



SPANISH GUN AT PUNTA GORDA, SANTIAGO DE CUBA. MORRO CASTLE IN THE DISTANCE.

# SERVICES OF THE GRADUATES IN THE WEST INDIES DURING THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE SUBSEQUENT OCCUPATION.

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CAVALRY PRIVATE, 1863.

FOR A PERIOD of thirty years following the civil war, the Military Academy went quietly on fulfilling the function of turning out educated soldiers. During this time it seemed as if the crucial test of war was never to be applied for determining in battle whether the process of training followed at the Academy was the best one.

With the exception of Indian wars and labor troubles, in which only a small part of the war machinery was employed, the usefulness of the graduates was manifested in, and their services were devoted to, the training of the Regular Army that was to form the

nucleus of the fighting forces for future wars.

War alone, however, can measure the results accomplished by the Academy, which has for its purpose the development of men ready to take up the task of war and to fit them as leaders of men in war.

Throughout these long years of peace there was no other incentive to perfect performance of duty than the fact that at some remote time there might come a day when this long and tedious preliminary training would make its full worth felt.

When war comes, it comes quickly and with little warning. Even the period of warning is one of action, and there is no further time for training or making up deficiencies by belated diligence. The best that can be done is to use the material available to the best advantage, and it is at this time that knowledge, capability, and familiarity with duties are of

double and treble value. We know how welcome a man of even the slightest military training is to the company of raw recruits. In the same proportion is a knowledge of the entire military art and an acquaintance with military matters acquired by daily contact of the greatest value at this time.

In the majority of professions the graduate is given an opportunity to test his powers and acquire knowledge by contact with the world and in competition with others. Deficiencies in the methods employed in the training in these professions can therefore be corrected from time to time and brought up to the standard of requirements by reference to the results achieved. In the profession of the soldier, how different! For thirty years the method of training, as devised by those in authority, was based on theory only, without seeing the results of their labor tested in the great mill of experience.

And finally the test comes, and comes with a rush. Everything must be done at a moment's notice. No opportunity now to review the work when coming before the judge, no consulting of books, or set of rules, nor is there time for reference to the experience of others. There is no model, and the circumstances are never the duplicates of former ones.

And as quickly as it comes, just as quickly is it over, and the opportunities have been but fleeting. If not grasped at the time they may not return for another generation. If seen and appreciated there still remains the action to be determined upon—and all at a moment's notice. To provide a correct training for such cases is the difficult task of the Academy. The execution which stands as a test of the training, is usually accompanied by the greatest excitement, by confusion, by trying circumstances, and often under the greatest personal hardships. To insure quick and correct action under these conditions requires that the training must be thorough and well laid out.

And how has the Academy performed this task as measured by the results achieved in the Cuban and Porto Rican campaigns? Can there be a more pleasant duty than answering this query by recording the successes that were achieved by our arms?

But while the successes achieved by the fighting line and the history made by it are conspicuous monuments to the greatness of the Military Academy and the thoroughness of its training, the work done in that campaign was not all that was accomplished. The Academy had prepared its pupils along other lines, and it was with equal credit that the pupils acquitted themselves in the duties connected with the war.

An army, to be ready for its practical duties in the field, must be organized, equipped, and prepared. For the small Regular Army this was an easy task, and all regiments that could be spared from their stations were mobilized in the south of the United States April 15, 1898. But in less than two weeks the Regular Army was increased from 26,000 to 61,000 men, and certain necessary changes in organization, long neglected by Congress, were authorized. This, even in time of peace, meant an enormous work, but that also was quickly and satisfactorily accomplished. Twenty-nine thousand recruits were chosen out of 127,000 applicants, and all the work was done by Regular officers.

But in the meantime other work and duties had arisen that devolved upon Regular officers. On April 22 Congress authorized the President to increase the Army by volunteers, and the first call, for 125,000, was issued the next day. Several hundred officers were detailed for the very important duties of mustering officers, quartermasters, and commissaries. The work of mustering-in these volunteers was expeditiously performed, as was also that of supplying them with camp and garrison equipage, clothing, etc., and sending them to camps of concentration established in various parts of the United States.

Another severe drain on the supply of officers of the Regular Army was in the shape of commissions given them by governors in State regiments. By act of Congress such details were limited to not more than one for each regiment. Not all of the regiments had such details, but the leaven introduced in this way worked wonders in those fortunate enough to secure the services of a Regular officer.

On May 25 the President issued the second call for volunteers—75,000. Besides the 200,000 in these two calls, three

regiments of cavalry and a volunteer brigade of engineers—three regiments—were authorized and organized, bringing the total to 223,000 men. In all these a small proportion of the officers were taken from the Regular Army, the total number of graduates so detailed being 61.

These, however, were by no means all the details made. For the large army of 278,000, composed of Regulars and Volunteers, a considerable number of general officers and a suitable staff had to be provided. For these details the Regular officers were specially fitted, and in consequence the greater number were selected from this class. Of the 26 major-generals commissioned, 19 were taken from the Regular Army and 7 from civil life; of these latter, all but one were graduates from West Point. One hundred and two brigadier-generals were appointed; of these, 66 were taken from the Regular Army and 36 appointed from civil life, and of these, 7 were graduates of West Point. Of the Regular Army officers serving in staff positions 161 were graduates, and 130 graduates were serving in the staff corps of the Regular Army; so that the Academy supplied about 325 general and staff officers out of its 1,800 graduates living at this time. Many more were serving in staff positions, but not holding appointments in any department.

The organization, supply, and equipment of this army, fifteen times as large as the regular force, was a large task, and its successful accomplishment is a great tribute to the officers of the Regular Army and to the Academy.

Great difficulties were, of course, encountered in procuring supplies of all sorts, there being no reserve or surplus of any kind. All of the articles of equipment needed were of army standard and special design, and but few establishments in the United States were equipped to meet the demand. The Government factories, workshops, and plants were inadequately equipped to supply the articles, and private concerns were not prepared to manufacture them.

Despite the difficulties encountered, the work progressed so rapidly and so satisfactorily that by the end of April the War Department commenced the preparation of three large armies. Active operations were begun within two weeks

after this, and in less than two months after the declaration of war these armies were on their way to foreign countries, separated from the United States by distances ranging from 100 to 7,000 miles, and from each other by half the circumference of the globe.

During this time the defenses of the United States proper had not been neglected, but, on the contrary, the advent of war was the signal for a truly wonderful activity in this respect. On March 9 Congress appropriated, by unanimous vote, \$50,000,000 for the purpose of national defense. Due to dilatory and grudging legislation, little had been accomplished before the war toward the execution of the perfected plan of coast defense, which would in the end require an expenditure of over \$100,000,000.

In the consummation of a plan on such a large scale time was, of course, a principal factor, but thirteen years had been allowed to pass since the formulation of the plan and Congress had appropriated less than one-fourth of the sum required for its completion. When war finally came upon the country the conditions were changed. Appropriations were made without stint, but time was lacking. Even with the belated aid and lack of time the Engineer and Ordnance departments achieved remarkable results and greatly improved the situation in regard to the defense of our coast line. The activity shown and the results accomplished are another source of pride to the Academy in the work accomplished by its graduates.

Thus, while part of the Army was preparing for active operations in the field the remainder of the officers were not idle, but each was at work and contributed his share of earnest effort, which brought about the very quick ending of the war.

The number of officers detailed for these various purposes seriously depleted the Regular regiments, especially as they were made at a time when the Regular Army had been more than doubled in size. No provision was made for filling the vacancies thus created by additional officers, and as a result there was a scarcity of officers with all regular commands, somewhat to the embarrassment of the Army.

This condition of affairs, no matter how much it was to be deplored, did not, however, cause any hesitation or check in the plans for the employment of that army. The greater army was in time concentrated at Tampa, Fla., and from there finally started out on its campaign to Santiago. Many plans of campaign were considered, and in some cases preparation for their execution had already commenced; but all were changed, owing to various causes. The principal factor at this time became the Spanish fleet, which had left the coast of Spain early in May and was steaming westward. Until this fleet could be located no plan contemplating an ocean voyage of the Army could be undertaken. All remained in uncertainty, therefore, until May 19, when the fleet was located in the harbor of Santiago. Whatever plans of campaign may have been considered practicable heretofore, no plan could be given a moment's thought after the location of the fleet that did not have Santiago de Cuba for its object.

The orders directing the Fifth Army Corps to proceed were sent on the 31st of May, and on June 7 the transports started down Tampa Bay. The intervening time had been one of much arduous and incessant labor on the part of all concerned. The loading of the transports in so short a time was one of the great achievements of the war, and the energy and ability of all officers were taxed to the utmost. To understand the difficulties of this important work it is only necessary to remember that the Army had not been mobilized in years. The problem was a new one in all respects, and Port Tampa was ill adapted for the handling of an army and its supplies. The selection of Port Tampa as the point of embarkation was largely due to unforeseen circumstances, which arose too late to enable the War Department to make any change in the plans.

The fleet of transports, though ready to sail, with most of them in the channel, had to be recalled on account of rumors of the Spanish fleet. These rumors were very vague, and afterwards it became known that they were unfounded. Still they could not be disregarded, for no one, however reckless, and no matter how great the necessity, could or would take the responsibility of ordering the fleet over seas where one or

more of the enemy's ships might be encountered. Circumstances like these, trivial as they may seem when viewed in the light of subsequent knowledge, make war an uncertain game and cause changes in the best-laid plans. They necessitate new arrangements and infinite work in preparing for them.

The fleet in this case had nothing to do but wait, but the week so lost was one of the most trying intervals in the entire campaign. If this time could have been utilized in additional preparation, its loss would not have been so severely felt. The fact that all transports had to be ready at an instant's notice prevented the accomplishment of anything of a definite character.

On June 14, when fear of hostile ships had been allayed, the welcome order to proceed was finally given, and the Army again started; this time not to turn back until all the work had been done, victories gained, and the pledge given to the world, that "Atrocities in Cuba must cease," had been fully and honorably redeemed.

The sea voyage was uneventful except for the loss of some of the lighters, thus further crippling the means for debarkation which had been secured at Tampa. Guantanamo Bay was reached in the morning of June 20, and would have been a splendid base of operations. The plan for the capture of Santiago and the Spanish fleet in the bay were, however, conceived on bolder lines, and the distance from Guantanamo was prohibitive. It was proposed to land the army within striking distance of the enemy and to attack the city and upper end of the bay by a direct movement. The absolute success of the operation and the celerity with which results followed is the best proof that the plan was the correct one. Daiquiri was accordingly selected as the point for landing the entire force, though a part was later landed at Siboney when that point was covered by our advance. On June 22 the hazardous movement commenced, and the same evening saw some 6,000 American troops on Cuban soil.

The assistance of the Navy was of inestimable benefit and expedited the movement greatly. It was cheerfully

given, thankfully received, and thoroughly appreciated and acknowledged.

This was the first of many occasions during the Spanish-American war, when the Navy and Army met and by mutual aid and good fellowship cemented the friendship that exists between the sister services to-day. Both derived benefit from the close intimacy brought about by the war.

June 20 saw all the troops disembarked, but much remained to be done in bringing provisions and ammunition ashore. The Army had to depend entirely upon its own resources brought in the ships, for the country was devastated and could not maintain even a small foraging party, to say nothing of a large army about to engage in a desperate struggle for every inch of ground to its front.

Active operations were not neglected during this period of preparation, for no sooner had the Army set foot on soil than it proceeded with the task on hand. Siboney is some 7 miles from Daiquiri, and about 12 from Santiago de Cuba, the final objective of the campaign. It was imperative to occupy Siboney, and this was successfully done on the morning of June 23, less than twenty-four hours after leaving the transports. With the occupation of Siboney a good defensive position was secured, and this also afforded an additional point of landing for troops and supplies, greatly facilitating that operation.

Siboney was occupied without resistance, the Spanish withdrawing to a position less than a mile and a half from it. Their vicinity was a menace to our forces, and it was determined on the night of June 23 to make a reconnoissance in force and drive the enemy to a safe distance. This precipitated the engagement of Las Guasimas on June 24, in which our troops were victorious.

#### CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

The prediction of military men that wars would be short and that great results would follow quickly was fully vindicated in this campaign. So was also the prediction that hereafter individual action would count for more and that future battles would be fought by the company commanders. After

the campaign many critics ignored this fact and the conditions resulting from the application of modern tactics and the introduction of modern weapons. This condition of affairs was clearly foreseen and attention called to it frequently. Once the plan of battle decided upon and the regiments placed, the fighting line has to shift for itself and the course of action is shaped entirely on individual initiative. As the action progresses, control by the higher commanders is steadily decreasing, passing from the division to the brigade commanders, then to the colonels, and finally, when the opposing troops engage, to the company commanders. It is on this account that we so often hear it said that the battles around Santiago were fought by the company commanders.

The first bloodshed and the actual contact of troops occurred at Las Guasimas on June 24. The Spaniards were posted in a position that menaced the advance of our forces and the movement to dislodge them was decided upon immediately.

There were two approaches from Siboney to the Spanish position, which was approximately at the junction of the two; one was the main road to Santiago, the other a mountain trail. A column was put on each road and the plan of attack was to deploy into one line about 900 yards from the enemy's position. This was successfully accomplished and the attack opened. The Spaniards had chosen an excellent position and were able to deliver a galling fire, but our force was finally successful. The loss was 1 officer and 15 enlisted men killed, and 6 officers and 46 enlisted men wounded of the 960 men engaged.

This engagement served a most useful purpose in driving the Spaniards from the line of our advance to Santiago. No further fighting was done until the armies came to actual combat on July 1, but the intervening time was not idly spent. Stores of ammunition, provisions, etc., had to be unloaded from the transports, this operation now being rendered entirely secure by the advanced position of our forces. Even while this was going on the Army was preparing for the struggle. Reconnoissances were undertaken, sketches of the ground were made, the enemy's position accurately located, and all the information obtainable was gathered and collated for the

information of the commander. Means of transportation were being unloaded, supplies and ammunition pushed forward, and in fact everything was done that could be done to provide for a successful campaign.

The final plan of attack was again shaped to a certain extent by the location of roads. Only one road was available for the advance from Sevilla, but to the north lay the main road from Guantanamo to Santiago. This road had to be occupied, and a strong column was sent out for that purpose. Furthermore, there was upon this road a stone fort and a good position at El Caney, which the Spaniards had occupied and strengthened. An advance of our force along the southern road upon San Juan Ridge was therefore endangered as long as El Caney remained in the hands of the Spaniards. On the right flank of the advancing force El Caney had to be taken first, and on that basis the plan of battle was determined upon on the afternoon of June 30. The attack on El Caney was to be made early in the morning of the next day, and as soon as that point was carried the force so employed was to move to the south and extend our line posted in front of San Juan Ridge.

The maneuver, though carried out as originally planned, took much more time than had been counted on, and instead of being a mere incident in the battle became the center of as fierce fighting as any along the line. El Caney was a position well chosen for its excellent natural defense, and had further been rendered more secure by blockhouses, rifle pits, and obstructions of barbed wire.

The stone fort, which afforded excellent cover, was the key to the position, and added much to the morale and resisting force of the defenders. It was reported at the time—and this information was afterwards verified—that there were only 500 Spaniards at El Caney. They gave an account of themselves that would have done credit to three times their number.

The deployment of our force, consisting of three brigades composed of nine regiments and a battery of four pieces, was made between 4 and 5 o'clock in the morning and the action opened at 6.30 a. m. From this time until 4 o'clock in the afternoon the battle raged.

The loss was severe on both sides. Practically all the defenders fell, only 40 being able to make their escape and only 140 being captured out of the total garrison of 520 men. On our side the losses were 4 officers and 77 enlisted men killed and 25 officers and 335 enlisted men wounded. This tells the tale of the fearful struggle as eloquently as words can do.

The victory was complete. The entire garrison was destroyed, the position occupied, and the right flank of the army was secure.

During the engagement it had become evident that the movement against El Caney instead of being a mere flank march had become a military problem in itself. Efforts were therefore made to recall the troops from action and join them with the others in the principal attack on San Juan Ridge. This recall was found to be entirely impracticable and the attempt was abandoned. The attack once entered upon had to run its course and could only be stopped when the decision had been reached. It was in favor of our arms, and the troops thus liberated could now be withdrawn and used elsewhere. Orders for this movement were issued on the night of July 1, and at 3 o'clock the next morning the tiresome march of 15 miles was commenced. It took until noon of that day to cover the distance, and at that time the forces finally reached the position assigned them in the original plan of battle.

#### SAN JUAN.

It had been the intention to await the rejoining of the forces sent to El Caney before the attack on San Juan Ridge was to be made.

As stated, however, the operation at El Caney was not a trivial one to be completed in an hour or two, but consumed the entire day.

Before the forces could rejoin it was noon of the second day. The failure to return earlier, however, did not delay the attack on San Juan Heights. The Spanish position here was well chosen and afforded the defenders every advantage to be gained by careful selection of ground. Rifle pits had been

constructed along the entire line in places that afforded a good view and a good field of fire. On San Juan Hill was a block-house that afforded an excellent rallying point and materially strengthened the Spanish lines. Kettle Hill was somewhat in advance of the general Spanish line and was consequently the first objective of the Americans. The San Juan River flows approximately north and south and in front of the Spanish position. This river was much swollen by recent rains and was difficult to cross. Daylight found our army prepared to make the attack; the signal for this was to be the sound of firing in the direction of El Caney. At 8 o'clock the fight at that point was well under way and the advance was accordingly commenced.

