

1919: MACARTHUR'S VISION OF
WEST POINT'S FUTURE WARRIORS

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On June 12, 1919, Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur slipped quietly into the command of the garrison in the Hudson Highlands, more commonly known as the United States Military Academy at West Point. He had chosen to forego the usual extravagant change of command ceremony and the Corps Review stating that, "They'll [the cadets] see me soon and often enough."¹ MacArthur was, at thirty-nine, one of the youngest superintendents in the history of the Academy. He was also the youngest brigadier general in the Army. His career had been exemplary, and his near legendary exploits on the battlefields of Europe in World War I were reflected by the two Distinguished Service Crosses and the seven Silver Stars that hung from the lapel of his uniform. In the search for a man of character and strength to rebuild the Academy, the Army Chief of Staff, General Peyton March, had, with good reason, looked to Douglas MacArthur.

The military academy that MacArthur had left as a young lieutenant was not the military academy to which he returned. The battlefields of the Meuse Argonne and St. Mihiel in France were not the only "battlefields" ravaged by the chaos of the Great War. During the war, the Academy that MacArthur so dearly loved struggled valiantly for a measure of sovereignty against a different form of invasion.

¹William A. Ganoe, MacArthur Close-Up (New York: Vantage Press, 1962) 25.

The halls of the War Department marked the "battlefields" of this struggle and the casualties, all of the Academy's upper classes and the four-year curriculum, were high. The result was tragic.

A significant repository of ages of tradition, the upper classmen, had graduated at a staggering pace leaving only untrained plebes to carry on the century-old legacy of the Corps. The question appeared to be how would the Academy now train the plebes and using what standard or model as a guide? Morale was also at an all time low. William Ganoe, the Adjutant at the Academy during this period, stated that "The Corps had died November first, 1918, ten days before the Armistice. Not even a miracle could bring it back to life. It had been as useless a death as the sacrifice of a babe fed into the burning mouth of Moloch. Instructors were glum. Tactical officers were sour. Professors were bitter. And the women were fulminating." ²

Into this swirling maelstrom of despair and emotional carnage stepped MacArthur. General March charged him to "revitalize and revamp the Academy." ³ He began to accomplish this task through a series of unprecedented reforms in military development that shook the Academy to its foundations. MacArthur forged his "blueprint" for these reforms, his vision and model of the future officer that West Point must produce, in the sweltering furnace of World

²Ibid. 20.

³D. Clayton James, The Years of MacArthur, 3 Vols, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970) 1: 261.

War I, where his experiences and combat baptism in blood taught him the horrible price brought about by the failures of unprepared leaders. This "blueprint" or vision of the future officer guided MacArthur's decisions and programs while he was the superintendent. Although many of his reforms would not prove entirely successful during his short tenure as the superintendent, his vision would serve as a bright light in the future by which later men, standing at the helm of the Academy, might mark their course.

MacArthur's experiences in World War I convinced him that the instruction at the Military Academy taught and encouraged obsolete methods of leadership. MacArthur believed that West Point had entrenched itself in tradition and had thus stagnated. He once said about the members of the Academic Board, "They have become set and smug. They deliver the same schedule year after year with the blessed unction that they have reached the zenith of education."⁴ Although MacArthur was referring specifically to the academic program, Gano suggests that it was characteristic of MacArthur's perception of the Academy in general.

War had become complex and had grown beyond the dimensions that could be fought by standing armies alone. The emerging way of war called for the mobilization and participation of entire societies and nations. The men who would lead these armies must, therefore, also be different. MacArthur's primary mission was to reorient the Academy's

⁴James 268.

instruction and military training such that it would produce leaders capable of fighting and winning the next war, not the last one. This became even more obvious in MacArthur's question, "How long are we going on preparing for the War of 1812?"⁵ He also posited in his first Superintendent's Annual Report; "the mission of West Point at once became the preparation of officer personnel for the next possible future war."⁶

In formulating his "blueprint" of the future officer, MacArthur sought to question what attributes these individuals would need to possess. This period of questioning is best reflected in his statement:

The problem which faced the authorities was, therefore, this: Have new conditions developed, have the lessons of the World War indicated that a changed type of officer was necessary in order to produce the maximum efficiency in the handling of men at arms? West Point... if a new era faces her, must of necessity train its personnel accordingly.

