



**UNITED
STATES
MILITARY
ACADEMY**

WEST POINT, NEW YORK

The 13th
Sol Feinstone Lecture

on

**THE
MEANING OF FREEDOM**

by

Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

4 October 1985

The United States Military Academy is pleased to sponsor an annual lecture series on the Meaning of Freedom. It is significant that this lecture program has been made possible by the generosity of the late Mr. Sol Feinstone, a dedicated American patriot whose commitment to the ideals of the American Revolution led him to devote many years of effort, as well as considerable personal resources to the collection of important letters, manuscripts, and books dealing with our heritage of freedom. His donation of these items to libraries and educational institutions insures that the message which they proclaim will be preserved and transmitted to future generations of Americans.

Mr. Feinstone's abiding faith in a brotherhood of free nations of men has found further expression in several lecture series which he has endowed in order to permit prominent Americans to interpret The Meaning of Freedom.

The U. S. Corps of Cadets and the staff and faculty of the Military Academy are pleased to recognize the generosity and loyalty of this great American for providing a living endowment in the defense of freedom.

THE POTESKIN PLACE*

A visitor to Panmunjom in Korea undergoes a succession of experiences. First one senses the tension unlike anything to be encountered on any of the other borders around the world between the Communist and non-Communist world. A Military Armistice Commission meets here. The fighting has stopped; the peace is still to come. Next one notices the tiny temporary buildings in which the Commission meets; little more than Quonset huts; the sort of thing put up to last out a three- or four-year war, but now in use for a third of a century. Then suddenly, looking up, out, something different. There, looming over the tin roof shacks is a massive white masonry palace put up by the North Koreans. It is hard to place architecturally. Late Stalinoid doesn't quite do, for there are slight oriental touches about the three doorways that intersperse twelve large windows along a second-story balcony. But any architectural interest is quickly displaced when one learns that the building, a full 34 meters long and 9 meters high, is 4 meters deep.

Off in the middle distance is a thriving village at the center of which is a flagpole some 160 meters tall. As the Washington Monument is a full 169 meters in height, we can safely say this is the tallest flagpole on earth, and the 15 by 30 meter red flag flying there may be safely assumed to be the largest of its kind. The village itself would accommodate hundreds of contented collective farmers, save for the problems we encounter at Panmunjom itself: the buildings are all facades; nobody lives there.

A visitor thinks immediately of the Potemkin Villages said to have been erected for the edification of Catherine the Great of Russia and the foreign ambassadors who accompanied her on a celebrated journey down the Dnepr River in 1787.*

Such a sight brings to mind not just the long history of deception, including at times self-deception, by which various despotic governments have sought to advance their causes, but also the difficulty which free peoples sometimes have in perceiving those deceptions.

*(Historians have quite rejected the theory of some massive hoax perpetrated by Prince Potemkin, the governor of the newly acquired southern territories through which the party traveled. It seems he did apply a touch of paint here and there, but the villages were not stage props carted downstream one after the other, nor were the villages' Lithuanians conscripted for the festivities, as was anonymously

*The 13th Sol Feinstone Lecture on "The Meaning of Freedom," presented at the United States Military Academy on October 4, 1985. Text is an edited version of the address. Copyright 1985 by D. P. Moynihan.

reported in the German press by the Saxon envoy von Helgig, whence the myth began. To the contrary, it appears the Czarist conquests were doing quite well. Only in contemporary Soviet satellites is the need for dissimulation total: brave and yet so pathetic.)

I have been in government for a long while now, long that is for someone who serves in appointive or elective office. I have served in the Cabinet or Subcabinet of four Presidents, have been an ambassador for my country on several occasions, and now serve in the Senate. And so I have been involved with American government during a long period when American power, the strength of the political idea of freedom, has been repeatedly tested.