As at El Caney and Las Guasimas, nothing could check the impetuosity of the American advance. Kettle Hill was quickly and gallantly taken. This was about the noon hour, and the second and main line was still intact. Not for long, however, as the American troops were all formed and ready to storm San Juan Heights. This was also accomplished in a dashing manner and victory again crowned the efforts of the army. The Spaniards withdrew to a second position about 800 yards in rear of the first and in the outskirts of Santiago. In this position, which was a most formidable one, they delivered a galling fire upon our troops in the positions they had so gallantly captured.

It now became necessary to intrench, as a further advance was out of the question. The army was thoroughly exhausted and could stand no further exertions. The losses had been severe; 15 officers and 127 enlisted men were killed, and 69 officers and 945 enlisted men were wounded. There had to be rest for this weary army to gather itself for renewed effort. During the night as much as possible was done to intrench the position, and the next day saw somewhat better conditions. Another great comfort on this day was the arrival of the forces that had been engaged at El Caney.

With July 2 the heavy rains of the season set in. It was not enough to be engaged in a death grapple with a formidable foe, but the weather added its share to render the conditions of the army almost unbearable. It was as severe

a test as could be given, but the army was equal to it and acquitted itself in its usual exemplary manner. During this trying day firing was kept up incessantly, and during the night several attempts were made by the Spaniards to recapture their position. These were always repulsed with heavy losses.

July 3 dawned the darkest of any day during the war. The capture of Santiago had not been effected and the conditions were not promising. It even looked rather doubtful whether the problem could be solved. And now occurred something entirely unlooked for and unexpected that changed the aspect of affairs and brought a cheer from the throats of the worn-out soldiers. At 10 o'clock that morning the Spanish fleet sailed out of the harbor of Santiago, and was promptly met and utterly destroyed by the American fleet. The victory was a glorious one, and wrought a wonderful change in the condition of the army in the trenches. Cheer upon cheer went up from the soldiers when the news of the Navy's accomplishment reached them. It practically ended the Santiago campaign. Except for firing on the afternoon of July 10 and the forenoon of July 11, hostilities ceased on the morning of July 3. From this date to the day of capitulation, July 17, was a tedious and discouraging wait for the army. The position in the trenches was maintained throughout the two weeks of negotiation. It seemed as if the agreement for the capitulation would never be reached, and both armies were kept in a state of constant preparation to resume hostilities. Such an outcome was avoided, however, and on July 17 the capitulation of the province of Santiago went into effect.

For the present nothing remained to be done but take possession of the city and to accept the surrender. These ceremonies were conducted on the morning of the 17th and concluded with the raising of the Stars and Stripes on the Government Palace in Santiago de Cuba.

Even now it is hard to believe that only a month had elapsed since the start at Tampa until the campaign was over and the task assigned had been thoroughly and satisfactorily accomplished.

## OCCUPATION OF CUBA.

On July 16 the articles of capitulation were signed and the surrender of the division of Cuba became an accomplished fact. The task was well accomplished, but who can calculate correctly with circumstances in war and prepare to meet all contingencies? A new foe now made his appearance. The dreaded yellow fever had broken out, and on July 12, four days before the capitulation, 100 cases had appeared in camp. Here was an army exhausted by the campaign, reduced in condition by hardships and exposure undergone, with 75 per cent either subject to or recovering from malaria, ill-supplied at best, and now came the problem how to combat the dreaded yellow fever. There was only one course possible and that was to send those not affected by fever to the United States. Montauk Point was selected for the convalescent camp and everything done to prepare it for the returning heroes. On August 1 orders were issued to send back the cavalry division, and these orders were followed by instructions, sent August 3, providing for the repatriation of the entire Fifth Army Corps. Here again came work of a special character to be performed under discouraging and untoward circumstances. The expertness and fine training of the Army was again called upon to make up for deficiencies that could not be supplied because of lack of time. By the end of August the members of the Fifth Army Corps, or what was left of them, were again on United States soil, to be nursed back to strength, the regiments to be reorganized and prepared for further heavy tasks of which these troublous times seemed to have no end.

Cuba, however, was not left to itself, nor was the duty required of the Army accomplished with the withdrawal of the Fifth Corps. Work of a new kind now appeared for that new army which took the place of those who had done the fighting. In the mighty task of evolving order out of the chaos brought about by the defeat of the Spaniards in Cuba the Army justly claims the credit. A government had to be reared to take the place of the one overthrown, and for this duty the Army was well fitted, and applied itself

with its usual diligence and accomplished the usual far-reaching and great results.

Here was an entirely new field of action. Routine duty in time of peace does not touch upon civil administration; in fact army officers are ordinarily credited with knowing little or nothing of city and State government. But the work of the Military Academy has been well done, and no matter how unfamiliar the task or how new the duty it was taken up with the usual courage and handled with the same intelligence that has always characterized the work of our Army, no matter what it may have been.

The task of establishing a republican form of government for the entire island of Cuba was one attended by many difficulties and obstructions. There was a radical change not only in the form of government, but in every part of the administrative departments. The faults of the Spanish method are too well known to require enumeration, and these faults and the attending evils that had crept into the administration of affairs in Cuba had to be eradicated, tooth and nail.

What body of men could be found that could undertake this herculean task better than the officers of the Army? Trained in absolute accuracy, true to every trust imposed upon them, immaculate in their conception of honesty and straight dealing, tested and never found wanting, imbued in every fiber with sound judgment and absolutely correct appreciation of justice, the selection of this corps of officials could not be surpassed. The purpose was to remove the taint of maladministration under Spanish rule and to introduce a republican form of government, in its purest state, for the future example for the free Cuban people.

"Cuba," Congress declared, "should and by right ought to be a free and independent State," but how much more that meant than simply driving out the Spaniards can only now be appreciated when we look back upon the years of toil that followed the evacuation of the island.


When finally the United States withdrew from Cuba, it left the people not only released from the Spanish yoke, but also free in every sense of the word; the Government was

intact and running smoothly, the revenues were honestly and economically administered, police protection was provided for, sanitary protection—the one thing needed more than any other—developed nearly to perfection; in fact, provision had been made for every want.

#### PORTO RICAN CAMPAIGN.

Though not as important as the Santiago campaign, the expedition against Porto Rico was by no means an easy undertaking. It involved, in the first place, a sea voyage of 1,200 miles, a landing in a strange country, with the possibility of opposition by a hostile force, the establishment of a base, and then a campaign on foreign soil and in a tropical climate. There was the advantage that the campaign would be conducted in a friendly country, the Porto Ricans being tired of the irksome Spanish yoke and ready to welcome the liberating army of invasion. Porto Rico was a Spanish possession, and while it exercised no influence on the causes of the war yet as soon as war was declared the island became an objective as much as ever Cuba could be. From the very start, therefore, the general plan of the campaigns in the West Indies included an attack upon Porto Rico. Success would mean the crippling of Spanish power, and the quicker and harder the blows the sooner would Spain sue for peace and thus end the war.

Before the corps at Tampa was ready, preparations for the expedition to Porto Rico were well under way, but it was not until June 26 that the final instructions were issued from the War Department. It had been the intention to utilize all or a part of the Fifth Army Corps for this new expedition, as soon as it could be spared from the task at Santiago. Subsequently this was found to be impossible, for the appearance of yellow fever in the camps precluded their further journey or their intermingling with fresh troops from the United States. On July 8 the first part of the expedition sailed from Charleston, comprising between 3,000 and 4,000 men. This force went first to Guantanamo, Cuba, where it was expected that it might be needed as reenforcement for the Fifth Corps. On July 21, four days after the capitulation of Santiago, the



MORRO CASTLE, SAN JUAN DE PUERTO RICO.

expedition finally set sail. On July 20 and 24 additional forces of 3,500 and 2,900 set sail from Charleston and Tampa, respectively. It had been understood that the landing was to be made at Point Fajardo, but this was only a ruse to mislead the Spaniards, and it was decided to disembark the army in the harbor of Guanica. This movement was thoroughly successful, only very slight opposition being met with and the landing was made without loss. The harbor was a good one, with deep water close to the shore line and the operation of disembarkation was comparatively easy. An advance was immediately made on Ponce, and after a spirited skirmish the latter place was occupied and the American flag raised. This gave another point of landing, and the second and third expeditions were disembarked there July 28 and 30.

Yet another expedition left Newport News on July 28, and upon its arrival was directed to Arroyo, 45 miles east of Ponce. The arrival of this last fleet, August 3, gave a total force of 15,200 men. The time between the landing and August 8 was spent in preparation and in arrangements for the execution of the plan decided upon. In Cuba there had been a definite objective; here in Porto Rico it was different. While San Juan, the capital, was the ultimate objective, the entire island was to be included in the theater of operations, and columns were sent out in different directions to accomplish the overthrow of the Spanish military power. It was a comprehensive and well-devised scheme and would have quickly brought about the desired result.

The Spanish forces, driven out of Ponce and the surrounding territory, took up a strong position on the San Juan-Ponce Road at Coamo and Aibonito. It was necessary to dislodge these forces, and two columns were directed against them from Ponce. A third column coming from Arroyo was directed against Cayey, a small town in rear of Aibonito. Slight opposition to this latter column was developed at Guayamo, and again on the mountain road from the latter place to Cayey. Both places were quickly taken with the loss of only 12 wounded, and this column moved on the Spaniards, who had taken a strong position to guard Cayey. Here a turning

movement was in progress when the notification of the cessation of hostilities was received.

In the meantime the columns advancing on the main military road had come upon the enemy at Coamo, and by a successful flank movement had dislodged them there. The Spaniards then withdrew to the strong position at Aibonito, which had been rendered secure by intrenchments. Another flank movement was decided upon and this was well under way when it was stopped by the news of the signing of the protocol. The total casualties of this column were 2 men killed and 2 officers and 3 men wounded. Two other columns had started on August 8 to complete the overrunning of the entire island. One of these columns proceeded from Ponce approximately north toward Aricebo. The principal objective was reached by the mountain pass leading through Adjuntas and Utuado. The purpose of selecting this route was to cut off the retreat of the Spaniards from the vicinity of Mayaguez and Lares toward San Juan. Although no opposition was met, the progress of this column was impeded by bad roads and difficult mountain trails, and Utuado was reached only on August 12. The next day the news of peace stopped further advance.

The westernmost column was organized at Yauco and left that place on August 9, the entire force numbering 1,500 men. To the lot of this column fell the heaviest fighting on the island, but, as in other cases, they acquitted themselves well, and victory crowned every effort. The plan was to advance through San German to Mayaguez, then through Lares to Arecibo. San German was occupied on the morning of August 10, and here it was learned that the Spaniards had advanced from Mayaguez to the vicinity of Hormigueros to resist the American advance. The American column advanced immediately and engaged the enemy, who had the choice of position. This availed the Spaniards little, for by a skillful disposition of our forces they were compelled to withdraw with a heavy loss. The American loss was 2 enlisted men killed and 1 officer and 14 enlisted men wounded. On the morning of August 11 the Americans occupied Mayaguez. The pursuit of the retreating enemy was undertaken immediately, but it was not until August 12 that the opposing forces again

encountered each other. This was near Lares. Further operations of this column were suspended with the receipt of the news of the signing of the protocol.

This short résumé of the Porto Rican campaign gives an idea of the cleverness of the plan and the thoroughness with which the details were carried out. If its consummation had not been stopped by the signing of the protocol, there is no doubt but that the campaign in Porto Rico would have included many other victories for our arms.

About 120 graduates of the Military Academy took part in the campaign of Porto Rico, thus again giving the representatives of our alma mater a large share in the operations and affording another proof of the thoroughness of their training.


The protocol between the United States and Spain was signed on August 12 and no further hostilities took place. The treaty of Paris, which was not signed until February, 1899, finally restored friendly relations between the two countries. As a result of this treaty Porto Rico was turned over to the United States. The occupation of Porto Rico subsequent to the fighting and the installation of a republican form of government went on quickly, and the efforts of the Army in this work were crowned with success. Porto Rico is at present designated as one of the island possessions of the United States, and is tranquil and content. How completely and how thoroughly the work of the Army was accomplished in this task of reconstructing the government and institutions of Porto Rico can be assumed from the fact that no army of occupation is needed, but the island provides for its own security in every respect.

## THE SERVICES OF GRADUATES IN THE PHILIPPINES.

I. Military Operations, by Lieut. Edwin R. Stuart, Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army (U. S. Military Academy, 1896).—II. The Pacification of Batangas, by Capt. Herbert A. White, Eleventh Cavalry, U. S. Army (U. S. Military Academy, 1895).

NOTE BY THE EDITOR: The committee of the Academic Board in charge of the memorial volume has not been able to carry out its original plans with respect to this chapter. As early as March, 1902, an invitation to write the history of the services of the graduates in the Philippines was sent to an officer of high rank and competence who, unfortunately, felt obliged to decline it on account of his duties; and other invitations of the sort have been sent from time to time to five other officers, all of whom were likewise obliged to decline, with regret, on account of the pressure of official work. The dispatch of letters to the Philippines and to other stations, and the consequent delays, consumed many months, and ended in disappointment. The committee was so fortunate as to secure from Lieutenant Stuart an excellent résumé of the military operations in the islands, which is here printed. But the history would be incomplete without an adequate account of the splendid administrative work accomplished by the graduates in all parts of our new possessions. The story is most honorable to all concerned, and of absorbing interest. The Army was suddenly placed in positions of immense responsibility and charged with entirely new duties, among a people of foreign race, laws, language, religion, and manners. Nothing in its past experience had prepared it for the novel conditions, which required the highest degree of intelligence, courage, resourcefulness, and sympathy on the part of the new rulers. Officers in high command governed provinces as large as European states and supervised millions of people; young lieutenants just out of the gray jackets of the Academy were charged with the welfare of thousands in the barrios. In every case the new responsibilities were met with courage, intelligence, and good will; in a great proportion with real skill, insight, and sympathy. The instant needs of each moment were met and wise plans for the future developed. The plans devised by the military arm of the Government were, in due time, approved and accepted *without change* by Congress and became the policy of the country.

The whole history is admirably summarized in the following paragraph from an address by the Hon. Charles E. Magoon, of Nebraska, and is more fully given in General Orders, No. 66, series of 1902, here printed.



THE BATTLE NEAR SANTA ANA, FEBRUARY 5, 1899.

“An examination of the great work performed in the Philippines in the development of government, the promotion of commerce, the revival of industry, the establishment of schools, courts, and other means of promoting the peace of society and advancing the progress of civilization, reveals the remarkable and gratifying fact that the work was accomplished by exercising the military powers of the sovereignty of the United States. The Army, organized, trained, and equipped for the work of destruction, was made an instrument of construction. The enginery of war was utilized as an agency of peace. That which was fashioned to overthrow and expel one government was devoted to the purpose of erecting another. The war powers of this nation, which are outside the limitations of our laws and Constitution, knowing nothing of their restrictions, bound only by the discretion of the commander-in-chief and the practices of civilized warfare, were effectively used to construct out of and for an alien and recalcitrant, oriental people, ignorant of our form of government, and of the principles upon which it is founded, a government, incorporating and inculcating the principles and theories which have made the United States the foremost among the nations of the earth. So wisely, so justly, so efficiently were these war powers used in building up the government of the Philippines, that when the Congress of the United States was called upon to provide legislation for civil government in those islands, that honorable body was unable to discover any improvement upon the government created by executive action by exercise of the war powers, and adopted and approved said government in whole and in part, and ratified and confirmed its every act and policy.”

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 66. }

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,  
*Washington, July 4, 1902.*

The following has been received from the War Department:

WAR DEPARTMENT, *Washington, July 4, 1902.*

*To the Army of the United States:*

The President upon this anniversary of national independence wishes to express to the officers and enlisted men of the United States Army his deep appreciation of the service they have rendered to the country in the great and difficult undertakings which they have brought to a successful conclusion during the past year.

He thanks the officers and the enlisted men who have been maintaining order and carrying on the military government in Cuba, because they have faithfully given effect to the humane purposes of the American people. They have with sincere kindness helped the Cuban people to take all the successive steps necessary to the establishment of their own constitutional Government. During the time required for that process they have governed Cuba wisely, regarding justice and respecting individual liberty; have honestly collected and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people the revenues, amounting to over sixty millions of dollars; have carried out practical and thorough sanitary measures, greatly improving the health and lowering the death rate of the island. By patient, scientific research they have ascertained the causes of yellow fever, and by good administration have put an end to that most dreadful disease, which has long destroyed the lives and hindered the commercial prosperity of the Cubans. They have expedited justice and secured protection for the rights of the innocent, while they have cleansed the prisons and established sound discipline and healthful conditions for the punishment of the guilty. They have reestablished and renovated and put upon a substantial basis adequate hospitals and asylums for the care of the unfortunate. They have established a general system of free common schools throughout the island, in which over two hundred thousand children are in actual attendance. They have constructed great and necessary public works. They have gradually trained the Cubans themselves in all branches of administration, so that the new Government upon assuming power has begun its

work with an experienced force of Cuban civil-service employees competent to execute its orders. They have borne themselves with dignity and self-control, so that nearly four years of military occupation have passed unmarred by injury or insult to man or woman. They have transferred the government of Cuba to the Cuban people amid universal expressions of friendship and good will, and have left a record of ordered justice and liberty, of rapid improvement in material and moral conditions and progress in the art of government which reflects great credit upon the people of the United States.