This statement demonstrates that MacArthur's World War I experiences had caused him to believe that the way in which men would wage future wars required the leadership of a new type of officer. MacArthur even stressed this point to the Board of Visitors, which wrote in its formal report,

The board desires to emphasize its strong approval of the splendid service

⁵Gano 30.

⁶United States Military Academy, Annual Report of the Superintendent, (West Point: USMA Printing Office, 1920).

⁷Douglas MacArthur, Duty, Honor, Country (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965) 28.

that General MacArthur and the officers associated with him are rendering to the country by constructing a new West Point, founded on the lessons of the World War, and in the spirit of Old West Point.⁸

Thus, MacArthur formed his picture of what the new officer must be like in order to meet these new challenges and based off of his lessons in World War I. MacArthur's statements describe this picture or "blueprint" of the future officer.

The rule of this war can but apply to that of the future. Improvisation will be the watchword. Such changed conditions will require a modification in type of the officer, a type possessing all of the cardinal military virtues of yore, but possessing an intimate understanding of his fellows, a comprehensive grasp of world and national affairs, and a liberalization of conception which amounts to a change in his psychology of command. This standard became the basis of the construction of the new West Point in the spirit of the Old West Point.⁹

MacArthur clearly articulated in this passage that his new model of the future type officer was the standard and would be the basis of the new West Point that he would create. He also stated in his initial superintendent's Annual Report that he intended to

introduce a new atmosphere of liberalization in doing away with provincialism, a substitute of subjective for objective discipline, a progressive increase of cadet responsibility tending to develop initiative and force of character rather

⁸MacArthur 32.

⁹Editors of the Army Times, The Banners and the Glory: The Story of General Douglas MacArthur, (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965) 52.

than automatic performance of stereotyped functions.¹⁰

MacArthur operationalized his broad vision of the future officer through programs that were intended to develop initiative and character and the other attributes that he felt were important. Many of these programs were successful while others tended to die out shortly after he left the Academy. Whether or not his programs survived in their entirety or not, however, was irrelevant. What was important was that MacArthur recognized, from his World War I experiences, the changing nature of war in the twentieth century and began the process of change in training officers capable of fighting these wars based on his vision. This understanding is demonstrated in MacArthur's statement:

Careful analysis yielded the following conclusions: Until the World War, armed conflicts between nations had been fought by a comparatively small fraction of the population involved....Early in the World War it was realized to the astonishment of both sides that the professional armies, upon which they had relied, were unable to bring the combat to a definite decision....War had become a phenomenon which truly involved the nation in arms....The great numbers involved made it impossible to apply the old rigid methods which had been so successful when battlelines were not so extensive....Such changed conditions will require a modification in the type of officer.¹¹

¹⁰MacArthur 29.

¹¹Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964) 79.

Based on his World War I experiences MacArthur intended to mold the training process at the Academy to his image and blueprint of the future officer.

In the military development of cadets he used several key areas to effect his reforms. Five of the most important areas in the dimension of military development were: tactical officers (Tacs), military training, athletics, privileges, and honor or moral ethical development.

MacArthur's vision saw men who led others by the sheer force of will and intellect combined with both the social and political skills necessary to meet the ever changing complexity of the world and the American soldier. These men would inspire confidence and trust in their subordinates through their personal actions. MacArthur wished "to develop initiative and force of character... and to deliver a product trained with a view to teaching, leading, and inspiring the modern citizen."¹² The old adage "deeds not words" would probably have appealed to MacArthur.

The Tactical Officer (Tac) became a central player in the development of the cadets under MacArthur's tenure. Prior to MacArthur, the Tacs had been relatively uninvolved with the cadets. "Hitherto, the Tactical Officer had been looked upon as a sort of master ogre... he knew the cadet mostly by form and face and regarded him as #7449." ¹³

¹²Ibid. 80.

¹³Ganoe 120.

Roger Nye, a noted West Point historian, supports this depiction of the cadets' perception of the Tactical Officer as "a terrifying disciplinarian who came to inspect and despoil."¹⁴

MacArthur's reforms were intended to give the Tacs much greater responsibilities and allow them to function more like "pseudo commanders." MacArthur, at the suggestion of the Commandant, COL Robert M. Danford, decided that the Tac should bear a closer resemblance to his field Army counterpart, the company commander. He felt that this would teach young cadets the proper relationship between a commander and his subordinates and let them see how an officer dealt with day-to-day problems and the discipline of a unit.¹⁵ To create this atmosphere, he immediately moved all of the Tacs' offices into the barracks with their cadets and established an orderly room for each company.