I went to Washington with John F. Kennedy, which was a complex fate. Early on one was to experience the assertion of American ideals in the most stirring terms, and the ready acknowledgment that if ideals are of any consequence they must be defended, which is to say that American ideals required American power. Next, one learned just how serious were the limits on American power imposed by the growing strength of the Soviet Union. Finally, slowly and well past Kennedy's death, one learned in South East Asia something of the inherent limitations on American power which those very ideals impose.

I thought at the time, and think now, that this latter point impressed itself on the President as time passed. I believe he was referring to this almost paradoxical aspect of Democratic government in an address he made at Dublin Castle in Ireland in June, 1963, the last year of his life. Dublin castle, that symbol, if you like, of the tragedy no less than the honor of politics. In a particularly poignant passage he had this to say:

Democracy is a difficult kind of government. It requires the highest qualities of self-discipline, restraint, a willingness to make commitments and sacrifices for the general interest, and it also requires knowledge.

It is that last point I wish to dwell upon: Knowledge. Knowledge, and the various decisions or non-decisions, which led us, beginning with Kennedy, into the war in Indochina which proved the most serious setback we have probably ever encountered as a nation, at least since the British burned the capital. (Military correctness requires that I note that we had first burned what is now Toronto.)

I admit to a certain fatalism about the war at the time. My generation had reason to think of violence as a normal condition of life. I was in the Navy at age seventeen, and save for the nuclear bomb, would be long since dead on the beaches of Kyushu or some such bastion of the Japanese archipelago. Serving in the Johnson and Kennedy Administration I knew, without significant exception, the persons who made the initial decisions to enter the conflict and then to intensify it

to the point where a Presidency was lost, and of course much else. I followed their reasoning. North Vietnam was seen as the point of a lance firmly grasped by two comrades in arms, the Soviet Union and its militant loyal ally, the People's Republic of China.

A recent visit to China reminds me, however, that during the years of the greatest intensity of American involvement in the Vietnam war, resisting what we viewed as the coordinated expansion of three Communist nations along the Eastern rim of Asia, those very nations were practically at war with one another, and one of them was at the point of internal collapse.

This latter, of course, was China. In his masterful study *Vietnam: A History*, Stanley Karnow writes that "though American officials repeatedly portrayed Mao Tsetung as the guiding spirit behind the Communist aggression in Vietnam, Mao actually took a cautious approach to the war." He was preparing to launch his Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, what Karnow calls "his devastating purge of the Chinese Communist party," and needed his army to help him carry out the political campaign. A large war to the South would only weaken him at home. Further, the Chinese Communists were by now thoroughly estranged from the Russian Communists, and the military threat on Mao's northern and western borders was growing. (In 1966 the Soviets brought tactical nuclear weapons to support their growing deployments on the 4,150 mile border.) Adam Ulam records that in Moscow,

As early as February 1964 Politburo members Michael Suslov, speaking before the Central Committee, attacked the Chinese leaders and warned that "they would not refuse to improve States, but as yet do not see favorable circumstances for such an endeavor."²

According to Karnow, the Vietnamese later claimed that Mao "wanted to use them as proxies in a war that would . . . leave them too exhausted to resist Chinese dominaton."³

Pause a moment. Here it is 1964. Three Communist nations are already well advanced in venomous assessments of treachery by one another. Somehow the United States saw instead a human wave of ecstatic red soldiery waving ancient rifles on their united way South. It was as if we were looking at one of those giant billboards you could see in Canton, and like the palace at Panmunjom not realize, no matter how tall and how long, it was not even four inches deep.

For reality was so different. The Communists powers were absorbed with internal divisions within Communist world, and preoc-

cupied with efforts to manipulate one another. No American in the 1960s could fail to be impressed by the manic menace of Chinese pronouncements concerning the United States. But it now appears that it was the Soviets the Chinese were actually trying to influence! Thus Adam Ulam:

China's virulent anti-Americanism before the 1970s had been largely designed to bar any reconciliation between the USSR and the US⁴

It would appear that the Chinese opening to the United States came primarily from fear that the Brezhnev Doctrine would lead to a Soviet invasion. To this day visitors are shown about the fantastic Underground Cities in Beijing where the population was to go when the nuclear exchange began. Limited hostilities did indeed break out in March, 1969, described in the *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* as the "Zhenbao Island counter-attack in self defense . . . made by Chinese frontier guards . . ."⁵

In the meantime the Cultural Revolution had commenced. Pronouncements apart, it first appeared in the "West" in the form of flotillas of bodies, bound hand and foot, floating down the Pearl River into the South China Sea at Hong Kong. Not an everyday event: but somehow we could not interpret.