The President thanks the officers and enlisted men of the army in the Philippines, both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and fortitude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which they have put down and ended the great insurrection which has raged throughout the archipelago against the lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United States. The task was peculiarly difficult and trying. They were required at first to overcome organized resistance of superior numbers, well equipped with modern arms of precision, entrenched in an unknown country of mountain defiles, jungles, and swamps, apparently capable of interminable defense. When this resistance had been overcome they were required to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush.

The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless of all obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal with problems of communication and transportation in a country without roads and frequently made impassable by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical heat and tropical disease. Widely scattered over a great archipelago, extending a thousand miles from north to south, the gravest responsibilities, involving the life or death of their commands, frequently devolved upon young and inexperienced officers beyond the reach of specific orders or advice.

Under all these adverse circumstances the army of the Philippines has accomplished its task rapidly and completely. In more than two thousand combats, great and small, within three years, it has exhibited unvarying courage and resolution. Utilizing the lessons of the Indian wars, it has relentlessly followed the guerrilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and jungle and crushed them. It has put an end to the vast system of intimidation and secret assassination by which the peaceful natives were prevented from taking a genuine part in government under American authority. It has captured or forced to surrender substantially all the leaders of the insurrection. It has submitted to no discouragement and halted at no obstacle. Its officers have shown high qualities of command, and its men have shown devotion and discipline. Its splendid virile energy has been accompanied by self-control, patience, and magnanimity. With surprisingly few individual exceptions, its course has been characterized by humanity and kindness to the prisoner and the non-combatant. With admirable good temper, sympathy, and loyalty to American ideals its commanding generals have joined with the civilian agents of the Government in healing the wounds of war and assuring to the people of the Philippines the blessings of peace and prosperity. Individual liberty, protection of personal rights, civil order, public instruction, and religious freedom have followed its footsteps. It has

added honor to the flag which it defended, and has justified increased confidence in the future of the American people, whose soldiers do not shrink from labor or death, yet love liberty and peace.

The President feels that he expresses the sentiments of all the loyal people of the United States in doing honor to the whole Army, which has joined in the performance and shares in the credit of these honorable services.

This General Order will be read aloud at parade in every military post on the 4th day of July, 1902, or on the first day after it shall have been received.

ELIHU ROOT, *Secretary of War.*

By command of Lieutenant-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN,

*Adjutant-General, Major-General, U. S. Army.*

The history of the pacification of the various provinces is yet to be written. We are fortunate in being able to present such a history for one of them. The work of Gen. Franklin Bell (U. S. M. A., 1878) was seconded by every officer in his command, graduate and non-graduate alike. The problem so magnificently solved by him was of the same nature as those presented to others in every province of our new dependency. When that history comes to be fully written it will reflect the highest credit upon all concerned in its solution.

# MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, 1898-1902.

By Lieutenant EDWIN R. STUART,

*Corps of Engineers, U. S. Army (U. S. Military Academy, 1896).*



CAVALRY PRIVATE, INDIAN  
CAMPAIGN, 1870.

AFTER the destruction of the Spanish ships on May 1, 1898, the city of Manila lay under the guns of the United States fleet. On the land side of the city was posted a hostile Filipino force equal in number to the garrison. The situation was hopeless for the Spanish. The presence of a sufficient number of United States troops to garrison the city was all that was necessary to force a surrender. Early in August the necessary troops arrived from the United States, and on August 13 the city was surrendered after a slight resistance to an attack of the troops supported by the fire of the fleet. The insurgents entered the city with our troops, and only after

two months of irritating negotiation, accompanied at times by threats of forcible expulsion, were they dispossessed. It is now known that even at this time the Filipinos were planning resistance to the authority of the United States in case the war with Spain should result in the occupation of the islands by the United States. Consequently the time that intervened between the surrender of Manila and the outbreak of hostilities with the insurgents was one of most exasperating tension, and caused the organization and transportation to Manila of additional forces. Upon their arrival the Eighth Army Corps was organized.



THE FIGHT AT ZAPOTE RIVER, JUNE 13, 1899.

The commanders were as follows:

Eighth Corps: Maj. Gen. E. S. Otis. First Division, Major-General Anderson: First Brigade, Brigadier-General King; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Ovenshine. Second Division: Major-General MacArthur; First Brigade, Brig. Gen. H. G. Otis; Second Brigade, Brigadier-General Hale. First Separate Brigade, Brig. Gen. M. P. Miller.

This organization was expanded in March, 1899, by the addition of one brigade under General Wheaton to the First Division, and one brigade under General Hall to the Second Division, formed of other troops from the United States. Hostilities with the insurgents were precipitated on the evening of February 4, 1899, by a picket firing on an insurgent who refused to halt. The firing was continued during the night, and the next morning our troops assumed the offensive and drove back the insurgents. The pumping station was occupied, and the capture of Caloocan on February 10 established the forces in a good position about Manila. General Miller's brigade, which had been sent to Iloilo, Panay, in December, now occupied that place. In a number of engagements in the vicinity of Manila the insurgents were defeated, and the provost guard kept the insurgents in the city in check.

Sufficient force was present for aggressive action. Manila, Cavite, and Iloilo were strongly held. The operations thenceforth consisted of expeditions or campaigns to effect the capture of some organized insurgent force, the occupation of some place where protection was desired, or the relief of Spanish garrisons, which by the terms of the treaty of peace were to be repatriated.

The first of these expeditions was commanded by General MacArthur, and comprised the brigades of Gens. H. G. Otis and Hale. This expedition was at first conducted with the object of capturing the insurgent force north of Manila, but the turning column had not cut off the retreat of the insurgents when they were driven northward by General Wheaton. The pursuit of the insurgents northward along the railroad was continued as far as San Fernando. Actions were fought at Calumpit and Balinag. The movement was assisted by an independent column of about 4,000 men,

under General Lawton, operating to the east of the railroad. The approach of the rainy season and the return of the State volunteers prevented further aggressive action at this time. Most of the conquered territory was held. Cebu, island of Cebu, and Bacolod, island of Negros, and Jolo, island of Jolo, were occupied at this time, but the garrisons were too small to accomplish anything beyond the occupation of the towns.

By the seizure of some gunboats the insurgents in Mindanao got possession of a considerable supply of arms and ammunition, rendering the relief of the Spanish garrison at Zamboanga by a small force impossible, and it was abandoned. The town was later captured by the Navy and garrisoned by troops drawn from Jolo.

The diminution of our forces by the return of the State volunteers enabled the insurgents to undertake aggressive action, and punitive expeditions were sent to Morong, under General Hall, and to the south of Manila, under General Lawton. Only minor operations were undertaken during July and August. In October the regiments of United States Volunteers began to arrive, and the force increased to a maximum of about 55,000 at the end of January, 1900.

The first aggressive action by the augmented force was begun about the middle of October, 1899. The plan was for General MacArthur to keep the insurgents occupied north of Manila while the insurgents could be surrounded by sending General Lawton to the east and north, then to swing westward and unite with a force under General Wheaton, which was to be landed at San Fabian, on the Gulf of Lingayen. These operations were delayed by various causes, and before the forces of Generals Lawton and Wheaton united Aguinaldo and his followers escaped to the northward. The insurgent army immediately disbanded, and the resistance from this period on consisted principally of guerrilla warfare. Generals Lawton and Wheaton began the pursuit of Aguinaldo, but did not succeed in capturing him. The United States troops soon overspread the entire northern end of Luzon.

General Wheaton was placed in command in northern

Luzon, and General Lawton returned to Manila. While leading a small expedition against Mateo General Lawton was killed in December. An expedition against the insurgents in southern Luzon was then undertaken. General Bates was placed in command, the two columns engaged in the operations being under Generals Wheaton and Schwan. The general plan and the results were similar to those in northern Luzon. The southern and southwestern parts of Luzon were then occupied.

An expedition under Gen. J. F. Bell was then sent to Camarines Province and later scattered garrisons over Mindanao. From this time forward no resistance requiring the concentration of large bodies of troops was encountered, and the force in the island was gradually scattered to better prosecute the work of police restraint, the repression of the *ladrones*, and the pursuit of small bands of insurgents.

Between January and June, 1901, the United States Volunteers returned to the United States and were replaced by a reduced number of Regular troops. The dissemination of the troops reached its greatest degree in March, 1901, when there were over 500 separate garrisons in the islands.

The effective resistance in the islands was entirely subdued by the close of the year 1900, and a further effective blow was struck at the insurgent power by the capture of Aguinaldo on March 23, 1901, by an expedition under General Funston, carried out with the assistance of native troops.

General MacArthur succeeded General Otis in command, and was in turn succeeded by General Chaffee. Under these two officers the work of stamping out the resistance of the insurgents has been effectively continued. Gradually the natives have been disarmed and civil government substituted for the military government, until quiet reigns in the archipelago with few exceptions, and these exceptions will soon cease to exist.

## THE PACIFICATION OF BATANGAS.

By Captain HERBERT A. WHITE,

*Eleventh United States Cavalry, U. S. Army (U. S. Military Academy, 1895).*

TO FULLY understand the question in all its phases, and particularly in those that show the need of the concentration system, it will be necessary to explain the methods which enabled the insurgents to keep up their warfare and also to explain the kind of warfare that it was. In submitting this explanation to the people of the United States I shall draw from captured insurrecto correspondence and papers that came into my office during active operations, and I shall also quote from declarations submitted to the provost-marshal of the brigade by the leading men of Batangas. After showing the means whereby the insurrecto officials raised the funds necessary to carry on the war and the readiness with which these calls for funds were responded to, this explanation will then show when and how the concentration system was started, its effect upon the natives to whom it was applied, and its result upon the war.

At the time General Bell assumed command of the Third Separate Brigade, about December 1, 1901, all provinces of the brigade, which included Batangas, Laguna, Tayabas, Cavite, and the island of Mandoro, as well as some adjoining provinces, were in a state of insurrection under the chief, Miguel Malvar. In a wordy declaration after the capture of Aguinaldo Malvar declared himself jefe-superior April 19, 1901, and as such was recognized by other chiefs and by the Hongkong junta, which organization, on receipt of Malvar's declaration, put out, on May 31, 1901, a large placard with

the headlines "Malvar no se Rinde"—Malvar does not surrender.

Malvar on April 28, 1901, issued a general order, called "General Dispositions and Instructions," that were to be followed in Luzon and in the other islands under his command. This was the first of a series of such general orders that was issued by him from April 28, 1901, to December 19, 1901. The second of these General Dispositions and Instructions, dated June 25, 1901, deals largely with the means of collecting money, supplies, and arms, and is given here in full as well as some extracts from the first order, issued April 28, 1901.

The American authorities were acquainted with these papers, copies of them having fallen into the hands of the military at different times, and the entire set, some of them the originals, was secured by Captain Bamford when he captured General Noriel and came so near getting Malvar, on March 23, 1902, as to secure his papers and personal effects.

In the First General Disposition we find the following:

Chiefs of zones or provinces are empowered to accept monthly as an ordinary war contribution 70 cents from each man and 30 cents from each woman, which contributions will not affect the extraordinary contributions which are required by abnormal circumstances.

The Second General Disposition is as follows:

In order to cover the losses produced by the continued desertions from this time on in any pueblo not having an organized force of our army, the citizen who is able to get together from 8 to 10 rifles to fight the enemy will be considered a second lieutenant of infantry; 11 to 24 rifles, first lieutenant; 25 to 49 rifles, captain; 50 to 99 rifles, major; without other requisites than that of notifying these headquarters. These organizations will be governed by dispositions and instructions of the headquarters. All appointments heretofore made by Señor Aguinaldo and from these headquarters are confirmed, even when the number of rifles does not correspond to the above category.

The officer who shows the most prestige and sympathy in his zone or province and shows the most intelligent activity, energy, and honor, will be commander of the same.

In addition to the ordinary contributions to the war in coin, the military administrator will collect 10 per cent of the crops for the army and national defense, collecting by force if necessary.

The priests will contribute \$1.50 monthly for every thousand souls under their charge. No one will be allowed to marry without having contributed one or more rifles, according to his position and fortune.

Anyone turning over arms to the enemy after July 10, in addition to being considered a traitor, will be obliged to turn over the number of arms he has surrendered, and if he can not do this, \$250 will be collected for every rifle surrendered; and in case of insolvency his lands or property will pass into the hands of the military administrator and will be used for the purchase of new arms and for the assistance of the widows, parents, and sons of our soldiers killed in the defense of the country, or wounded in the same.

In addition to these, extraordinary contributions were levied for the national defense, and many of the subordinate chiefs levied contributions to supply their immediate needs and those of their soldiers. These taxes were collected by "pangolas," (tax collectors) in each barrio, a barrio being something like our township, only much smaller in area. These pangolas were required to return a certain sum, depending upon the wealth and number of people in their barrios.

Forced enlistments were also made, though an individual was exempted from military service on the payment of an amount varying from 10 to 20 pesos. Licenses were also issued, even in towns where troops were stationed, and the cockpits were regular contributors to the *insurrecto* fund. A tax was also levied on the officials of the *pueblos* and the provinces, and an official often found himself in sore straits, having to furnish a goodly portion of his salary to the *insurrectos*.<sup>a</sup>

This system of taxation was in full operation on December 1, 1901, and was being forced in every town, not excepting the towns where military government under the American troops was established.

When Malvar surrendered he was required to report every morning at the office of the brigade provost-marshal (Captain Boughton), where questions were continually coming up that he could answer better than anyone else. The first morning I took from him a statement regarding affairs in the Third Brigade, and also in all the territory commanded by him. He

<sup>a</sup>See extracts from the declaration of Pedro Pastor, given later.

gave me the following information respecting his system of conducting the war.

He had, during the latter part of 1901, 2,500 effective guns. This would imply 2,500 soldiers actually armed with guns. According to the insurgent method, one additional man armed with a bolo accompanied each rifleman to take the rifle in case the rifleman was wounded.<sup>a</sup> This would imply 5,000 men actually in the field belonging to the regular force. In addition each barrio had a company of bolomen, varying from 10 men upward, armed with bolos; and every able-bodied man above the age of 16 not thus employed was classed among the reserves and was liable to be ordered out at any moment.

The theater of war was divided into zones, corresponding somewhat to our departments or brigades, or,ly very much smaller, and over each zone was a general or colonel, and in some cases a lieutenant-colonel. The following are the zones actually under Malvar and the commanders who worked under his orders:

Zone.	Commander.	Rank.
Oriental Batangas .....	Casala .....	Colonel.
Occidental Batangas .....	Marsigan .....	Lieutenant-colonel.
Lipa and Binan .....	Gonzales .....	General.
Laguna .....	Caballes .....	Colonel.
Morong .....	Asuncion .....	Do.
Oriental Tayabas .....	Marques .....	Do.
Occidental Tayabas .....	Mayo .....	Lieutenant-colonel.
Alaminos, Bay, Calauang .....	Ramos .....	Colonel.
Mindora .....	Atienza .....	Do.
Department of the South .....	Lucban .....	General.
Visayan Islands .....	Maxilom .....	Do.
Cavite .....	Noriel .....	Do.
Infanta .....	Ascarraga .....	Do.

These commanders probably never had more than 250 to 300 men in one place at any one time, but were simply carrying on guerrilla warfare. In General Dispositions, No. 1, Malvar ordered that engagements be abstained from until there was notice of a general movement. They realized the correctness

<sup>a</sup> The writer found this system carried out in a small engagement he had with the insurgents in Tayabas during February, 1902.

of Pedro Pastor's advice and acted upon it; that regular battle should never be given the Americans, because they would always conquer and annihilate the insurgents. They never made an attack unless they occupied superior advantages as regards position, and they never engaged in an open fight.

Moreover, the men we fought to-day would probably be the amigos in the streets to-morrow, their guns and bolos hidden, and they themselves back in town until again called out by their chiefs. Should the Americans come upon an insurrecto, unless caught red-handed with a gun in his hand, he would plead that he was a friend and was simply working in the fields or else passing to market, or one and all of a thousand specious lies invented to deceive the Americans.

I quote quite freely from the confession of the presidente of Batangas, Jose Villaneuva, one of the ablest Filipinos in the islands, and also from the confession of Pedro Pastor, clerk of the court of the first instance for the seventh judicial district. They are but samples of what was being done continually throughout the brigade. The provost-marshal's desk is full of similar ones from the leading men of Batangas, and the provost judges of other towns have received the like from the leading men of their sections. A collection of them would make a large book and one scarcely to be equaled in the tales of treachery and deceit that surrounded the American troops during their entire stay in the islands, and made success impossible in any system of warfare except the concentration system, which cut off supplies and contributions formerly enforced by the insurgents.

*[Extract from the declaration of Villaneuva, who was presidente of Batangas under the insurgent government.]*

Before the entrance of the Americans, the Filipino military men requested all the arms and ammunition of the police, and also the members of the force. I had charge of only one corporal and four or five guards for the transmission of messages. After the entrance of the Americans (into Batangas), I sent these police with a letter to the military commander consenting that they enter the service of the insurgents, and if they did not they could leave their guns in the mountains where Colonel Rillo was stationed.<sup>a</sup> A Mauser rifle, my property, was given

<sup>a</sup> Colonel Rillo at this time was chief of the oriental zone of Batangas; he died shortly afterwards and was succeeded by Casala.

to the corporal, who had stayed by my side till the entrance of the Americans. Another gun, a carbine which I had in trust for Father Jacinto, curé of the city, was afterwards lost in a deep fissure in the mountains.