MacArthur also eliminated the old procedure of "skin lists," which enumerated the offenses that Tacs had written up on cadets, and the practice of trading written rebuttals, known as "bellyaches," between the Tac and the accused cadet to determine innocence or guilt.¹⁶ MacArthur reasoned that the Tac should deal with the accused cadets face-to-face. The Tac gave the cadet a chance to explain his actions. After hearing the cadet's explanation, the Tac determined

¹⁴Roger H. Nye, "The United States Military Academy in An Era of Educational Reform, 1900-1925," Diss., Columbia UP, 1968, 328.

¹⁵Ganoë 121.

¹⁶Ibid.

guilt or innocence and administered punishment if necessary. This method taught cadets how a company commander was expected to deal with his soldiers in an Army unit. It reinforced MacArthur's desire to create officers who could interact with subordinates on a more personal level. His statement in his Annual Report described this officer as "A type possessing... an intimate understanding of the mechanics of human feelings... and a liberalization of conception which amounts to a change in his psychology of command." 17

The position and purpose of the Tac slowly shifted from a ruthless disciplinarian to a mentor, advisor, and role model.¹⁸ MacArthur had infused into the Corps structure his belief in a more humanistic style of leadership, a style bred on the battlefields of Europe and reinforced by the blood of American soldiers.

The move of the Tacs to the barracks had a tremendous effect on the development of professionalism within the Corps. Today Tacs have their offices located within the company and have become the backbone of the Academy developmental process. Because of their close proximity to the cadets, they are much more effective in their role as a mentor, counselor, and role model. MacArthur's vision of incorporating them, when seen from this perspective, was both brilliant and overwhelmingly successful.

¹⁷Annual Report of the Superintendent 1920.

¹⁸Nye 314.

One of the most controversial reforms that MacArthur instituted while superintendent was his displacement of summer training from the time honored encampment at Fort Clinton to the Regular Army garrison at Camp Dix, New Jersey. MacArthur looked upon the military training at the Academy with great disdain. He believed that it was useless and entrenched in a pedagogical tradition that was incongruent with the changing order of the world and warfare.

The cadet summers consisted of an encampment of tents erected just east of Trophy Point on Fort Clinton. The typical day was a routine of parades and drill during the morning, followed by leisurely afternoons and formal hops in the evenings. Waiters served extravagant meals to the cadets in large tents. This environment has at times been labeled a "rich man's summer resort." MacArthur saw these activities and condemned them as "a ludicrous caricature of life in the field." ¹⁹

MacArthur's experiences in the Great War had taught him the terrible consequences of poor training and preparedness. In a plea to Congress for more funds for training and expansion MacArthur argued that preparation would "serve in future to lessen the tremendous expense and the loss of blood for which no money can repay when the unforeseen tragedy is upon us." ²⁰ He also related this sentiment to

¹⁹Ibid. 330.

²⁰MacArthur 78.

the War Department when he wrote, "lest a condition may ultimately result which will be paid for in the bitterness of American blood." 21

MacArthur transformed the gay summer days at Fort Clinton into demanding and realistic training with regular Army noncommissioned officers and soldiers, at Camp Dix. Here the cadets received instruction on the use of modern weaponry, participated in realistic field exercises, and generally learned what it was like to serve in the Army with soldiers.²²

All along, MacArthur's great vision stood dominant: to use the lessons of the Great War to shape the leaders who would fight the next war. The move to Camp Dix was no exception to this. MacArthur stated his intent when he said,

Consciously and unconsciously during their stay in the same cantonment with enlisted men of the Regular Army, they absorb a vast amount of useful knowledge of the soldiers whom they will later command. They gain in those qualities of self-confidence and assurance which are so valuable to efficient leadership. They learn more of human nature; they acquire understanding, sympathy, and tact. The entire experience both broadens and deepens their character.²³

There can be no doubt as to the clear and far sighted intentions of MacArthur in this matter. Unfortunately, this reform came to a temporary close for two reasons. The first

²¹Ibid. 111.

²²Annual Report of the Superintendent, 1920 10.