Simon Leys describes the Red Guards as an "anarchorevolutionary movement."⁶ Destruction reigned. Intellectuals were the primary target. Again I cite the *Selected Works* of Chairman Deng:

During the "Cultural Revolution," the Gang of four slandered the intellectuals as the "stinking Number Nine" – the ninth category after landlords, rich peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, Rightists, renegades, enemy agents and "capitalist roaders."

Universities were closed, high schools were closed. Faculties and Party officials – Deng Xiaoping – were sent en masse to the countryside to plant rice and slop pigs, with, again the *Selected Works*, "disastrous consequences."⁷ Evidently millions died. (A few years ago having remarked to Alexander Solzhenitsyn that few would have expected that the great literature of the 1960s would come out of Russia, I asked where he thought it would appear next. "In China," he replied, "in the 1990s." Which is to say when those who survived the '60s begin to write of their experiences.

There were successive stages. First the monster rallies in Tian'anmen Square in Beijing: a million youth brandishing the Little Red Book. Next the sanctioned slogan, "rebellion is Justified." Then, in the words of Joan L. Cohen and Jerome Alan Cohen in *China Today*, an "unprecedented assault" by Red Guard groups with the assistance of Lin Biao's army units on "Party organization at every level." A reign

of terror in the cities. On New Year's Day 1967 Mao urged the nation to a "general attack" on "monsters and demons anywhere in society." The Cohens write:

By the summer of 1967 China seemed to have reverted to the civil war and chaos that had debilitated her during the century prior to Communist rule.

Next the army under Lin Biao took over and at Mao's orders turned on the youthful revolutionaries they had turned loose in the first place. Then, evidently, Mao murdered Lin Biao, his named successor, and contrived a story of his attempted coup as a running dog of the Soviet revisionists.

And so it went: to the point I would suspect of simple exhaustion. I visited Beijing in 1975, about the last year of the convulsion, and as I write at the time, found nothing but "Stalinist art and Meiji manufacture." Although the break with the Vietnamese, Soviet allies, was complete by this time, it was not until 1979 that a shooting war would commence. I cite the *Selected Works* one last time: "The counter-attack in self-defense on Viet Nam was undertaken . . . to defend China's borders against the Vietnamese aggressors." As is well known, the Chinese forces were soundly licked.

I will refer only to an event of almost equal significance. By 1965 Indonesia, the fifth most populous country in the world, with the largest Communist party in a non-Communist nation had broken with the United States and its President Sukarno had got to proclaiming that a Peking-Djakarta axis would marshal the "emerging forces" of the new Afro-Asian nations. The *Encyclopedia Americana* states plainly that "During most of 1965 Indonesia seemed destined to become a Communist country."¹⁰ Thereafter the united Soviet-Chinese-Vietnamese forces driving down the Eastern perimeter of the Continent would join forces with a massive new Communist country, one pointing westerly and north towards India, such that the encirclement of the Eurasian land mass would proceed apace. This was not to be. To the contrary, an abortive Communist coup in September in 1965 led in turn to the overthrow of Sukarno, and the total destruction of the PKI, the Indonesian Communist Party. Upwards of 500,000 persons were massacred. Not a pretty event. But one surely that required notice, like those corpses floating down the Pearl River. But little seeming notice was taken.

I pose the question: How could it have happened that, in thinking about this part of the world, *these* developments were not central to our calculations. For they were not. From first to last, our foreign policy was premised on the unity and strength of three Communist powers which were neither unified nor strong. (During this period the profound internal weaknesses of the Soviet also began to be evident.)