From the time of my surrender to Colonel Anderson I was sometimes in an anomalous condition, as in the meantime other presidentes of some cities continued in their office or with the military, but I considered I was without authority and fit only for agriculture. Many citizens, notwithstanding, recognized me yet as before, and also some cabezas (heads of barrios) came to me for consultation.

I received an order from Colonel Rillo, convoking a great conference and ordering me to attend. I went to the said conference, in the mountains in the vicinity of the barrio of San Miguel, and there met Señor Rillo, who did not wish or care to leave his hiding place, and only took office to preside at the meeting, to determine, if I do not forget, the form of collecting contributions for a war fund.<sup>a</sup> In all there was much said to the people, which tended to reunite their respect for property, fraternity, and constancy in their work, as there had been many excesses committed on this class. It was agreed to collect from the citizens a contribution equal to the cedula tax in the time of the Spaniards.

In one of the conferences which I attended I turned over to Captain Nicomedes 70 pesos which came, as I remember, from a local fund which was in charge of Pedro Pastor.

I returned to live in the fields to avoid being though an Americanist, because at that time the papers were beginning to speak of these as well qualified for laudable assassination.

Some time after this, one or two months, I received a communication from Crisanto Borrueal, major of insurgents, requesting that the cabeza of the barrio of either Tinga or San Pedro, I do not now remember which, should be displaced on account of poor services. I answered conforming to this in everything, as I did not feel able to tell them that I would have nothing to do with them. About this time I received an order for money to the value of 20 pesos, as I remember, but I gave only 15 pesos and about a month later I received another order to which I replied by giving 8 pesos.

In March, which is the month for harvesting sugar cane, I received notice about an order from General Malvar requesting sugar by way of contribution for the troops from all owners of sugar mills. My father then prepared under my orders a pair of kerosene oil cans full for this contribution, and unquestionably it was given, though I never received a receipt.

In April or May of the same year, 1900, the lieutenant of the barrio collected a contribution of palay (rice in the husk). I sent 5 pesos in place of palay and my father sent two cavans of rice.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup>This was before Malvar assumed command.

<sup>b</sup>A cavan is about 140 pounds.

In June of the same year I went to Manila to procure a new stock for my drug store in this city. This had hardly been well established to advantage when I received a message from the insurgents requesting a long list of medicines, signed, if I remember correctly, by Colonel Casala or by Major Cantos. This I concluded to be a bad beginning for my business. If the whole list had been filled it would have cost 50 or 60 pesos, but making the excuse that I did not have many of the articles which figured in the list I gave only antipyrine, quinine, iodoform, and other medicaments of common use, to the value of 20 to 24 pesos. When later they sent to me requesting saltpeter and sulphur for the manufacture of powder I considered it serious indeed, for these things were considered contraband of war. I could freely give medicaments, morally from a humanitarian standpoint, but in this I could not oblige them, giving the excuse that I had hardly one hundred grams of saltpeter. This drug is but little used in pharmacy, and on account of the state of war was prohibited from being sold in large quantities in Manila.

In the month of February, 1901, I was greatly surprised at being elected president of the Federal party. Though at another time I would covet this exceedingly, yet I could not incur the hate of the insurgents toward the Federals. At last I decided to accept the presidency, and to insure my personal safety on my farm, where there were no guards, I took the remedy of writing to Colonel Casala asking permission to accept this, and if not given, for him to come and capture me, so that I could be away from the party. Excessive congratulations were in his answer, which was in effect an order that I should continue as president of the Federal party.

Some time in the fall of 1901 I received a package of copies of letters of the revolutionary committee of Hongkong, signed by Galicano Apacible. In these letters General Malvar was much applauded. The capture of Aguinaldo was much lamented, and also the surrender of many generals at the same time, which tended much to reduce the patriotism of the Filipinos. Yet Malvar was above all this, and in him the committee congratulated themselves that they still had a native land if he did not surrender.

[*Extract from the declaration of Pedro Pastor, then municipal secretary, but now clerk of the court of first instance for the seventh judicial district.*]

In the time of Colonel Rillo, when the Americans entered the city—Tuesday, January 16, 1900, at 9 o'clock, a. m.—I was tax collector of this district, and the money in the local treasury of the city under my authority, collected from December 31, 1899, when I rendered my last account to the provincial treasurer, was about 150 pesos. This was taken from me by an American lieutenant who stopped me inside the town as I was proceeding on horseback to take this money to the insurgents. In my building in the barrio of Mahabangdahilig, Batangas,

there was deposited some money of the provincial treasury, which I think amounted to about 600 pesos. I took this money from the place two or three days after the entrance of the Americans and turned it over to the insurgent tax collector.

Beginning in the month of February and continuing to the end of April I accepted the accounts of all the municipal officers to the amount of 200 pesos and turned it all over to Colonel Rillo.

Beginning about January 14, 1900, I charged a tax of 1 peseta (20 cents Mexican) on every document, credentials of ownership, and transfers of stock, until the actual establishment of the municipality on May 22, and this fund was used to purchase articles for Colonel Rillo and Colonel Casala.

I maintained written and verbal correspondence under the assumed name of "Sinapaloc" with Rillo, who used the name "Loray," with Nicomedes Yrineo, who signed "Dimas-Upil," and with Casala, alias "Lasac," sending them papers, and also told them never to attack the city as they could not be victorious and to content themselves with a guerrilla warfare, existing on the American ammunition and rations, and to be careful and not let any misfortune overtake their persons, to hide well so as not to be captured, and to prolong the war for an indefinite period, because only by endurance could the nationalist cause hope to triumph.

To the above-mentioned chiefs I took contributions in money of which I do not know the exact amount, but which did not exceed 200 pesos, and 40 cavans of palay, for the months of February and March, 1900. Later to the company of Yrineo I sent 20 pesos in money and medicines to the value of 17 pesos.

Martin Cabrera (colonel and predecessor of Marasigan as chief of the occidental zone of Batangas) asked me for rice for his soldiers at Taal, but I did not send him any, replying that I had sent 300 pesos to the government of Malolos before the breaking out of hostilities. Ramon Atienza at Taal wrote me and asked for contributions on three different occasions before he went to take command in Mindoro. The first time I sent him 20 pesos, the second time 10 pesos, and the third 5 pesos, all in bank notes.

During the sugar season of this year I sent the insurgents two ollas of sugar from each of my sugar mills.<sup>a</sup>

On December 24, 1900, Manuel Scarella, captain, asked me for a pair of patent-leather shoes as a Christmas present. I did not answer, but I sent to the camp 10 pesos for the poor soldiers.

In January and February, 1901, I sent to Casala 7 pesos with a letter requesting that Bernardo Andal be exempted from service as a soldier, as he had but recently married. In the same months I also sent Casala 25

<sup>a</sup> An olla is about 100 pounds.

pesos, requesting the exemption from service of an agent of my uncle, which request was granted. Later I sent Soriano, captain, four large mats that he had requested, and also 200 pesos to Casala.

In June, 1901, I received notice from Casala that the third part of my salary as municipal secretary should be sent him, and I answered that on account of my money resources being almost exhausted in place of the third part of my pay I would give him 6 cavans of palay each month, and I suggested that he take it from my place in the barrio of San Augustin, Ibaan, and I give orders to my agent in the said barrio that he should always have 6 cavans of palay in readiness each month to be given when he should be shown the name "Lasac." Casala wrote me in October that on account of the difficulty in transportation he had not at that date gotten any palay, and he asked me to hold a proportionate amount in readiness for him in my place in the barrio of Mahabangdahilig, Batangas, and I accordingly gave orders to this effect in that barrio.

During all this time, from January, 1900, to November, 1901, I had frequent correspondence with the insurgents, both verbal and written. I had regular messengers in my house, and among other things I told the chiefs that regular battle should never be given the Americans, because they would always conquer and annihilate the insurgents. On two or three occasions I sent notice to the insurgents when an American expedition was to set out, to what place it was going, and for what purpose. At other times I gave data about the location of the Americans inside the city, for example, that there was one company in the convent, another in the house of Rameriz, another in the house of Genato, another in that of Felipe Borbon; and also their change in location in the city, and that they had their rations in the government building and their war munitions in the lower part of the convent.

At the risk of repetition let me again call the attention of the reader to the fact that the actions of these two men, the presidente and the secretary of the town, living in the town and supposed to be friendly to the Americans, are but examples of nearly every inhabitant of the Third Brigade at the time General Bell took command. The man who received the Americans with the greatest protestations of friendship was quite sure to be the worst spy in town. All that were met or seen were amigos of the Americans and had never done anything to help the insurgent cause. One of the stoutest to deny all accusations of correspondence with the insurgents was this very Pedro Pastor, who continued in his denials until confronted by Captain Boughton, the provost marshal, with undeniable proofs which were found in some

captured correspondence in spite of Pedro's excessive carefulness.

Men and squads of men without commission, without being part or portion of the regularly organized hostile army, without sharing continuously in the war, but with intermittent returns to their homes and avocations, and with frequent assumptions of the semblance of peaceful pursuits, divesting themselves of the character and appearance of soldiers, committed hostilities by fighting and making raids of various kinds, after which they concealed their arms and returned to their homes, posing as peaceful citizens, secretly and often openly living in the same towns with garrisons of our troops. They accepted local offices from the government and took the oath of allegiance solely for the purpose of improving their opportunities and facilities to deceive the Americans and to treacherously aid and assist the cause of the insurrection. In proof of these statements one has only to look at the convictions before military commissions of the crime of the violation of the oath of allegiance.

Should any one ask me why these men, in towns garrisoned by American troops, furnished this money and these supplies, I could answer in no better way than by quoting General Orders, No. 259, Headquarters Division of the Philippines, 1901, which fully explains the reason, and which has been hinted at above in Villeneuve's declaration.

GENERAL ORDERS, }  
No. 259. }

HEADQUARTERS  
DIVISION OF THE PHILIPPINES,  
*Manila, P. I., September 7, 1901.*

Before a military commission which convened at Binan, Laguna, was arraigned and tried Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, a native.

*Charge 1.*—Kidnapping.

Specification: In that he, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, did, in the pueblo of Binan, Province of Laguna, Luzon, P. I., then as now occupied by United States troops, at a time then as now of insurrection, in company with other natives, unlawfully, by force, and with intent to do bodily harm, kidnap and carry away Mateo Carabo, native.

This in the pueblo of Binan, Laguna Province, on or about July 8, 1900.

*Charge 2.*—Murder.

Specification: In that he, Euligio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, on or

about July 8, 1900, then as now a time of insurrection, at or near Binan, Province of Laguna, Luzon, P. I., a place then as now under the military government of the United States, did willfully, feloniously, and with malice aforethought, kill and murder one Mateo Carabo, native, by stabbing him, the said Mateo Carabo, inflicting thereby wounds whereof he, the said Mateo Carabo, then and there died.

*Plea.*—Not guilty.

*Finding.*—Guilty.

*Sentence.*—And the commission does therefore sentence him, Eulogio Alomia, alias Toyo, native, to confinement at hard labor, at such place as the reviewing authority may direct, for the period of thirty years.

In the foregoing case it appears that this accused, Eulogio Alomia, alias Toyo, at the pueblo of Binan, Province of Laguna, P. I., about July 8, 1900, kidnapped from his house one Mateo Carabo, and thereafter killed him with a dagger. It further appears that the accused was one of the official executioners appointed by and acting under the orders of Lieut.-Col. Eustacio Castelltor, and it does not appear that the accused had not ample opportunity to avoid obedience to this illegal order and seek protection from the American authorities.

As illustrative of the methods pursued by his superior officers, the following quotation is taken from a written confession of the accused, made in the presence of witnesses, prior to his trial and admitted by him on his trial to be true and correct: "I carried a letter of authorization \* \* \* to act as a special agent, which means authority to commit murder. Each time a murder was ordered, a letter was sent to one of four men (above named) by one of the chiefs (naming them). Afterwards this letter was taken up and burned. If a man did not pay his contributions to the insurgent tax collector he was ordered to be killed." This confession is so in line with numberless well-established cases that its substantial truth may be accepted with little doubt.

The sentence approved by the department commander is confirmed and will be duly executed at the Presidio de Manila, to which the prisoner will be sent under proper guard.

By command of Major-General Chaffee:

W. P. HALL,  
*Assistant Adjutant-General.*

As late as July 2, 1902, the writer forwarded and approved the death sentence passed upon three natives, soldiers of Gonzales's column, who went into the open market place at Tanauan, Batangas Province, and killed the native interpreter of the American troops in that place. There was no motive other than that he was an Americanista, and, though they did not claim so openly, they were ordered to kill this man, as did

the accused in the case above given. In fact, it has been quite a most delicate question for commissions and reviewing authorities to determine upon the guilt and the amount of punishment to be meted out to murderers that acted under orders from insurrecto officers.

Against such treachery as this the American army had been waging war unsuccessfully for over two years. And this failure was not due to any lack of activity or ability on the part of the American troops. But many times the number of troops that were employed would never have been able to track down the guerrilla bands, for besides the mountain topography, the insurrecto soldiers at night would have slipped out of the corner in which they found themselves and disappeared, and the following day there would be none but friendly natives when the troops returned to their towns. Such warfare as we had been waging in the Philippines was not successful. The Army, under the most trying circumstances, had fought a foe quite savage in its instincts, for the massacre at Balangiga was under control of Lucban, Malvar's general in Samar. In fact, the war in the Philippine Islands, due to a desire of the American people to carry on the theoretical dream of a humanitarian war, had become more or less of a failure, and this was taken by the insurgents as a sign of weakness.

Grown weary of a war that reflected little credit upon American arms, except for the wonderful examples of individual bravery and the remarkable state of discipline shown by the troops in not taking harsh measures, either by retaliation or otherwise, the unequalled Wheaton determined to wage war as it had been waged by Grant and Sherman, when after three years of fighting they decided to crush the rebellion in 1864. He chose as his lieutenant the youngest and most energetic brigadier in the islands, Gen. J. Franklin Bell, and ordered him to carry out drastic measures in Batangas and Laguna, the hotbeds of the insurrection.

It is unfortunate that the people of the United States have derived their ideas of a concentration system from the reconcentrado policy of General Weyler in Cuba, when a Cuban junta in Washington spread broadcast over our land the

awful pictures of starvation in the Cuban camps. And the people either could not or would not dissociate these pictures from the true state of affairs in Batangas, and papers in the States, supposed to be reputable, began printing pictures of Weyler when publishing articles on General Bell's campaign in Batangas.

The concentration was ordered by General Bell on December 8, 1901, by telegraphic circular No. 2, which is as follows:

[Telegram.]

*Telegraphic Circular No. 2.*

BATANGAS, *December 8, 1901*

*To all Station Commanders:*

In order to put an end to all enforced contributions now levied by insurgents upon the inhabitants of sparsely settled and outlying barrios and districts, by means of intimidation and assassination, commanding officers of all towns now existing in the provinces of Batangas and Laguna, including those at which no garrison is stationed at present, will immediately specify and establish plainly marked limits surrounding each town, bounding a zone within which it may be practicable with an average-sized garrison to exercise supervision over and furnish protection to inhabitants (who desire to be peaceful) against the depredations of armed insurgents. These limits may include barrios which exist sufficiently near the town to be given protection and supervision by the garrison, and should include some ground on which live stock could graze, but so situated that it can be patrolled and watched. All ungarrisoned towns will be garrisoned as soon as troops become available.

Commanding officers will also see that orders are at once given and distributed to all the inhabitants within the jurisdiction of towns over which they exercise supervision, informing them of the danger of remaining outside of these limits and that unless they move by December 25 from outlying barrios and districts, with all their moveable food supplies, including rice, palay, chickens, live stock, etc., to within the limits of the zone established at their own or nearest town, their property (found outside of said zone at said date) will become liable to confiscation or destruction. The people will be permitted to move houses from outlying districts should they desire to do so or to construct temporary shelter for themselves on any land vacant within the zones without compensation to the owner, and no owner will be permitted to deprive them of the privilege of doing so.

In the discretion of commanding officers, the price of necessities may also be regulated in the interest of those thus seeking protection.

As soon as peaceful conditions have been established in the brigade these persons will be encouraged to return to their homes and such assistance will be rendered them as may be found practicable.

J. F. BELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

The order was carried out by commanding officers in the spirit in which it was given. People came into the towns, bringing all their provisions and household effects with them, and were sheltered in the houses of relatives and friends or else made shelter for themselves. After this order was issued parties were sent out, mostly natives guarded by small detachments, to gather the palay and food stuffs of the neighborhood, and whatever was found was brought into the towns, and after giving a certain portion to the gatherers, the rest was stored under guard for future issue to the poor. In the inaccessible parts of mountains the palay that could not be reached by caribou train was destroyed. Telegraphic circular No. 7 is given below to show the working of the system:

[Telegram.]

*Telegraphic Circular No. 7.*

BATANGAS, P. I., *December 15, 1901.*

*To all Station Commanders:*

Though section 17, General Orders 100, authorizes the starving of unarmed hostile belligerents, as well as armed ones, providing it leads to a speedier subjection of the enemy, it is considered neither justifiable nor desirable to permit any persons to starve who have come into towns under our control seeking protection. Although many of these persons can unquestionably be classed as enemies with perfect justice, it is too difficult to discriminate between the hostile and those who really desire peace to inaugurate or permit any policy of starvation under such circumstances. Every proper effort will be made at all times to deprive those in arms in the mountains of food supplies, but in order that those who have assembled in the towns may not be reduced to want it is absolutely essential to confiscate, transport to garrisoned towns, and save for future contingencies, whenever possible, every particle of food supplies which may be found concealed in the mountains for insurgents or abandoned at a distance from towns.

