPE evolved into a recognized full-fledged department at the United States Military Academy and earned the Master of the Sword a position on the Academic Board. The combination of these factors elevated physical development in the cadet developmental process and set the conditions for final codification. As the strategic planners codified the *West Point Experience* in the late 1980's physical development had propelled itself through its evolution and the awareness of the importance of physical fitness on the battlefield, to the level of significance equivalent to academic, military, and moral-ethical development. As such, it became a codified pillar in West Point's leader development model known as The *West Point Experience*. "When the Superintendent briefs the *West Point Experience* and physical development is flashed up on the screen side by side with academic and military development, you better believe it makes a difference...it provides credence and gives the program credibility."⁴³ Hence, its codification makes it now an integral and undeniable process in the development of "Leaders of Character."

Military Academy. (New York: USMA Printing Office, 1967), 18.

⁴³ Maureen LeBoeuf, interview by John B. Richardson IV, 25 October 1999, Arvin Gymnasium, West Point, New York.



“The West Point Experience”



“Leader of Character”



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