Why did the evidence escape us?

There are those who, not without provocation, will ascribe America's blindness to rapturous accounts to carefully programmed visits of assorted literary folk. Well, this is a long-observed phenomenon. In *The Mill on the Floss*, written 125 years ago, George Eliot writes:

People who live at a distance are naturally less faulty than those immediately under our own eyes; and it seems superfluous, when we consider the remote geographical position of the Ethiopians, and how very little the Greeks had to do with them, to inquire further why Homer calls them "blameless."¹¹

Of course there are more depressing judgments that can be made about the affect this phenomenon has had on the reputation of successive totalitarian regimes during this century. It is powerful, but I believe it is also, usually, temporary. Moreover, the half life of the original rapture seems to me to be declining. The reports of prodigies of production, of poetry readings, of child care facilities taper off fairly fast now. When was the last time any youth showed up in Cuba to help with the sugar cane harvest? I would concede the current enthusiasm of the "sandalistas", as Western journalists have come to call their compatriots in Managua, two years at most. In any event, such propagandists have had, or so I think, but little influence on American foreign policy. In the main they are not read: they have not even been heard of.

Unsentimental people make American foreign policy. My concern is the degree to which they, we, are insensitive as well as unsentimental. Insensitive, that is, to political and social nuance of the sort a liberal education is designed to impart.

Consider. Even a casual reading of Orwell would have alerted the policy maker of 1966-76 to the type of totalitarian behavior on display in Mao's China. Recall from 1984, Emmanuel Goldstein's explanation in *The Theory and Practice of Oligarchical collectivism* that party members are expected to live "in a continuous frenzy of hatred of foreign enemies and internal traitors, . . ." ¹² Or for that matter, a mild acquaintance with the early history of the Soviet Union, especially the "war scare" of 1827 which Stalin contrived as a cover for the collectivization of agriculture, would have offered a suggestive parallel. Which is to say no more than that foreign policy in an era of the totalitarian states must take into account the possibilities of internal convulsion and chaos which simply do not exist in the democracies.

Which is but another instance of President Kennedy's proposition that above all Democratic government 'requires knowledge.' It requires a mastery of texts, a perception of nuance, the art of association

to a degree I think we have not ever before known simply because our adversaries are in all ways so distant and in some ways so new.

In the course of the Cultural Revolution Madame Mao suppressed all operas in China. Leaving, in Ley's words, "this artistic, subtle, opera-mad people . . . to the strict regime of . . . six feeble Punch and Judy shows, where the only "revolutionary" daring is to maneuver on stage, to the languorous saxaphonic Khachaturian-like music, platoons of the People's Liberation Army complete with banners and wooden rifles."¹³ Statesmen needed to take note. I believe, although I could scarcely claim certainty, that the vulgarization of art in totalitarian regimes marks a decline in societal energy; its re-emergence often a sign of revolt. No matter: *this is the world of politics also*. Until such concerns more deeply penetrate our political sensibilities I fear we will remain an uncompleted and, yes, imperilled nation.

Fair enough, the analysts will say. But supposing the magnitude of these events and their implications had been fully appreciated at the time, *ought* we to have behaved differently? *Would* we have behaved differently? I reply most emphatically yes, whilst allowing that a whole range of different responses might have been chosen. At one extreme we might simply have withdrawn from the mainland leaving Vietnam to Hanoi, and to border war with the Chinese and the Cambodians. (Would this have been any less honorable than the devastatingly cynical policy we arrived at eventually in which we asked of Hanoi only a "decent internal" between the time of our departure and their final takeover?) At the opposite extreme, betting that the Chinese would not intervene, we might have taken the war directly to the enemy in the North. Instead we sank into the protracted, low-level warfare which Orwell foresaw on a global scale, but which he quite understood could only be sustained by rigidly totalitarian regimes.

This manner of speculation can be interesting, but it is not in itself especially useful.