²³Ibid. 10.

was strictly a matter of money and resources. The Board of Visitors reported that it "regrets that the run down conditions of Camp Dix and its abandonment in the spring prevented sending the Corps there again this summer."²⁴

The second dealt with the arrival of MacArthur's successor, Brigadier General Fred W. Sladen. Since the summer of 1920 when MacArthur first moved the summer training, the greatest outcry had come from the officers and their wives stationed at the Academy.²⁵ They greatly missed the summer festivities at Fort Clinton. Therefore, it is of little surprise that this became an important issue with the new superintendent. Red Blaik later described these events in an article for the Assembly when he wrote "The resentment by the permanent staff was so great that shortly after MacArthur's departure, the first change made was the re-establishment of summer camp."²⁶ Sladen reversed the MacArthur initiative and returned summer training to Fort Clinton.

If this were the end of the story, then one would have to agree that MacArthur's vision in this aspect fell short and died out. The reform that he introduced, however, was later resurrected by other superintendents. The superintendent who followed Sladen, Major General Merch B.

²⁴United States Military Academy, Report of the Board of Visitors USMA, (West Point: USMA Printing Office, October 11, 1922) 10.

²⁵Earl Blaik, "A Cadet Under MacArthur," Assembly (23 Spring 1964): 8-11.

²⁶Ibid.

Stewart, stated that he agreed with MacArthur's reforms and intended to continue MacArthur's work. Stewart said of MacArthur, "Everything that MacArthur changed is coming back in full force. His principles and practices will be carried on and improved upon as time goes on. He was sound as a dollar."²⁷ General William D. Connor would also support MacArthur's reforms during his superintendency from 1932-1938 and would lay the groundwork for continued advancement along the vision that MacArthur had espoused in 1920.²⁸ Nonetheless, it would take a process of gradual and incremental change before the training at Fort Clinton would be permanently abandoned after World War II.

Even today, we can see the mark of MacArthur's vision in cadet military training. The summer training at Camp Buckner utilizes soldiers from elite units, such as the Special Forces, 82nd Airborne Division, and the 101st Air Assault Division, as instructors for the cadets. The training is conducted on field sites throughout the reservation.

Cadet Troop Leader Training (CTLT) is also a manifestation of Douglas MacArthur's vision. Although it is not entirely clear whether or not the development of CTLT was a direct result of MacArthur's initial training ventures at Camp Dix, it certainly demonstrates his farsightedness. CTLT is nothing more than an extension of MacArthur's

²⁷Ambrose 284; Gano 160.

²⁸Ibid. 284.

initial vision and rationale of training cadets to be officers by immersing them in Regular Army units. Despite the best efforts of several men of lesser vision, MacArthur's concept of officer development emerged in the long run as the best solution.

Athletics was another major area that MacArthur believed contributed immeasurably to the development of young officers. He often spoke of the poor physical condition of many of the officers and soldiers during the war and the influence this had on their performance on the battlefield.²⁹ MacArthur stated that he designed the athletic intramural program because

It was apparent from the experiences of the World War that a course of training should be planned not only to fit future officers physically for the rigors of military service, but also to qualify them as physical directors and instructors for their future commands... additionally, the war had shown the value of organized group athletics in creating and maintaining morale³⁰

He also wrote in his Annual Report that:

These advantages I conceive to be the coordination of mental and physical effort, an appreciation of the principle of cooperation, the development of hardihood and courage, and the inculcation of an aggressive spirit.... Nothing more quickly than competitive athletics brings out the qualities of leadership, quickness of decision, promptness of action, mental and muscular coordination, aggressiveness, and courage. And nothing so readily and

²⁹Ambrose 274.

³⁰MacArthur 81.

so firmly establishes that indefinable spirit of group interest and pride which we know as morale.³¹

The athletics program received wide acceptance and praise from the cadets and the Board of Visitors. Prior to MacArthur's assumption of command, athletics was purely a voluntary activity. The new program, however, required that every cadet participate in at least one of nine intramural sports for his company. The sports that were taught and practiced were football, baseball, basketball, soccer, lacrosse, track, tennis, golf, and hockey. In this way, MacArthur insured that cadets would gain an appreciation for physical fitness that would enable them to develop programs as young officers for their soldiers.