Therefore, instead of destroying animals and food products found by troops under such circumstances, commanding officers will make every possible effort to see that such animals and food are brought into the nearest town and kept under the control of the military authorities for

future use. In accomplishing this, all means of transportation may be seized and every able-bodied male impressed and marched under guard to transport such food products into towns.

Though it is recognized that it may be difficult at times to accomplish the above instructions, it is expected that every reasonable effort will be made to do so, even at the expense of time, care, and labor, and that no rice or food will be destroyed except where absolutely impracticable to get it into towns. It should not take more than a week to completely clear out all outlying districts of food products. Station commanders will begin at once to hunt for and bring in these supplies. Food abandoned may be given to those town people who will bring it in, if impossible to get it in for the government.

Storehouses in which to store these products will be taken possession of, or when none are available the presidente will be required to build one with labor and material of the town without compensation from the government. These products will be carefully preserved by the garrison for future use in accordance with a system to be announced hereafter. The rice of persons believed to be disloyal, beyond an amount necessary for themselves and dependents, may be confiscated and preserved for the same purpose.

No rice or food supplies thus seized will be fed to public animals, nor will any of it be consumed by troops except in case of emergency and necessity. None of this food will be issued gratis to well-to-do people who have means and property on which they can raise money to buy it, but when such people have no rice and are unable to purchase it elsewhere, these government stores may be sold in small quantities at a reasonable rate. The money thus accumulated will be used to purchase other rice in Manila to be transported by the government and resold at the same price or issued gratis to paupers.

The utmost care will be taken in registering paupers and the members of their families, in order that frauds may be prevented in the gratuitous issue of food.

In the discretion of subdistrict commanders, after consulting station commanders, a uniform scale may be established, regulating the prices that may be charged by merchants for ordinary and necessary food supplies. Subdistrict commanders may also transfer any surplus of government stores from one town to another that needs it worse.

It is the purpose of this order to place the burden of feeding the poor upon the wealthy classes whose disloyalty has brought on and maintained this war, and upon those who still remain disloyal, especially upon those who are actively sympathizing, contributing to, and otherwise assisting the insurrection. See provisions of sections 21, 37, 38, and 156, General Orders, No. 100.

J. F. BELL,  
*Brigadier-General, Commanding.*

In the city of Batangas the provost-marshal established a poorhouse, called the "poor hospital," where the people that were brought in sick were kept, fed, and treated by an army medical officer until they were well. There was, however, little sickness in any of the camps of the brigade. This poorhouse in Batangas became a refuge for families whose heads still remained in the field, and it excited the admiration of all who cared to investigate the concentration system. It is to be noticed that General Malvar, in giving to the world the reasons for his surrender, did not nor could he truthfully give as one of his reasons compassion for the people inside the zones. They needed no compassion. They were fed, provided with shelter, poor funds arose in every town out of the sale of palay and rice, and the only people suffering were the insurgents in the field, that with almost mulish stubbornness remained out long after the end was a foreseen conclusion.


One advantageous feature of bringing the people into the towns was that they became acquainted with the Americans. Probably 60 per cent of the people of Batangas had never seen an American, and as they came in touch with us they found they were not maltreated, as they had been told by the insurgents they would be; they found they were fed and housed; they found their personal rights were not interfered with, and their individual liberty only restricted as was necessary under war measures.

When Malvar surrendered on April 16, 1902, the zones were broken, prison doors flew open to all but criminals, and General Bell and his officers set to work to help repair the homes, while camotes, seed corn, and seed palay were furnished from the poor fund for planting. Families returned to their homes, fields were put under cultivation, and peaceful vocations were once more resumed. Rice was furnished at a nominal cost, and as it was cheaper than the people had known it to be for years, it was readily sold. Money appeared, some of it bearing evidence of having been buried in the earth, and the Filipinos recognized that the United States Government was not as bad as they had feared. Rice is still being sold to the people by the government, they paying for it in money, or lime, or by working on the roads.

No suffering in Batangas that I have seen has been due to a scarcity of food, and the other day it was found impossible to hire boys to work on the plaza in front of the church at pulling weeds. Boys were playing in the streets, but they did not want to work. Such is a true picture of bleeding Batangas.

And, now, what did the concentration system accomplish?

In a little less than four months it put an end to a guerrilla warfare that otherwise would have continued for years, with ladrones terrorizing the people; it compelled the surrender of Malvar, who would not otherwise have surrendered; it made possible a civil government which, under native governors, took control in both Laguna and Batangas on the 1st and 4th of July; it brought peace to a ladrone-ridden race, with less suffering than could have been expected; it made the Filipinos acquainted with the Americans, and made them realize that the Army of the United States is here simply to bring peace and development to them and open for them a road to a civilization and a pursuit of happiness such as the brown people have never dreamed. They have felt the weight of the mailed fist, it is true, but it was not harsh, and it was laid upon them by as gentle a hand and guided by as humane a heart as American civilization has ever produced.




GENERAL CHAFFEE ENTERING PEKIN.

# THE SERVICES OF GRADUATES IN CHINA, 1900-1901.

By Major CHARLES R. NOYES,

*Ninth Infantry, U. S. Army.—United States Military Academy, 1879.*



CAPTAIN (ADJUTANT) LIGHT ARTILLERY FULL DRESS, 1901.


THE recrudescence of antagonism to foreigners in China in the year 1900 became known as the "Boxer" uprising. The prominence and leadership of a society of fanatics which for many years had been in existence and to which the name "Boxer" was given in translation of the Chinese appellation, perhaps not with entire correctness, brought about this popular designation. The society is said to have received the encouragement of the Buddhist monks who possessed power and control over large masses of the populace, and who feared that the teachings and commercial enterprise of foreigners would subvert their power. Eventually the Empress Dowager, who, possibly in her ignorance, hoped to see the absolute exclusiveness of the Empire once more restored, secretly gave her influence and assistance to the agitators. The sufferings of the Chinese people at large from famine and from the oppressions of their rulers placed the masses in a state of mind favorable to any movement which would alleviate their condition, and they were, on account of their unhappy state, the more easily persuaded that the extinction of "foreign devils" was a necessary step to secure the favor of their gods and obtain relief. The teachings of the Boxers were fanatical. They believed that a course of physical training persistently practiced would render them invulnerable to foreign bullets. This belief was accepted by even intelligent and educated Chinamen, and the specious explanation that they who suffered death had not sufficiently practiced the art of physical development was accepted with unquestioning faith.

Although all foreigners in China knew that they were a hated lot, and that they pursued at some personal risk their various occupations as missionaries, merchants, railroad builders, and even as representatives of their several governments, or as employees of a Chinese administrative bureau—the customs service—they were not so apprehensive of danger in the early part of the year 1900 as to withdraw from their occupations, even though located in remote districts of the Empire.

The animosity of the Boxers was at first directed chiefly against the natives of their own land who had become Christians under the teachings and guidance of the missionaries. One English missionary was, however, murdered in December, 1899. For this crime the representatives of the foreign Governments at Peking obtained punishment of the murderers, and at their solicitation the Empress Dowager, who held the reins of government, issued decrees against the secret societies, which were the reported leaders of all the outrages against the native Christians. These decrees were adroitly worded, and were pronounced by some students of the situation to indicate sympathy with the movement and a purpose to secretly aid the societies rather than a determination to suppress them.

The measures taken were, at all events, so ineffectual that after repeated protests by the foreign ministers the latter deemed it expedient to ask their Governments to send war ships to Chinese waters, the requests being made simultaneously by the English, American, French, German, and Italian ministers, in March, 1900.

The indignities imposed upon native Christians increased during the spring months, and the Boxer societies attained greater power and influence among the people, becoming bolder in their aggressions, and the Chinese troops which the Government had sent to disturbed districts were either unable or unwilling to restrain them. Missionaries in remote parts of the Empire now became alarmed. Some fled to Peking, Tientsin, and the coast cities, but many, unwilling to abandon their Christian converts, clung to their posts, hoping the foreign ministers would still be able to compel effective measures for their protection.



CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION—TIENSIN TO PEKIN, CHINA.

The gravity of the situation was not fully appreciated by all the ministers. The British and American were loth to take steps which would place their Governments in a criticising, or, possibly, belligerent attitude toward China. As late as May 21 the British minister in a note to his Government, expressed the opinion that he did not share the gloomy anticipations of the French Fathers, that he was convinced a few days' heavy rainfall to terminate the long drought would do more to restore tranquility than any measures which either the Chinese Government or foreign governments could take. But the populace was by the end of May, 1900, completely inflamed, and the events which transpired then and immediately thereafter aroused the civilized world.

About May 28 the ministers called upon the naval commanders at Ta-ku for guards, and the Chinese foreign office, the Tsung Li Yamen, was notified that the guards would arrive immediately. May 28, Captains John T. Myers and Newton H. Hall, U. S. Marine Corps, and a portion of the marine guards of the U. S. S. *Oregon* and *Newark*, consisting of 54 men, were sent ashore at Ta-ku, arriving at the railroad station, Tong-ku, on the left bank of the Pei-ho River, opposite Ta-ku, in the afternoon. Request was made upon the railroad officials for transportation to Tien-Tsin, 28 miles inland, but was refused until the authority of the viceroy could be obtained. Delay was impossible. Accordingly, the command proceeded at once by the river, being towed on a lighter, and arrived at Tien-Tsin at night (May 29). They were the first troops to appear in the city, and were received with enthusiasm by the foreign inhabitants.

On May 30 and 31, marines from the ships of Russia, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan assembled at Tien-Tsin until the force numbered 350.

On May 31, the necessary authority having been obtained, the marine force of about 350 men left Tien-Tsin at 4.30 p. m. by rail for Peking, arriving at the railroad terminus outside the city about 11 p. m., and marched at once to the legations unresisted, but observed by silent throngs of Chinamen. Captain Bowman H. McCalla, of the *Newark*, accompanied the command, and returned to Tong-ku by rail June 2.

On June 3, the German and American ships at Ta-ku sent guards to Peking.

On June 4, the last train went over the railroad from Peking to Tien-Tsin. Sections of the railroad were destroyed, and during the next few days the rails were removed from the part of the line from Peking southward about 30 miles.

On June 5, alarm increased at Tien Tsin, and reports were current that the Boxers would attack the foreign concessions.

On June 9, foreigners at Tien Tsin expected immediate attack, and at Peking Boxers swarmed through the city, fraternizing with the Chinese soldiers.


Additional guards were urgently called for by the ministers. The guards were expected to travel as far as possible by rail and march the remaining distance. The Seymour relief expedition, so called from the name of its commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Seymour, K. C. B., was organized, and the first train load of marines and seamen left the coast June 10. On June 11, three more train loads made the total force 2,056 officers and men. Captain McCalla commanded the United States contingent of 112 men. The U. S. gunboat *Monocacy*, Captain Wise, lay in the Pei-ho River, near Tong-ku, and served as a base point for the Americans in this expedition. Captain Wise took possession of the railroad terminal a few days later when it was abandoned by the Chinese officials, and employed his officers and men in running trains as far toward Tien-Tsin as the line remained unbroken.

At the departure of the Seymour command from Tien-Tsin a guard of less than 600 men was left, the inhabitants of the foreign concessions arming themselves as far as practicable and cooperating with the troops. The native walled city had fallen into full possession of the Boxers, who made demonstrations in force against the concessions after the departure of the Seymour command, and they soon cut off communication with it.

On June 12, the relief expedition, after repairing breaks in the railroad, reached Lang-fang, about 40 miles from Tien-Tsin, and there its advance ceased. A small detachment pushed on a few miles, but the railroad had been destroyed

# TIENTSIN TO PEKIN CHINA SHEET NO.1

0 1/2 1 2 MILES.



Map showing engagement at  
Tientsin July 13, 1900 - and  
Road map of Route of U.S. troops  
of China Relief Expedition from  
Tientsin to Peking, China  
Aug 4<sup>th</sup> to Aug 14<sup>th</sup> 1900.  
To  
Major General Chaffee.

Commanding Expedition.  
Respectfully submitted,  
H. B. Ferguson,  
1<sup>st</sup> Lt. Engrs U.S.A.  
Chief Engineer Officer.

- Explanation
- ☛ Artillery      ♣ Inf<sup>y</sup> Infantry
  - ☛ U.S. Art.      D. British.
  - Infantry.      F. French.
  - U.S. Inf.      J. Japanese.
  - ♣ U.S. Marines,      bb Cavalry.

beyond; hordes of Boxers surrounded the detachment, and it was compelled to withdraw to the main body, which itself was now attacked.

On June 17, the Seymour expedition began a retrograde movement to Tien-Tsin, the command having frequent encounters with large bodies of surrounding Boxers and troops. On this day, also, the Ta-ku forts at the mouth of the Pei-ho River were captured from the Chinese by the allies as a measure of safety for the protection of the Seymour expedition and Tien-Tsin. News of this at Peking caused the Chinese Government to assume, officially, a belligerent attitude, and the members of the legation were notified to leave the city. They considered the journey to the seacoast impracticable and unsafe in view of the disturbed condition of the intervening country, and measures were adopted to endure a siege while awaiting relief from the coast.

The inability of the Chinese Government to preserve order and maintain the safety of the ministers had already been demonstrated. The chancellor of the Japanese legation at Peking had been murdered on June 12. Missions had been burned and native Christians murdered and tortured within the limits of the city. Many others had been gathered within the legation grounds. There was no longer any delay in preparing for the siege, and the locality occupied by the legations was made as impregnable as possible. The streets leading to the legations were barricaded and the walls and buildings prepared for defense. On June 20 the German minister, while attempting to go to the office of the Tsung Li Yamen, was murdered, and his interpreter badly wounded.

On June 18 the *Nashville* arrived at Ta-ku, having on board a battalion of marines from Cavite, under the command of Major Littleton W. T. Waller, U. S. Marine Corps. This force was landed the following day, and joined a body of Russians which had arrived from Port Arthur in an effort to reach Tien-Tsin, now cut off from the coast, sections of the railroad having been destroyed. This command was repulsed in a fight, June 21, a few miles from Tien-Tsin and driven back 4 or 5 miles, Major Waller's command having 4 killed and 7 wounded. Although other losses among the Americans

had already occurred with the Seymour expedition, no information of them had reached the seacoast, and Major Waller's losses were the first reported in the United States, causing a profound sensation.

On June 21, Russian troops, including a field battery, arrived from Port Arthur, and a battalion of British (Royal Welsh Fusileers) from Wei-hai-wei.

On June 23, another advance on Tien-Tsin was essayed, the force now numbering 2,500 men, of whom 1,500 were Russians, and after severe fighting the city was reached.

On June 25, the Seymour expedition, which, driven back, had fortified itself in the Hsi-ku arsenal a few miles north of Tien-Tsin, was relieved by the force which had fought its way up from Tong-ku, and was brought back to the city the following day, the arsenal with immense quantities of ordnance stores being destroyed. The total losses of the Seymour command were 62 killed, 228 wounded.

Tien-Tsin (the foreign concessions) now became the objective of Boxer operations, the Chinese forces consisting of Boxers, salt commissioner's armed men, and regular troops, holding the "walled city" and the contiguous forts. The foreign concessions were bombarded from the forts almost daily, and numerous attacks were made on outlying posts, the railroad station being fought for most determinably on several occasions.

Communication by means of the Pei-ho River was kept open between Tien-Tsin and the ships at Ta-ku, and almost all the women and children and missionaries were removed from the city.

Thus far the Navy and the Marine Corps had borne the share of the burden which fell to the United States in the efforts of the nations to sustain their rights and relieve their beleaguered citizens in China. The failure of the Chinese Government to protect the ministers and legations at Peking had stirred the whole civilized world against her, and as days passed bringing more positive information of the dangers which beset their fellow countrymen, and of the state of siege in which they were placed, China was regarded as dishonored,



and the eagerness to overthrow her and hasten to the support of the endangered legations became intense.

The Army of the United States was called upon for action in June. On the 14th of that month, soon after the news of the landing of the Seymour expedition reached Washington, the Adjutant-General cabled to Major-General MacArthur, who commanded the United States forces in the Philippines, inquiring how soon he could send a regular regiment to Peking, if required. To which General MacArthur replied that, although the loss of a regiment at that time would be a serious matter, he could, if critical emergency arose in China, send a regiment on two days' notice. An order was cabled June 16 upon receipt of General MacArthur's reply. The Ninth Infantry, which had been serving in the Province of Tarlac, Luzon, 70 miles north of Manila, ferreting out and running down such insurgent forces as remained intact in that district, had at this time just secured the surrender of the Filipino general who commanded there, with the chief part of his command. The regiment had its headquarters and most of its companies on the line of the Manila and Dagupan Railroad, and was regarded as capable of being quickly concentrated in Manila. The colonel, Emerson H. Liscum, was an officer of long service, favorably known for his valor, energy, and good judgment, and although the hard service of the regiment had depleted its strength and endurance somewhat, it seemed most available for the new field of action, and was at once selected by General MacArthur.