My concern is different, and applies to the present as well. Why *did* we? and do we still? have trouble perceiving events in the meaning of events in the long twilight struggle, to use President Kennedy's phrase, that engages us with totalitarian regimes around the world for the rest of this century and beyond?

I think of Dean Acheson, an exemplary Secretary of State, perhaps our greatest, and the way he had of making the obvious obvious. Here is a passage from his celebrated address at the National Press Club in Washington in January, 1950, when the nation was still reeling from the implications of the Communist triumph in China. He saw Chinese more than he saw Red and gave to his address the title: "Relations of the People of the United States and the Peoples of Asia," with the subtitle, "We Can Only Help Where We Are Wanted." Here is

the key passage.

. . . . I should like to suggest . . . that the Soviet Union is taking the four northern provinces of China is the single most significant, most important fact, in the relation of any foreign power with Asia.

What does that mean for us? It means something very, very significant. It means that nothing that we do and nothing that we say must be allowed to obscure the reality of this fact. All the efforts of propaganda will not be able to obscure it. The only thing that can obscure it is the folly of ill-conceived adventures on our part which easily could do so and I urge all who are thinking about these foolish adventures to remember that we must not seize the unenviable position which the Russians have carved out for themselves. We must not undertake to deflect from the Russians to ourselves the righteous anger and the wrath and the hatred of the Chinese people which must develop. It would be folly to deflect it to ourselves. We must take the position we have always taken that anyone who violates the integrity of China is the enemy of China and is acting contrary to our own interest. That, I suggest to you this afternoon, is the first and the greatest rule in regard to the formulation of American policy toward Asia.¹⁴

Now this is a classic perception of diplomacy: that nations that have different interests rarely combine in common enterprise. Still more rarely do they sacrifice themselves for others. Statemanship is the art of keeping adversaries divided, and most surely of never imagining that in some impossible circumstance they have combined. Had we thought no further, we would have avoided a lot of trouble in South Asia.

But we did "think" further. And that curiously is when we began to get in trouble. There is a rule of sorts that organizations in conflict become like one another. We associate it with the turn of the century German sociologist George Simmel who observed for example, that the Persians finally figured out that it was best to have Greeks fight Greeks. Somewhere after the 1960s the United States decided that with respect to the Cold War it was best to have ideologists fight ideologists.

The surest mark of this was the appearance of academics in foreign policy positions: rare then, now routine. An earlier version was to enlist fallen away Communists in various conservative causes; while more recently there has been a vogue in Washington for those whose early training was marxist but anti-Communist, or at least anti-Stalinist. All to the good, but up to a point.

The problem, or so it seems to me, sorts itself out somewhat as

follows. The Vietnam experience left us with an exaggerated sense of the universal nature of the communist threat. If my analysis is right, we ought early on in that conflict have perceived just how divided that "movement" is. Well we didn't, and so we began to seek answers elsewhere. As these explanations more and more derived from theoretical analysis of the nature of a kind of "ideal" type of antagonist, which is to say, a totalitarian regime performing at the peak of capacity, we began to be mesmerized by the presumptive strength of totalitarian symbols.

After a point, or so it seems to me, the size of that palace in Panmunjom, that flag pole, tends to overimpress us. This tendency was already evident in the 1960s. A senior official of the Johnson Administration said to me recently, defensively perhaps, but I think fairly, that by the time Mr. Johnson came to office his predecessors had created such a myth of invincible communism, especially among the policy elites of the time, that Johnson and his advisors could not break out of the conception no matter how many corpses floated down the Pearl River.

The problem is that failure in Indochina, not of arms but of policy, has led to emergence of a new elite disposition which seems to me to be something of a mirror to Goldstein's, (which is to say Orwell's) conception of maintaining a "continuous frenzy" over the threats we face in all corners of the world. There again Simmel's law: organizations in conflict becoming like one another. Observe please that I am not referring to the ridiculous proposition that over time we will see a convergence of the United States and the Soviet political and economic systems. If anything we become more differentiated, one from the other. But we are capable of emulating each others tactics and strategies. (Observe their ICBM force!) And we should be careful in doing so.