This contribution to the West Point experience can not be understated. Typical of MacArthur's seemingly uncanny ability to read the future face of war and determine the attributes needed by those who would wage war, he saw with great astuteness the relationship between physical fitness and combat readiness. Half a century later, the Army would sponsor numerous studies to determine the degree to which physical condition contributed to combat performance. True to the MacArthur vision, the results of such studies have conclusively shown that physical condition increases a soldiers' ability to handle the stress and rigors of combat.

MacArthur must have seen this when he had these words inscribed on the stone portals of the gymnasium: "Upon the

³¹United States Military Academy, Annual Report of the Superintendent, (West Point: USMA Printing Office, 1921) 12.

fields of friendly strife are sown the seeds that, upon other fields, on other days, will bear the fruits of victory."³² MacArthur's intramural program exists today and continues to contribute to the development of men and women capable of fighting a future war.

On numerous occasions MacArthur expressed the opinion that the officer of the future must possess attributes far different from those of the past. The changing nature of war and the grossly different conditions under which World War I was fought demanded a new type of officer. American officers were in foreign countries dealing with foreign officers as their allies. This required them to be well versed in their allies' customs and cultures and to be sensitive to the political, as well as, military implications of their actions or those of their command. In short,

such changed conditions will require a modification in the type of the officer, a type possessing all of the cardinal military virtues as of yore, but possessing an intimate understanding of the mechanics of human feelings, a comprehensive grasp of the world and national affairs, and a liberalization of conception which amounts to a change in his psychology of command. ³³

In order to broaden the cadets' perspective, MacArthur introduced another very controversial reform. He greatly increased the privileges of cadets in numerous ways. He allowed them to receive small amounts of money (\$5 a month)

³²MacArthur 82.

³³Annual Report of the Superintendent, 1920 11.

to spend. He granted them six-hour leaves away from the Academy. He established a first class club and allowed the first classmen to have greater interaction with officers. He allowed the three upper classes to elect class officers. In addition, he directed that cadets receive two newspapers daily to allow them to keep current on world and local affairs. He later expanded this by requiring the Economics and Government course to have the cadets discuss current events for the first fifteen minutes of their class. He even allowed the cadets to start a small newspaper called The Bray.

The motive for these new privileges was clear. MacArthur once again drew on his World War I experiences in his attempt to reform the Academy. He recalled that

some West Pointers in the occupation showed little knowledge of any fields beyond the military, yet the administration of the Rhineland required them to deal with political, economic, social, and psychological problems.³⁴

He felt this was directly attributable to West Point's monastic environment. He stated that

they had no opportunity to familiarize themselves with the mores and standards of people in the world without, so that when they graduated and mingled freely with their fellows, they had no common background of knowledge and awareness. They were thrust out into the world a man in age, but as experienced as a high school boy.³⁵

³⁴James 265.

³⁵MacArthur 81.

This sentiment was also espoused by the media. The New York Times stated that

We need less "pipeclay" and less seclusion at the Military Academy--in one word, more democracy. During their four years' term the cadets see about as little of the world as the inmates of a convent. When they graduate they know little of human nature, and the only men they have handled are themselves.³⁶

MacArthur thus felt that the increase in privileges would accomplish many beneficial objectives. It would permit greater individual growth and development, enable the cadet to stay in touch with the outside world, and serve as a means of relaxation from studies. MacArthur also articulated his intentions for the increased privileges when he stated:

I felt that this vacuum [cadets' lack of social interaction] could be filled by allowing certain privileges common to all higher institutions of learning. This would serve both as a relaxation from the rigid grind of study and training, and as a means of keeping in touch with life outside the walls of the institution. They were no longer to be walled up within the Academy limits, but were to be treated as responsible young men.³⁷

All of these things would result in a better, well-rounded, young officer who was capable of dealing with the problems of future wars.

Once again, MacArthur's successor, Brigadier General Sladen rescinded some of the innovations. He immediately

³⁶Ambrose 263.

³⁷Ibid. 81.

discontinued the policy of allowing the cadets to have newspapers and spending money. However, he expanded some of the first class privileges that MacArthur had introduced. He increased the six-hour leave to a twenty-four-hour leave and allowed the cadets to keep their publication, although The Bray was renamed the Pointer.³⁸

MacArthur's expansion of cadet privileges paved the way for even broader concessions in the future. In time all of his initial reforms were reinstated. The practice of having newspapers delivered to cadet rooms so that they could keep pace with world events was reinstated and continues today, as does the limited spending money. MacArthur's concept of a more mature, self-disciplined officer who was in touch with world, social, political, and economic affairs moved closer to reality. Thus,

As hard as Sladen tried to restore the old West Point, he could not. The windows had been opened, if only a little. Tradition had been challenged, ideas had been introduced, experiments had been tried. After Sladen's reactionary reign the superintendents who followed generally concurred in MacArthur's reforms, and the windows were gradually opened wider.³⁹

MacArthur's vision once again proved to be an accurate assessment over the long haul of the future officer the Army needed.