Instructions were telegraphed to Colonel Liscum on June 17 to concentrate his regiment in Manila as rapidly as possible, but a severe typhoon which was in progress delayed the transmission of the message, and no information of the proposed movement reached Colonel Liscum until the afternoon of June 18. The storm was the worst of the season and did great damage to shipping in Manila, to the railroad and roads, besides flooding flat country everywhere and converting streams and rivers, which were ordinarily fordable, into deep and impassable torrents. It was impossible to approach the army transports in Manila Harbor, which had been


designated to carry the command to China, to unload them, or prepare them for their trip. Seventy miles north, in the Province of Tarlac, the companies of the Ninth Infantry, which were located at a distance from the railroad, were cut off by the high water. Strenuous efforts were made, however, by officers and men to overcome all difficulties, as everyone was imbued with the eager interest and excitement which the prospect of active service in a new field developed. Two companies of the regiment were placed in Manila June 19, twenty-six hours after receiving the order. These were companies on the railroad which could move at once. The transfer of Ninth Infantry companies away from their stations involved movement of detachments of other regiments, the Twelfth on the north and the Forty-first U. S. Volunteers on the south, to occupy their places, as it was contrary to the policy in the Philippines to abandon any place which had once been occupied.

On June 20 the band and three companies proceeded to Manila; on the 21st five companies from outlying stations reached the railroad and proceeded to the city; and on the 22d Colonel Liscum, with his headquarters and one company, moved to the city, leaving but one company (F) and detachments at the outlying posts to be relieved. The last detachment reached Manila on June 25. In the meantime, the storm having abated, the two transports, *Logan* and *Port Albert*, had been coaled and loaded with stores. The troops were, by direction of General MacArthur, re-equipped throughout in order to present a good appearance when placed in comparison with the troops of other nations. The uniform adopted was campaign hat, blue shirt, khaki trousers, and leggings, with blanket rolls in new shelter tents. Khaki blouses were carried in the rolls, and the ordnance equipment was new throughout.

Staff detachments were added to the command as follows: 1 officer and 20 enlisted men of Engineers; 1 officer and 10 enlisted men, Signal Corps; 4 officers, Medical Corps, and 20 Hospital Corps men.

The troops were transferred to the *Logan* on June 26. The *Port Albert* was loaded with 50 horses of a regimental

TIEN TSIN TO PEKIN  
CHINA  
SHEET NO.6.




NOTES.

- 1 To Ching Gate
- 2 Tien-Fu "
- 3 Tuan "
- 4 Wu "
- 5 Tung Hua "
- 6 Sheh-Wo "
- 7 Hsi-bua "
- 8 American Legation
- 9 British "
- 10 Prussian "
- 11 Russian "
- 12 Trench "
- 13 Pei-Tang Mission

Route and Position of U.S. Troops August 14th and 15th 1900. (In red.)

\*\* Artillery.



Tien-Fu Gate (No. 2) and Tower



mounted detachment, mules, wagons, ambulances, etc., on the same date.

The strength of the Ninth Infantry was 32 officers and 1,230 enlisted men.

The graduates of the U. S. Military Academy in the command were:

With the Ninth Infantry: Capt. Charles R. Noyes ('79), Capt. Frank DeW. Ramsey ('85), Capt. Edwin V. Bookmiller ('89), First Lieut. Francis H. Schoeffel ('91), First Lieut. Joseph Frazier ('91), First Lieut. Louis B. Lawton ('93), First Lieut. Thomas W. Connell ('94), First Lieut. Harold Hammond ('98), First Lieut. Ira C. Welborn ('98), Second Lieut. Fred R. Brown ('99).

With the detachment of Engineers: First Lieut. Harley B. Ferguson ('97).

Colonel Liscum having received final instructions from General MacArthur, and sailing orders having been issued, the anchor was weighed at 8 a. m., June 27, 1900. The *Port Albert* sailed a day or two later. Nagasaki, Japan, was reached at 6.30 a. m., July 2, and the operation of coaling and taking in a supply of fresh water was proceeded with, this port being the usual one at which such supplies were obtained by United States transports on their voyage from Manila to the United States. The location of the port is such that it became, during the troubles in China, a convenient point of call for war ships and transports of the United States, as well as other nations, and was used under the authority of the Japanese Government as a subbase, in so far as to permit trans-shipping of troops and supplies, disposal of sick and wounded, and coaling of war ships and transports.

The international character of the service upon which the command was entering was evidenced by the presence in the port of war ships of Russia, England, France, and the United States, as well as Japan, by military officers and men of these nations on the streets in uniform, and by the common interest felt in events, information thereof being communicated from one consulate to another as soon as received. The American consul, Mr. Harris, gave Colonel Liscum information of the movements of United States war ships, and conveyed reports

of what was transpiring at Tien-Tsin and vicinity. The news concerning Peking was most disheartening. For days communication had been cut off, and there were persistent rumors of the annihilation of the ministers and all foreigners in the city. A cablegram from Admiral Kempff, who was the senior American naval officer at Ta-ku, was received on the afternoon of July 3 speaking of the situation as desperate, and Colonel Liscum decided to sail at once. He ascertained from the captain of the ship that sufficient coal and water would be on board by midnight, and orders were given to sail immediately thereafter. About sunset of that day the U. S. S. *Brooklyn* arrived, en route from Cavite to Ta-ku, having on board Rear-Admiral George C. Remey, and a battalion of marines, 18 officers and 300 enlisted men under Colonel Robert L. Meade, U. S. Marine Corps.

The *Logan* experienced smooth seas en route to China, entered the Gulf of Pe-chi-li near Port Arthur, and arrived at the anchorage opposite Ta-ku at 4 p. m. July 6. War ships of all nations were there, also supply ships, and Japanese, Russian, and British transports, about 40 ships in all, riding at anchor 10 miles from shore. The distant land was scarcely visible, being very low and flat, and the intervening bar prevented ships of deep draft approaching nearer. At low tide there were 2 feet of water over the bar, which was 2 or 3 miles wide, and at high tide about 10 feet of water, sufficient to permit small Japanese transports and coasting vessels from Shanghai and Cheefoo to cross and enter the mouth of the Pei-ho River. Formerly it was customary for such vessels after entering the river to wend their way up its tortuous course about 45 miles to Tien-Tsin, but since the construction of the railroad in 1897 merchandise was usually unloaded at Tong-ku, 4 miles up the river on the left bank, to be transported thence to Tien-Tsin and Peking by rail.

The appearance of the great white transport *Logan* among the war ships, loaded with United States soldiers, was doubtless an event quite unexpected by the foreign naval officers and gave an impression of the readiness of the United States to participate in affairs in the Far East. The command was

very much larger than any other that had arrived, except from Japan, and the Russian troops from Port Arthur.

Colonel Liscum proceeded at once in a launch to the U. S. S. *Newark* and conferred with Admiral Kempff. The next day he went ashore with his adjutant and quartermaster, consulted Captain Wise of the *Monocacy*, inspected the line of railroad as far as it remained intact, and arranged to have lighters sent to the *Logan*. They arrived on the following day, July 8, and were at once loaded with stores to their full capacity. One of them was a large, well-built lighter, with an iron deck, and the other a Chinese junk; both were under the control of the British and were provided through the courtesy of the British naval officers upon request of Captain Wise. Early in the morning, July 9, headquarters, the band, First Battalion, and Company E of the Second Battalion, were placed on the lighter and the three remaining companies of the Second Battalion on the junk. This was the full limit of their capacity. At the same time the 300 marines from the *Brooklyn*, which had arrived the day before, were placed in small boats of that ship, towed by launches to the *Logan*, and attached in a long line astern of the junk. In that manner, towed by two strong tugs which had been secured by Captain Wise, the flotilla pulled away from the *Logan*, cheered by the officers and men of the Third Battalion and by many refugees who had already been collected from the United States war ships and given accommodations on the *Logan*. Foreign ships in the immediate vicinity paid their respects as the flotilla passed, bands playing. It was an inspiring moment for all participants, and officers and men looked forward eagerly to landing on Chinese soil and taking part in the exciting events which were taking place not far away. The booming of cannon at Tien-Tsin, where the bombardment of the foreign concessions was in progress, had been heard the evening before, and it was evident to all that something more was in store for them than a summer day's march to Peking.

Arriving at Tong-ku about 5 p. m., the command was marched ashore and placed in shelter-tent bivouac for the night. Detachments of Russian and Japanese troops were

found in the vicinity. They were engaged in establishing a base, and all nations having naval forces ashore had set their flags over warehouses, railroad shops, and portions of the dock, to give a semblance of proprietorship and secure accommodations for handling troops and supplies when they arrived. Captain Wise had secured certain railroad buildings and river frontage, which afterwards served as the American base. Colonel Liscum did not, however, consider it advisable to leave any part of his command there, and at daybreak, July 10, the troops were reembarked, the journey to be made by the tortuous Pei-ho River to Tien-Tsin. The entire day and part of the night were occupied in the journey, the larger lighter arriving at the bund about 10 p. m. The tug towing the junk was disabled late in the afternoon and the journey was not completed by that portion of the command until the following afternoon. Major Waller, of the Marines, welcomed Colonel Liscum upon his arrival, and the five companies were conducted to the building in which the Marine battalion was quartered.

A combined attack by the allies on the Chinese position had been planned for early morning of the 11th, but delay in the completion of pontoon bridges by the Russians caused a postponement. From 3 o'clock a. m. until 6, however, the Chinese bombarded the foreign concessions and made a determined infantry attack on the exposed position at the railroad station, which had been tenaciously held by the allied detachments against great odds, its tactical position in the line giving it great importance.

Upon arrival of the Ninth Infantry at Tien-Tsin Captain John S. Mallory, Second Infantry ('79) (at that time lieutenant-colonel Forty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers), was found in the city, having arrived two or three days before on a roving commission issued to him at headquarters, Division of the Philippines, directing him to visit Hongkong and other Chinese cities.

He should be credited with being the first army officer and graduate to come under fire in the China campaign. He eventually attached himself to Major-General Chaffee's headquarters and participated in the march to Peking.

There was cessation of the attacks on the foreign concessions from the morning of July 11, and the preparations of the allies for a general attack on the walled city, its suburbs, and the Chinese forts went on uninterruptedly. It was essential to silence the heavy guns which the Chinese had used so successfully for several weeks. The French concession, which was nearest to the Chinese city, had been partially destroyed by the enemy's shells and resulting conflagrations, and many buildings in more remote sections of the concessions had been badly damaged. Not many lives had been lost, but the demoralizing effect of the bombardment could not be longer endured. On the afternoon of July 12 the Russian general announced that he was ready. The plan of battle included a Russian and German attack on the east side of the walled city and an attack on the south side, simultaneously, by the other allies, the Japanese to take the lead and the other nations to be in support. The troops were to be in position at daybreak, Friday, July 13, 1900. The force under the Russian general comprised 2,300 Russian soldiers and 300 German sailors and marines. The Japanese force, commanded by Major-General Fukushima, was 1,600 strong. The British and Americans acted under the orders of Brigadier-General A. R. F. Dorward, a colonel of Engineers from Wei hai wei, having the local rank of brigadier-general, and the French cooperated with his command. The Austrians were represented by a small detachment from a ship at Taku. The American force comprised 330 marines under Colonel Meade, 15 officers and 423 enlisted men of the Ninth Infantry under Colonel Liscum at one part of the battle, and 2 officers and 100 enlisted men at another part. One company of the Ninth Infantry remained as guard in the building in which the regiment had secured quarters, and the Third Battalion did not arrive at Tientsin in time to join Colonel Liscum's command on the field during the morning, but reached there while the battle was in progress and was held in reserve.

The Russian attack was so far removed from that on the south side as to constitute an entirely separate battle. Theirs was a hotly fought engagement, continuing throughout the

day, and ending without the desired penetration into the walled city. The killed and wounded numbered 140.

On the south side the attack began at daylight, the Japanese gaining positions near the west arsenal on a mud wall which surrounded the city at about 1,500 yards from it. The intervening ground between the mud wall and the Chinese city was level and unoccupied, but filled with ditches, pools of water, and mounds over Chinese graves.

The Japanese opened fire at the interior wall at daybreak, while guns obtained from the British ships and from the captured Taku forts poured in shot and shell from positions on and near the same mud wall close by the foreign concessions. British artillery (Hongkong companies, Sikhs) found places for their mountain guns on the mud wall near the west arsenal, and the United States marines, who had three fieldpieces, rushed through the gate and, taking position among small buildings adjacent to the arsenal, kept up fire until their ammunition was exhausted, when the guns were withdrawn. The infantry companies of the marine battalion were placed with a battalion of Welsh Fusileers (from Wei-hai-wei) on the left of the Japanese early in the action, and when the latter scaled the mud wall and began advancing across the open waste in their front, the Marines and Fusileers supported them on the left. While the marines were thus engaged, British blue jackets and marines and the Ninth U. S. Infantry were held in the open fields outside of and about 1,000 yards distant from the mud wall, deployed facing it, and ready to advance. In this position the rifle fire of the Chinese passing over the mud wall unfortunately caused a number of casualties to which no reply could be made.

There were 9 casualties in the Ninth Infantry at this time, including 1 man killed and 1 officer, Captain Noyes, slightly wounded in the arm. The latter was able to rejoin the regiment after receiving the attention of a member of the British hospital corps, who happened to be close at hand. Colonel Liscum's orderly was severely wounded at this time.

General Dorward, learning of the casualties among the troops in the open field, ordered the lines forward to the mud wall, where they were perfectly protected. There they

remained for an hour or more, until the time arrived for the assault. The moment for the assault came when the marines had exhausted their artillery ammunition and withdrew their fieldpieces through the gateway to the exterior side of the wall. A Japanese infantry column, waiting closed in mass near the gate, was sent in first, and the Ninth Infantry followed. It appears from General Dorward's report that it was the original intention to place the Ninth Infantry on the extreme left of the Japanese, who had scaled the mud wall far to the left, but a British staff officer showed the way to a path over a depression in the wall about 100 yards to the left of the gate, and the regiment upon passing over found itself among the ruins of the small buildings, where the marines had served their guns, and where, now, the small Japanese column which had passed through the gate was for a moment protecting itself from the rain of bullets.

When the Japanese advanced the regiment followed and found shelter for its extended line on the edge of a moat surrounding the arsenal. A body of French infantry were located in the same place, and the right of the Ninth Infantry line was pushed so far to the right that the moat no longer protected it. That wing was therefore swung forward to an elevated road which crossed the open ground obliquely to the right in the direction of the concessions. But immediately a withering fire was received from the Chinese houses lying between the walled native city and the concessions, and Colonel Liscum decided to advance toward this new and unexpected onslaught. The change of front under fire could not be executed with tactical exactness, and the advance was begun at once by rushes of detachments from cover to cover, led by the officers. Losses were heavy. Captain Bookmiller fell soon after the advance began, severely wounded. Colonel Liscum marched gallantly along the elevated road, calling out to his men and motioning them forward whenever the Chinese fire slackened. Numbers of men fell in the terrible rush. Many tumbled into the ditches and were unable or unwilling to advance farther. The bravest pushed on and reached a position within 75 yards of the enemy's loopholed houses, where an impassable pond stopped their progress.

At the moment of making the last rushes the enemy's fire had almost ceased. An evidence of this was the fact that wounded men who were able to walk withdrew a distance of 200 yards, seeking shelter, without being fired upon. But immediately thereafter the fire redoubled and no movement could be made to circumvent the obstacle. In this advanced position the color bearer fell. Colonel Liscum seized the colors and was in turn shot down, receiving a mortal wound from which he died in a few minutes. Command was assumed by Major Jesse M. Lee, who was next in rank on the spot. About 9 o'clock, the ammunition being nearly exhausted, he decided to send word of the situation to General Dorward, and the message was successfully carried by Lieutenant Lawton, his battalion adjutant, accompanied by a musician named Hoyle. Lawton was severely wounded, however, while returning with reenforcements. He was mentioned by name in General Dorward's report and received a medal of honor for his gallant behavior. Major Regan, who commanded the second battalion, received two severe wounds, and Captain Noyes was disabled by a second wound. The casualties among the enlisted men were 15 killed, 67 wounded. The graduates present in this desperate rush not mentioned among the wounded were Lieutenant Frazier, who distinguished himself leading his company and assisting Colonel Liscum under fire, after he had been stricken down, for which he was recommended for a medal of honor, and Lieutenant Hammond, who was recommended for a brevet advancement for meritorious conduct.

Company A, increased to 100 men by detachments from other companies, had been located during this fighting as a guard at a pontoon bridge within the concessions, and in support of the post at the railroad station. The fighting at the railroad station being severe, reenforcements were called for, and 50 men were sent under Lieut. Fred R. Brown. The enemy's shells were fired at the buildings all day, the men taking shelter during the bombardment in ash pits in the engine house, rushing out to the intrenchments to repel infantry attacks when necessary. One shell exploded in the

building, killing two and wounding five of the Ninth Infantry, besides causing casualties among the United States marines and French and English soldiers who formed part of the post. Lieutenant Brown, in command of this detachment, did excellent service.

The result of the fighting on July 13 was no certain advantage for the allies. The terrific artillery fire to which the walls of the city had been subjected had made no breach, and the gates were still closed. The losses had been heavy on both sides of the city. The Ninth Infantry on the right of the Japanese and the marines on the left had protected the flanks, but were incapable of advancing from their exposed positions, and were withdrawn after nightfall.