My principal concern is with balance. The wise diplomatist, like the victorious general, will make every effort to avoid understanding the strength of the adversary. That as much as anything is a frame of mind: audacity yes, if needed, but overconfidence never. The first principle of Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist of the 6th Century B.C. is "Know your enemy." It is required reading for Marine corps lieutenants, and ought to be for members of the National Security Staff! For the most difficult and pressing task is to know the enemy's weaknesses. That is how battles are won. That is how eras are won.

The true diplomatist, like the true general, while aware of his adversaries' strength is primarily concerned to find his weakness. The weakness of the totalitarian world are two-fold: First it is as much or more rent by ethnic conflict as the world in general, with the added difficulty that Marxist-Leninist doctrine predicted the disappearance of

ethnic conflict with the establishment of "socialist" regimes. Secondly, more importantly, it is a political form of government that cannot successfully exploit modern technology. Leninist governments are based on the greatest control of information by the smallest number of persons. This could be adapted to the production of steel. It cannot adapt to technology based on the diffusion of information. A year ago in Washington I asked an audience which I would describe as frenzy friendly: "How are you going to install home computers in a society that won't permit the publication of telephone directories?" My address was not a success, but I believe my question was fair, and I believe the answer is that you can't!

Mind managing the decline of these regimes will be a task requiring the uttermost discipline *and* knowledge. For as they come to sense they are doomed, they must become ever more dangerous. Some, Walter Laqueur suggests, including China, might evolve "toward some modern version of bureaucratic autocracy." The Soviets won't; dare not. "In the name of God on high," as Mr. Gorbachev recently put it, let us watch *them* with hawk-like alertness. But, it seems to me that true knowledge of the state of the world just now requires that we keep that Panmunjom Palace in mind also, and never for a moment neglect our own affairs which in the end will most determine the condition of freedom in the world.

FOOTNOTES:

- 1 Stanley Karnow, *Vietnam: A History* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), pp. 452-3.
- 2 Adam Ulam, *Dangerous Relations: The Soviet Union in World Politics, 1970-1972* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 34.
- 3 Karnow, p. 453.
- 4 Ulam, p. 46.
- 5 Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping* (Beijing: Foreign Languages press, 1984), p. 27.
- 6 Simon Leys, *Chinese Shadows* (New York: Penquin Books, 1978), p. 148.
- 7 Deng, p. 402.
- 8 Joan L. Cohen and Jerome Alan Cohen, *China Today: and Her Ancient Treasures*.
- 9 Deng, p. 406.
- 10 "Indonesia," *The Encyclopedia Americana*, 1983, Vol. 15, 93.
- 11 George Eliot, *The Mill on the Floss* (New York: Harper and Row, 1958), pp. 213-14.
- 12 George Orwell, *1984* (New York: Signet Classics, 1971). p. 171.
- 13 Leys, p. 143.
- 14 Dean Acheson, "Relations of the Peoples of the United States and the Peoples of Asia, We Can Only Help Where We are Wanted" delivered to the National Press Club, Washington, D.C. January 12, 1950.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR:

Daniel Patrick Moynihan is the senior United States Senator from New York. He was elected in 1976, and re-elected in 1982 with the largest majority in a mid-term race in the history of the Senate.

Senator Moynihan was previously a member of the Cabinet or sub-cabinet of Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Ford; the only person in American history to serve in four successive administrations. He was United States ambassador to India, 1973-75, and United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1975-76. In February, 1976, he was President of the United Nations Security Council. Earlier, he served on various diplomatic missions involving the Alliance for Progress, NATO, and the General agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

From 1955 to 1958 he was an aide to Governor Averell Harriman of New York.

He enlisted in the United States Navy in 1944, and was on active duty for three years, latterly as Gunnery Officer of the U.S.S. Quirinus. In 1966, he completed twenty years in the Naval Reserve and was retired.