The last of the major reforms that MacArthur introduced was the formalization and codification of the Cadet Honor

³⁸Ambrose 285.

³⁹James 293.

Code. The Honor System at West Point began its existence at the Academy when Sylvanus Thayer established the principle that a cadet's word was always accepted and consequently that a cadet was always expected to tell the truth.⁴⁰

The cadets had maintained their concept of honor through informal systems, such as the Vigilance Committee. This committee took matters into its own hands whenever its members felt that someone had tarnished the honor of the Academy. An example of this is reflected in the events that occurred in 1871. Two plebes who had lied to the Commandant, Emory Upton, were taken by the First Classmen to the gates of the post. Here, the First Classmen forced the plebes to put on civilian clothing, gave them fifty dollars, and told them never to return to the Academy.⁴¹ Thus, although the cadets valued honor, the formal and legal system by which they might legitimately exercise their belief was not existent. MacArthur built upon this informal infrastructure by having key first classmen devise a program that he could officially adopt and apply throughout the Corps. This system evolved into a thirteen-member Honor Committee, comprising of first classmen representing each of the companies and the Corps staff.⁴²

MacArthur's views on honor could only be described as uncompromising. He felt that

⁴⁰Ambrose 279.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Nye 316.

The highest standards of honor were to be demanded as the only solid foundation for a military career--a code of individual conduct which would maintain the reputation and well-being of the whole--a personal responsibility to his mates, to his community, and above all to his country. In many businesses and professions the welfare of the individual is the chief object, but in the military profession the safety and honor of the state becomes paramount. In the final analysis of the West Point product, character is the most precious component.⁴³

MacArthur's time in France had taught him the importance of trust and honor. Throughout his tenure at the Academy and his career, his view would remain that honor was an inviolate aspect of the military officer's character. Those found wanting would receive no quarter nor compassion at the hands of Douglas MacArthur.

MacArthur's restoration of the Honor System remained in place following his departure and grew to become one of the most powerful organizations at the Academy. His vision of an Honor Code that would bind the moral character of a cadet to his career as an officer had been realized and remains a vital and fundamental part of cadet development at the Academy today.

The reforms that MacArthur made were visionary. His experiences in World War I provided him with tremendous and far reaching insights into the type of officer needed to fight future wars. MacArthur's intent upon assuming command of the Academy had been the reformation of the areas

⁴³MacArthur 80.

critical to the development of a future officer capable of winning the next war. Throughout his tenure, he had implemented his programs in accordance with his overall vision and "blueprint" of the future officer type. He was able to introduce reforms that sparked life into and resurrected an institution that had almost died in the fall of 1918. Despite the attempts of the permanent faculty and the following superintendent to nullify or eradicate the reforms, they managed to outlive both their adversaries and creator.

A leading authority on West Point's history, Stephen Ambrose, assessed MacArthur's contribution as a slow but steady movement towards acceptance. He stated that "Slowly his innovations would be restored, his ideas accepted. If Sylvanus Thayer dominated West Point in the nineteenth century, Douglas MacArthur dominated it in the twentieth. The chief difference was that Thayer had sixteen years in which to impose his personality and ideas, while MacArthur had but three." ⁴⁴

Although not all of MacArthur's reforms were left intact upon his departure, he had a significant effect on the Academy. Many of the programs that are in existence today are either a direct result of his reforms or are amazingly similar to those he created. But whether or not these programs are directly or indirectly the result of his

⁴⁴Stephen E. Ambrose, Duty, Honor, Country: A History of West Point, (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966) 283.

efforts is irrelevant. What is important is the considerable insight that he had into the development of future officers. His ability to see the changing nature of war in the twentieth century, as experienced in the muddy trenches of World War I, and draw from that a model, a "blueprint" of the future officer--stands as testament to the genius of his vision and the programs which it guided while he stood in command at the helm of the Academy.

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