The Japanese had, however, secured a position close up to the walls, protecting themselves among the mud buildings there, and hanging on tenaciously to what they had gained. During the night they completed arrangements to blow in the gates, a deed which was accomplished with great gallantry on their part at daylight on the 14th of July, resulting in occupation of the walls and rapid overthrow of all resistance. The Chinese, although numerous and sufficiently armed, lacked the organization and discipline necessary to sustain a long-continued attack. The havoc produced by the allies' shells within the densely populated city was awful to contemplate. Fires were found in progress at many places, the dead were lying about in great numbers. The regular Chinese forces withdrew from the city during the night, July 13-14, going out on the north side, and no large captures of armed soldiers were made.

With the capture of the native walled city quiet reigned in the Tien-Tsin foreign concessions, and there was no interruption to the preparations for the march on Peking.

The events of the latter part of June and the first two weeks of July, just described, impressed the powers with the necessity of largely increasing their forces in China, as it was now anticipated that the march to Peking would be contested by the whole military power of the nation available in that vicinity. On the part of the United States, as early as June 22, the

Adjutant-General of the Army inquired of Major-General MacArthur if he could spare another regiment for China, and on June 26 Major-General Adna R. Chaffee, U. S. Volunteers (colonel Eighth Cavalry), was ordered to China to assume command of the military forces of the United States. On July 7 instructions were cabled to General MacArthur to send the Fourteenth or Twentieth Infantry, and Taylor's Battery. Both of the infantry regiments mentioned, except one battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, which had returned to the United States, were doing duty in the city of Manila, and either could be quickly prepared for the required service. The Fourteenth Infantry was selected, and Reilly's Battery (F, Fifth Artillery, afterwards Tenth Battery, Field Artillery) was ordered instead of Taylor's, being more available. Arrangements were also made by the War Department to divert troops en route to Manila to China if the necessity became pressing. The Sixth Cavalry (two squadrons), one battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry, one battalion of the Third Artillery, and a battalion of marines were so diverted.

Six companies of the Fourteenth Infantry sailed from Manila, July 15, on the chartered transport *Indiana*; two companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, the battery, and the horses of the mounted officers, Fourteenth Infantry, on the *Flintshire* the same day. The wagon transportation of the Fourteenth Infantry was on the *Wyefield*, which followed a day or two later. With these troops were sent, besides the transportation and necessary forage, subsistence supplies for 5,000 men for three months, clothing for the Ninth Infantry, small-arm ammunition, and miscellaneous ordnance supplies. The strength of this command was: Fourteenth Infantry, 26 officers, 1,135 men; Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, 3 officers, 146 enlisted men.

The graduates present were:

Staff officer: Capt. William Crozier, Ordnance Department ('76).

With the Fourteenth Infantry: Capt. John C. F. Tillson ('78), Capt. William B. Reynolds ('79), Capt. Frank F. Eastman ('79), Capt. Alfred Hasbrouck, jr. ('83), Capt. Charles H. Martin ('87), Capt. John R. M. Taylor ('89), Capt. Henry

G. Learned ('90), First Lieut. Louis M. Nuttman ('95), First Lieut. William A. Burnside ('96), First Lieut. Frank M. Savage ('97), First Lieut. Joseph F. Gohn ('98), Second Lieut. James Hanson ('99), Second Lieut. Duncan K. Major, jr. ('99), Second Lieut. Albert N. McClure ('99).

With Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery: First Lieut. Charles P. Summerall ('92), Second Lieut. Manus McCloskey ('98).

Graduates of the class of 1900 joined the Fourteenth Infantry in September. They were Second Lieuts. Harry E. Mitchell, Ernest E. Allen, and Pressley K. Brice.

Captain Frederick C. Palmer, Ninth Infantry ('84), accompanied the Fourteenth Infantry, rejoining his regiment from hospital. Major George P. Scriven, Signal Corps ('78), proceeded from Manila to Taku on the *Wyefield*, arriving August 2, and becoming chief signal officer of the expedition.

The *Indiana* arrived at Taku on July 26. The troops were disembarked and forwarded to Tientsin with the least possible delay. The *Flintshire* arrived July 29. In the meantime Captain Ramsey, quartermaster Ninth Infantry, had unloaded the *Logan* and dispatched her to Nagasaki, and upon the arrival of two officers of the Quartermaster's Department, Captains Joseph C. Byron ('86) and Winthrop S. Wood ('89), the needs of the United States as to lighters were made known to them and they at once went to work to remedy the situation. Other foreign nations, except Japan, were also in somewhat of a predicament as to landing facilities, and it was only by the greatest activity that they could be outdone in the race to secure what was required. These officers were successful in getting two 70-ton scows, or barges, from Chefoo, and from Shanghai a fair-sized coasting steamer named the *Pechili*, which could, at high water, go over the bar. The anchorage was, however, so far from shore that in high winds the sea was heavy and no work could be accomplished. The battery was much delayed by a gale of wind.

The *Pechili's* cables parted at night, July 31, while loading horses from the *Flintshire*, and the barge having the guns aboard was with difficulty kept from foundering. The steamer was obliged to go into the Peiho River to Tongku the morning of August 1 with what was aboard, and while a

tug was towing in the barge the cable broke and guns and carriages and men aboard were for a time in danger of being driven to sea. They rigged a sail, however, and by the greatest good luck were boarded by an officer of the customs service who knew the channel, and with his assistance the barge was successfully guided across the bar and into the river.

General Chaffee arrived at Taku from the United States July 29 on the transport *Grant* with the men of the Sixth Cavalry and a battalion of marines. He went to Tientsin at once, arriving there July 30 at 11 a. m. With him were three graduates—Major Samuel M. Mills, Sixth Artillery ('65), who had reported to him at Nagasaki pursuant to telegraphic instructions from the War Department for duty on his staff; Captain Grote Hutcheson, Sixth Cavalry ('84), who was announced at once as adjutant-general of the China Relief Expedition, and Second Lieut. Roy B. Harper, Seventh Cavalry ('97), aid de camp.

The graduates with the Sixth Cavalry were: Captain Augustus P. Blocksom ('77), Captain William W. Forsyth ('82), Captain DeRosey C. Cabell ('84), First Lieut. John T. Nance ('86), First Lieut. Charles D. Rhodes ('89), First Lieut. Francis C. Marshall ('90), First Lieut. John W. Furlong ('91), First Lieut. Thomas M. Corcoran ('91), First Lieut. Benjamin B. Hyer ('93), First Lieut. Herbert A. White ('95), First Lieut. Elvin R. Heiberg ('96), Second Lieut. Malin Craig ('98), Second Lieut. Wallace B. Scales ('98), Second Lieut. Patrick W. Guiney ('99), Second Lieut. Stuart Heintzelman ('99).

Graduates of the class of 1900 joined the Sixth Cavalry in September. They were Second Lieuts. Joseph A. Baer, Willis V. Morris, and Walter S. Grant.

The number of troops of all nations at Tien-Tsin by August 1 was about 20,000—Japanese, 10,000; Russian, 5,000; British and American, each, 2,000; French, Italian, Austrian, together, about 1,000, chiefly French.

General Chaffee's arrival gave an impetus in the councils of the generals in favor of immediate advance on Peking. The British and Japanese generals (Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Gaselee and Lieutenant-General Yamagutchi) were in favor

of such action, but the Russian general desired delay for the arrival of a larger force. While the councils and preparations were in progress at Tien-Tsin the desperate state of the legations at Peking was communicated to the military authorities by secret messengers, who at long intervals succeeded in reaching Tien-Tsin. The determination to advance was arrived at shortly after General Chaffee arrived, August 4 being set as the date. The American command was to consist of the Ninth Infantry, Fourteenth Infantry, Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, and two battalions of marines, in all about 2,000 men. The Sixth Cavalry had arrived at Tien-Tsin, but the horses were still on the ships at Taku, and the squadrons were ordered to await them, remaining as guard at Tien-Tsin. One troop, Captain Cabell's, received their mounts and overtook the relief column on August 9.

The duty of preparing the transportation of the American contingent of the expedition fell to Captain Ramsey, Ninth Infantry, who was announced in orders as chief commissary and acting chief quartermaster. The only wagons available were those which the Ninth Infantry had brought and a number of Chinese carts which the marines secured in the vicinity of Tien-Tsin. A pack train arrived just in time to join the expedition, relieving the wagons of a considerable part of their loads of ammunition. Main dependence was, however, placed on the flotilla of Chinese junks in the Peiho River, near which the road to Peking found its way. The main supply of rations and other stores was carried on the junks, the wagons being used to haul from them to the troops.

The expedition moved out August 4, and camped at Siku Arsenal, 3 miles north of Tien-Tsin walled city. Early the next morning, August 5, the Japanese fought the battle of Peitsang, driving the Chinese regular troops from an entrenched position, and sustaining a loss of 60 killed, 240 wounded. There were a few casualties among the British and Russians, the latter being on the east side of the Peiho River, but the Americans were in reserve and suffered no losses. The advance was resumed the following day, the American and British troops crossing the river to the east

side and the Japanese continuing on the west. The Chinese had intrenched again at Yangtsun, 12 miles farther on, and awaited the advance of the allies. The country was nearly level, and the railroad pursued a straight course northward, most of the way on an embankment, to Yangtsun, at which place it crossed from the east to the west side of the river and continued toward Peking, leaving the course of the stream. The Americans followed the railroad embankment; the British and Russians kept the road near the river, giving them a longer march. The Japanese met obstacles on their side in the nature of inundated country and broken bridges, delaying their progress.

The Chinese position near Yangtsun was approached about 11 a. m., after a very hot and exhausting march, the men suffering intensely from thirst. They were obliged to go into battle in fields of high millet with no water in their canteens. The Ninth Infantry, the marines, and the battery crossed to the east side of the railroad when the firing began, and the battery did excellent service against villages to the eastward of Yangtsun, which were occupied by Chinese guns and infantry. It was advanced rapidly, the marines being in support, and was kept well up with the infantry firing line, at one time receiving a stiff musketry fire at close range. Much of the battery's firing was done by quadrant elevation, the high millet preventing a clear view of the field. Captain Reilly and Lieutenants Summerall and McCloskey observed the shots from housetops, an observation ladder, or the tops of ammunition chests, exposing themselves boldly in order to secure the greatest effectiveness of their guns. The Ninth Infantry, on the right flank of the allied forces, had one battalion deployed, the others in support. They advanced steadily, clearing out the villages as they passed, and at times were subjected to accurate shrapnel fire as well as musketry.

On the other side of the railroad, between it and the river, the Russians opened with volleys at long range, and British and Russian batteries shelled the Chinese intrenchments and Chinese guns, which were in positions near the railroad station, close by the bridge. The Fourteenth Infantry, fighting


alongside British Sikhs, pushed forward rapidly without returning the enemy's fire, and when within a few hundred yards of a small village Colonel Daggett ordered a charge. The Chinese were most gallantly driven out of their position, and a few minutes later the portion of the line nearest the railroad embankment charged the station. The companies in advance in these movements were Companies K and M, Fourteenth Infantry, leading, Companies L and I in support. With the former were Lieutenant Burnside and Captain Martin, and with the latter Lieutenant McClure and Captain Taylor. Other officers, nongraduates, were there too, among whom Lieutenant Murphy was mentioned for magnificent conduct throughout the fight, being the first to reach the enemy's position at the railroad station. The Second Battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, commanded by Captain Eastman, was close up in support of the leading one and suffered some losses. It was, in addition, most unfortunate in being fired upon by British or Russian batteries after coming up on the railroad embankment, losing 15 killed and wounded. The losses of the Americans were greater than those of any of the other allies, numbering in all 9 killed, 65 wounded. Many men were prostrated by heat. Sixteen of the wounded died within a few days.

The allies remained in camp at Yangtsun August 7, in accordance with the plan of the generals as agreed upon before departure from Tien-Tsin, and arrangements were perfected for farther advance. During the night of the 6th and early morning of the 7th First Lieut. Louis R. Burgess ('92), of the field artillery, made a plucky march with a handful of men from Tien-Tsin to Yang-tsun to overtake the battery, having just arrived from Manila.

The march of the allies from Yang-tsun August 8 to the immediate vicinity of Peking was not seriously opposed. The Japanese, who were in the lead, brushed away all detachments in their front and easily forced open the gates at the walled towns. It was an exhausting march on account of the heat and dust. At Matow 100 exhausted and sick men were left with detachments of the other allies, the 100 Americans being

under the command of Captain Hasbrouck, Fourteenth Infantry. On the 12th the expedition arrived at Tung-chow, a walled city on the Pei-ho River, at the point where the route to Peking left the river and took a westerly course following an old canal and paved road. Peking was about 13 miles distant. Here again the Russian general was disposed to delay, but the others favored marching at once to Peking. It was finally decided to spend the 13th of August in reconnaissance, and in moving forward to a line about 6 miles from Peking, where the plan of attack should be determined. But early on the 14th it was ascertained that the Russians had pushed on during the night, without waiting for a conference, and were already at the Tung-pien gate of Peking.

General Chaffee, as soon as he learned the whereabouts of the Russians, ordered Cabell's troop forward, and supported it shortly after by a battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry. The cavalry advanced to within 1½ miles of the wall, driving off small detachments of Boxers, but was then opposed by a superior force, and fell back 500 yards to a village, where it withstood the enemy until the arrival of General Chaffee with the battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry. Both Captain Cabell and his lieutenant, Guiney, were recommended by General Chaffee for good judgment and gallant conduct in these maneuvers. All the American command was ordered up, and the battery was placed in position to fire first at the high pagoda over the southeast corner of the Tartar wall. Twenty thorite shells were fired at a range of 3,200 yards. Soon afterwards it was ordered forward about a mile and opened on the enemy occupying the east wall of the Chinese city from the northeast corner southward. Its fire in that direction, together with the fire of the Fourteenth Infantry companies, was effective along the wall to the next gate, Shawomen, and against the pagoda surmounting that gate, driving off the Chinese and clearing the way for the entrance of the British column at that point an hour or two later. In the meantime the second battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, having its companies moved forward under the personal direction of General Chaffee and directed toward outlying villages to drive off Chinese snipers, gradually worked onward, drawing fire from the Tartar wall; but



UNITED STATES INFANTRY MOVING UP TO THE GATE, PEKIN.

finally, by rushes, two companies crossed by a bridge near the northeast corner of the Chinese wall, to the wall itself, which was not occupied by the enemy in that immediate vicinity. They halted there to observe the situation; a packed and confused crowd of Russian troops occupying the Tung-pien gate further on. These were companies E and H.

To successfully oppose the fire from the Tartar wall it appeared to be necessary to gain the top of the Chinese wall. Musician Calvin P. Titus, of Company E, volunteered to attempt it first, and under the breathless attention of his officers and comrades succeeded in scaling it by finding footholds on each side at an angle made by a bastion with the curtain. He climbed thus 22 feet, and was the first American on the wall. He was quickly followed by Captain Learned, adjutant, and Lieutenant Gohn, who commanded Company E. Other men of the company were assisted to the top with ropes and ladders made of poles and wire, and at the same time Company H succeeded in ascending at a similar angle not far away. The attention of these companies was first given to the fire from the pagoda of the Sha-Huo gate, southward, aiding the battery which was engaged, as mentioned before, in driving the Chinese from that position; then to the buildings within the wall near the Tsung-Pien-Men, but the proximity of the Russians prevented much effective fire in that direction or toward the Tartar wall. The colors of the Fourteenth Infantry were brought up at this time and placed on the wall, and Captain Crozier and Lieutenant Ferguson were among those who climbed to the top a short time later.

It was now about 11.30 a. m. A situation had developed at the Tung-pien gate which called for energetic and intrepid action. The Russians had succeeded in blowing in the massive doors with artillery some hours before, and, after much fighting with considerable loss, had pushed their way in and endeavored to gain the open ground in front of the Tartar wall—an immense wall 40 feet high with bastions and crenelated crest extending across the city from east to west, dividing the Chinese section on the south from the Tartar section on the north—but the fire from the bastions and from the pagoda at the southeast angle of the wall had

stopped them. Infantry and artillery were standing in a confused crowd at the gate and sheltering themselves among the buildings just within, unable to advance.

The Japanese had been engaged all the morning at other gates farther north; the British were approaching the Sha-Huo gate to the south, from which the enemy had been driven by the American battery and the Fourteenth Infantry companies, as already described, their fire being supplemented later by a British battery, which came into action on their line of approach from Tung-Chow.