At various times, Senator Moynihan has taught in the extension programs of Russell Sage College and the Cornell University School of Industrial Relations. He was an Assistant Professor of Government at Syracuse University, and Professor of Government at Harvard University. He was also Director of the Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard for the years 1966-69.

His early education was in the public and parochial schools of New York City. He graduated from Benjamin Franklin High School in East Harlem in 1943, and attended the City College of New York for a year before entering the Navy. He received his bachelor's degree (cum laude) from Tufts University in 1948, and his Ph.D. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1961.

He is the author, co-author, or editor, of twelve books. *Beyond the Melting Pot* (with Nathan Glazer), a study of the ethnic groups of New York City, won the Anlyfield-Wolf Award in Race Relations in 1963. His most recent work is *loyalties*. He is a member of the publication committee of *The Public Interest*, and, formerly of *The American Scholar*.

He is member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the American Philosophical Society. He has served as Vice Chairman and as a Member of the Board of Directors of the American Association for the Advancement of Science Advisory Committee. He is a Honorary Member of the American Institute of Architects.

He has received 51 honorary degrees, of which the most recent is Doctor of Strategic Intelligence, the first such degree granted by the Defense Intelligence College. In 1984, the State University of New York at Albany awarded Senator Moynihan a Medallion of the University, its highest award for public service, in recognition of Senator

Moynihan's "extraordinary public service and leadership in the field of education.

He has also received the Meritorious Service Award of the U.S. Department of Labor, 1965; the Arthur S. Flemming award as "an architect of the nation's program to eradicate poverty," 1965; the International League for Human Right Award, 1975; The John LaFarge Award for Interracial Justice, 1980; and in 1983 the First Hubert H. Humphrey Award by the American Political Science Association in recognition of notable public service by a political scientist."

He was born in Tulsa, Oklahoma, in 1927. In 1955, he married the former Elizabeth Brennan. They have three children, Timothy Patrick, born in Albany in 1956; Maurs Russell, born there in 1957; and John McCloskey, born in Syracuse in 1960. Their home is a farm near Pindars Corners in Delaware County, New York.

Mrs. Moynihan is a writer and lecturer, with special interests in archeology. She is author of the widely acclaimed volume *Paradise as a Garden: In Persia and Mughal India*.

Senator Moynihan is a member of the Senate Finance Committee, the Budget Committee, and the Committee on Environment and the Public Works. He is a member of the official U.S. Senate Observer Group to the arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. He is also a member of the Senate Democratic Policy Committee.

PAST FEINSTONE LECTURERS

- 1971 — General Harold K. Johnson
- 1975 — Rear Admiral Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr.
- 1976 — Herman Wouk
- 1977 — Sidney Hook
- 1978 — Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.
- 1979 — Barbara W. Tuckman
- 1980 — Alistair Cook
- 1980 — Isaac Bashevis Singer
- 1981 — Carl Sagan
- 1982 — George F. Will
- 1983 — Hanna H. Gray
- 1984 — Milton Friedman



Dr. Sol Feinstone, (1888-1980), Founder and First Director of the David Library of the American Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania, presenting to Major General J. B. Lampert, Superintendent, USMA, a gift of an original George Washington Letter (24 February, 1965).



SOL FEINSTONE'S CREDO

DEDICATED TO

The Judeo-Christian commitment of self-sacrifice for peace on earth, and the brotherhood of free nations of free men;

The Spirit of '76, a struggle of free men to remain free;

The immigrants who came after the revolution and helped build our country in freedom;

The underprivileged of all races who, by uplifting themselves, will raise all mankind to a higher humanity.

MY DEFINITION OF FREEDOM

In the beginning there was the void of sameness; the spark of life made everything different.

The stamp of sameness is the stamp of death.

Freedom to me means a social order based on individual freedom to live differently and to dream differently. I dream of a Brotherhood of Free Nations of Free Men.

Sol Feinstone