It was at this moment that General Chaffee came up in person to the Tsung-Pien gate, observed the situation, and determined to push through the Russians and move his artillery and infantry to the front, where they could do something. His own intrepid and determined character, supported by the intelligent and energetic action of Colonel Daggett and Captain Reilly, brought life and action into what had become a stalled and well-nigh defeated attack. The official account of the battery's part in the action, as written for the War Department records by one of its lieutenants, states:

An officer of the Fourteenth Infantry reported that a part of the regiment had reached the wall but needed some guns to subdue the Chinese fire. Captain Reilly took Lieutenant Summerall's platoon forward. The guns soon came under the Chinese fire from the tower of the Sha-Huo gate. They immediately opened fire from the road at the northeast corner of the Chinese city wall, enfilading the east wall and driving the Chinese from the Sha-Huo gate. The platoon then advanced to the Tsung-Pien gate, which was found open. The narrow street inside the wall was packed with Russian troops. Many Russian dead were lying outside. The Russians were all under cover of the brick and mud buildings along the street. Two guns were pointed toward the walls of the Tartar city, but fired only a few shots after the American guns arrived. The heavy firing of the previous night was at once explained. The Russians had stormed the gate and had blown it open with their guns, but were unable to advance beyond it. They had lost severely and were trying to keep under cover until help came. The platoon drove into the street, but found it blocked by the Russian guns and carts. An officer of the Russian battery spoke to Lieutenant Summerall and said that it was useless for the Americans to try to advance farther, as he had tried to rush his guns forward and lost every horse in the first carriage, which he had to abandon. The Chinese occupied the walls of the Tartar city 100 yards away, and were firing through the crenelated

parapet with great accuracy at every exposed part of the street. The Russian guns were moved by the men of the platoon and one of our guns opened fire from its position, as there was no other place in the street through which a gun could fire. Captain Reilly rode through an alley to the left of the street and found an open space for the two guns. The piece not in action started through the alley, but the space was too narrow and the gun carriage jammed. Fortunately, just at this section of the alley one side was a brick wall, which the cannoneers quickly tore down, enabling the gun to pass. The alley was enfiladed from the Tartar wall, and but for the rapid and effective fire of the gun in action the section in the alley would probably have suffered. As soon as the advance piece opened fire from the left, the piece in the street was placed beside it, and from this position the south wall of the Tartar city was enfiladed; and all that portion of the east wall, including the pagoda, from which the Chinese could fire into the Chinese city, was commanded. The guns fired with rapidity and effect, at ranges of from 200 yards to as great as necessary to reach the Hai-Ta-Men gate. The shrapnel demolished the parapet and sent fragments of brick along with the bullets, sweeping the top of the wall. In this way the bastions were attacked successively.

The moat along the south side of the Tartar city wall is crossed by a stone bridge from the Tung-Pien gate. This bridge was swept by the Chinese fire when the guns went into action, but in a short while it could be crossed with safety. The remainder of the battery and the American infantry came up shortly afterwards and advanced across the Tang-Sang bridge into the Chinese city. Captain Reilly ordered Lieutenant Summerall to continue enfilading the Tartar wall and cover the advance of the Americans along the streets parallel to the walls. Shortly afterwards orders came to move the platoon forward. It had not gone far when other orders directed it to return and resume firing, because the Chinese reoccupied the wall as soon as firing ceased. The platoon remained in this position, sweeping the walls with its fire until 5.30 p. m. Most of the Russian troops followed the Americans into the city. The American marines remained with the platoon until about 4 p. m., when they were ordered back to guard the wagon train. The caissons and the battery wagon remained with the left platoon. The marines had occupied the wall of the Chinese city at the Tung-Pien gate and kept down the fire from that direction. After they withdrew the Chinese on the east wall of the Tartar city endeavored to reach the guns with their fire, but sufficient protection was afforded by the north wall of the Chinese city. At about 4.30 p. m. a Russian officer sent a note to Lieutenant Summerall, requesting that he cease firing long enough to permit the two remaining Russian guns to pass in front of his guns, as he had orders to withdraw. There was then left at the gate a small detachment of Cossacks. As nothing had been heard of the American troops since they

left the platoon that morning, Sergeant Wolfe was sent to learn their whereabouts. He returned and reported that they were in camp near the Chien-Men gate. Lieutenant Summerall then proceeded to the camp with his platoon, and the caissons, battery wagon, and spare horses. On the way one of the spare horses succumbed from exhaustion. This was the first horse lost after the disembarkation. The Japanese who attacked the east wall of the Tartar city with their entire force early on the 14th were heavily engaged until 10 o'clock at night, when the main gate was blown in and the wall was captured. It was afterwards learned that the British entered the Sha-Huo gate shortly after the Chinese had been driven from it by the left platoon and the Fourteenth Infantry. They advanced along the center of the Chinese city to a point opposite the legations, being protected by the American fire from the Chinese on the south wall of the Tartar city.

Colonel Daggett's account of events at this juncture reads as follows:

About 11:20 a. m. General Chaffee's attention was called to the Fourteenth Infantry flag on the wall near the Tung gate. The British advance being near relieved the American left. General Chaffee then ordered all of his troops that had not entered the city to move to the Tung gate. Here everything was in confusion. A Russian battery and company of infantry were in the narrow street. The American troops that had just arrived were trying to press their way through. Reilly somehow forced two of his guns—the left platoon—through, and by tearing down a building got them into action. While tearing down the building one of the guns fired into the tower from the narrow street. In this he was assisted by Captain Eastman with a company of the Fourteenth Infantry. Lieutenant Burgess says: "Lieutenant Kilbourne, Fourteenth Infantry, rendered valuable assistance by covering the movement of the platoon in this position with a squad of infantry under his command."

The artillery and infantry fire soon drove the Chinese out of the tower and rendered the crossing of the Tan-Sang bridge comparatively safe. The left platoon remained in this position, firing on the south wall of the Tartar city until 5.30 in the afternoon. The four other guns crossed the Tan-Sang bridge and ford and proceeded in a westerly direction. At the crossing of the street near the Haita gate a gun was put in position to silence the fire at that point from the wall, which it did. The first platoon then proceeded to and entered the Chien gate, and fired one shot at the gate of the Imperial city, when orders were received to suspend further operations.

The center platoon, Lieutenant McCloskey, escorted by a platoon of the Ninth Infantry under Lieutenant Welborn, proceeded also along a

street parallel to the wall of the Tartar city, and when within about 400 yards of the Haita gate fired about 22 shots into it. Moving to the western opening of the gate it fired 2 shells into the opening, "raising the portcullis 18 inches from the ground." The battery was then assembled for the purpose of entering the grounds of the legations.

During the forenoon of the 14th, and while the battery was in different positions east of the Chinese city, the third battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry was its support. About noon the Ninth Infantry moved to the Tung-Pien gate, where it was delayed by the crowded condition in the narrow entrance and street beyond. It finally moved forward, following the route passed over by the Fourteenth Infantry and battery. It placed a few men on the buildings to keep down "snipers" that remained on the wall.

The marines acted as guard to the wagon train much of the time. Company A, Lieutenant Butler, was sent to the wall of the Chinese city, and placed a few men thereon to prevent "sniping."

To the American force should be given the credit of clearing the way for the British at the Sha-Huo gate, for taking up the work of the Russians at Tung-Pien gate and carrying it on to success, and for clearing the south wall of the Tartar city from the southeast angle to the Chien gate, thus preparing the way for the British, so that upon entering at the Sha-Huo gate the latter were able to march northward without firing a shot, pass under the Tartar wall at the "water gate," a sluiceway between Hata-Men and Chien-Men, and achieve the distinction of being the first to enter the legations. A better knowledge of the situation of the water gate and the practicability of entering that way would have enabled the Americans to themselves have reaped the glory of appearing first at the legations, a goal which they had justly won by their valor.

The 15th of August, that is, the day following the entrance into the city, was another day of fighting for the Americans. General Chaffee learned from Mr. Edwin H. Conger, the United States minister, that portions of the Imperial city had been used as positions from which to fire upon the legations, and he decided to occupy that locality. The Imperial city was an interior portion of the Tartar city surrounding the still more interior part known as the "forbidden city," which was the residence of the Emperor and Empress Dowager,

the depository of ancient official records, and the storehouse of silks and gold. High walls protected these interior fastnesses and a series of massive gateways, with pagoda-like structures surmounting them, stood across the main north-and-south avenue leading into the most interior throne room.

The camp of the American troops on the night of August 14 was along the south side of the Tartar wall, the legations being just within on the north side. At 7 a. m., August 15, General Chaffee led his command to the Chien gate, which had been held during the night by an American detachment, and sending the marines up into the pagoda the way was cleared of débris by them, giving places for four guns of Reilly's Battery, the center platoon (McCloskey's) being faced westward to sweep the top of the wall to the next gate, and the right platoon (Burgess's) northward to fire over the first gate (Ta-ching-men), a low one, to the pagoda on the Tien-fu gate, 600 yards distant. Summerall's platoon, which had led the preceding day, was held below, sheltered by the wall at the first gate of the Imperial city (Ta-ching-men). The infantry was marched within the Chien-men and was also protected from the fire from the second gate of the Imperial city (Tien-fu-men) by the wall at the first. It was, however, subjected to slight flank fire from the left. The guns on Chien-men in an hour silenced the fire from the pagoda next west on the Tartar wall and were turned on the pagoda at Tien-fu-men, from which the fire was becoming more intense. The Fourteenth Infantry had in the meantime battered down one of the center doors in the Ta-ching-men. Colonel Daggett entered with his staff officers, and observing the necessity of bringing a powerful fire on the Tien-fu-men ordered up Lieutenant Summerall's platoon to burst open the doors on the right and left of the middle door. The area into which entrance was now given was paved with granite, was 600 yards long, terminated at the northern end by the pagoda, gateway, and wall of the Tien-fu-men, and was flanked by the walls of long storehouses.

Colonel Daggett ordered in a platoon of his regiment, put the guns in position at the battered portals, including a Ninth Infantry gatling gun, under the command, at the time, of

Lieutenant Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, and at the same moment the remaining guns of Reilly's Battery and the marines on Chien-men, in rear, redoubled their fire. It was a tremendous fusilade of a most unique and spectacular character. The Chinese were unable to withstand it long and at the end of an hour, under the influence of this fire and flank attacks on side streets by companies of the Fourteenth Infantry, retired from Tien-fu-men. But in the combat the Americans lost Captain Reilly, killed while sighting one of his guns on Chien-men, also 4 men of the Fourteenth Infantry and 1 of the Ninth Infantry, killed at the gateway, 1 officer (marine) and 21 men wounded. It was now possible to advance to the Tien-fu-men. The heavy doors in this were battered down by Summerall's guns, and the way was open for fire on the next gate (Tuan-men). The return fire of the Chinese was not so severe, and was shortly silenced. The command then advanced to Tuan-men, opened it as before, and came in view of the Wu-men, which is the entrance to the forbidden city, and was practically undefended. Here the advance was stayed, as a council of the commanding generals decided that the crowning achievement of the campaign, the final act of overthrow of the enemy, should be participated in by all the powers. The other allies had so far taken little part in the closing scene of the drama. The Americans, although withdrawn on August 15, were returned to the Imperial city August 19, and finally were left in possession of the Wu-men.

The march into the forbidden city was made as a formal military display on Tuesday, August 28, 1900, all the allies taking part with detachments approximately proportionate to their military forces in China. The order of entry and the number of men of each nation was as follows:

1. Russians . . . . .	800
2. Japanese . . . . .	800
3. English . . . . .	400
4. American . . . . .	400
5. French . . . . .	400
6. German . . . . .	250
7. Italian . . . . .	60
8. Austrian . . . . .	60

The American contingent was made up of detachments from all the organizations which participated in the march to Peking.

General Chaffee's report of these operations and his endorsements on the reports of subordinate commanders gives credit to many officers for gallant conduct and meritorious service. Among the graduates mentioned are the following:

*Personal staff officers.*—Second Lieut. Roy B. Harper, Seventh Cavalry, aid-de-camp; First Lieut. John W. Furlong, Sixth Cavalry, acting aid-de-camp, and First Lieut. Benjamin B. Hyer, Sixth Cavalry, acting aid-de-camp, for gallantry at Yang-tsun and Peking.

*Expeditionary staff officers.*—Captain Grote Hutcheson, Sixth Cavalry, for special efficiency as acting adjutant-general and fine soldierly qualities under fire; Major George P. Scriven, signal officer, for efficient service as chief signal officer and for gallantry at Yang-tsun and Peking; Captain William Crozier, Ordnance Department, chief ordnance officer, for active assistance on the field of battle and gallantry at Yang-tsun and Peking; First Lieut. Harley B. Ferguson, Corps of Engineers, for valuable services as acting aid-de-camp, and coolness and bravery under fire; Captain Frank DeW. Ramsey, Ninth Infantry, chief quartermaster and chief commissary, for especially meritorious and arduous services in his departments, in which he was ably assisted by Second Lieut. Malin Craig, Sixth Cavalry; Lieut. Colonel John S. Mallory, Forty-first Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Second Infantry), for tactfulness and good judgment in the performance of special duties assigned him at the headquarters of the commanding general of the Japanese forces; Major Samuel M. Mills, Sixth Artillery, for similar services at the headquarters of the commanding general, English forces.

*Ninth Infantry.*—Captain Frederick L. Palmer, commanding a battalion during the march, for marked efficiency.

*Fourteenth Infantry.*—Captain Frank F. Eastman, for efficient services during the battle at Peking; Captain Charles H. Martin and Captain John R. M. Taylor, for gallant and

efficient services at Yang-tsun and at Peking; Captain Henry G. Learned, for conspicuous gallantry and efficient services in scaling the wall of the Chinese city of Peking; First Lieut. Joseph F. Gohn and Second Lieut. James Hanson, for scaling the wall of the Chinese city at Peking; Second Lieut. Albert N. McClure, Fifth Cavalry (serving with Fourteenth Infantry), for gallant and distinguished conduct while commanding his company in the battle for the possession of the gate to the Imperial city, Peking; and Musician Calvin P. Titus (who afterwards entered the Military Academy as a Cadet), for daring and gallant conduct, in that he was the first to scale the wall of the Chinese city, Peking.

*Sixth Cavalry.*—Captain De Rosey C. Cabell, for gallant and efficient services near Peking; Second Lieut. Patrick W. Guiney, for coolness and gallantry in action near Peking.

*Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery.*—First Lieut. Charles P. Summerall, for gallantry in action and for efficient services while in command of his platoon storming the gate to the Imperial city, Peking.

Graduates mentioned in the reports of other officers were First Lieut. Thomas M. Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, by Colonel Daggett and Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge, for good work with the Gatling gun at the gate of the Imperial city; Captain William B. Reynolds, quartermaster, Fourteenth Infantry, by Colonel Daggett, for gallant conduct at Yang-tsun; First Lieut. Louis M. Nuttman and First Lieut. William A. Burnside, by Major Quinton, who commanded the leading battalion, Fourteenth Infantry, at Yang-tsun, and who reported also that every officer in his battalion earned and deserved special mention and reward.

Lieutenant-Colonel Coolidge reported, as regimental commander, Ninth Infantry, at Yang-tsun, that the officers did their duty faithfully during the entire day. At Peking, he stated that "while the officers and men were zealous in the performance of the duties that fell to their lot, yet the position of the regiment as second in a column where the front was very restricted, gave them little opportunity to display any marked acts calling for special recommendation, except

in the case of Lieutenant Corcoran, Sixth Cavalry, with Gatling gun."

Major Quinton said, in his report for August 15, at Peking:

I desire to bring to the especial notice of the general commanding, for gallantry, coolness, and soldierly behavior in this action, Captains C. H. Martin and J. R. M. Taylor, and Lieuts. W. A. Burnside and A. N. McClure.

Lieutenant-General Sir Alfred Gaselee, commanding British forces, transmitted to General Chaffee extracts from reports of his officers, mentioning Captain Taylor (also Major Quinton, a nongraduate) at Yang-tsun, attention being called to Captain Taylor "for the very gallant way he led his men to attack the second village under a heavy fire, and also for the great help he gave in forming the men up for the second attack on the village."

After the relief of the legations, Peking was divided into districts for police and general administrative control, the Americans being assigned portions of the Tartar city, and the Chinese city, besides holding the control of the principal entrance to the Forbidden city, the Japanese controlling the other gates.

While the advance to Peking was in progress the First and Third squadrons, Sixth Cavalry, remained at Tien-tsin, guarding American supplies accumulating there, and assisting in the protection of the city. Their horses arrived at Ta-ku and were forwarded to Tien-Tsin as soon as they could be put ashore. The city and the line of communication to the relief expedition were threatened during the first part of August, and First Lieut. Elvin R. Heiberg, Sixth Cavalry, encountered a considerable force while reconnoitering with his troop, but suffered no losses, although the enemy's line was approached to within 200 yards.

Several thousand Boxers congregated at a walled town about 5 miles from Tien-Tsin, and a plan was made to disperse them. It was executed under the direction of Brigadier-General Dorward, British army, 6 troops of the Sixth Cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wint—about 500 men—constituting the chief part of the force. English and Japanese were

the other participants. The command moved out from Tien-Tsin early in the morning of August 19, and under the guidance of First Lieut. Francis C. Marshall, Sixth Cavalry, who had made himself familiar with the locality, came in contact with the Boxers about 6 a. m. Troops A, C, and D were commanded by Captain Augustus P. Blocksom; Troops I, K, and L, by Captain William W. Forsyth. Blocksom's squadron had the advance and developed the enemy's strength, coming under fire about 6 a. m., and being more or less engaged fighting on foot and advancing until 9.30 a. m. The British contingent of about 350 men then came into action on the left of the allies, and "Captain Blocksom mounted his squadron and made a splendid and most successful charge, completely routing the enemy, who dispersed in all directions, no longer showing fight." (Lieutenant-Colonel Wint's report.) Captain Forsyth's squadron was at first in support, and later operated on the right flank. General Chaffee's indorsement, forwarding the report of this engagement, stated the importance of the action as follows:

The defeat and routing of the Boxers and Chinese troops, about 5,000, near Tien-Tsin, August 19, 1900, was practically the work of the Sixth Cavalry, splendidly handled by Lieut. Colonel T. J. Wint, commanding the regiment, and Captains Blocksom and Forsyth, squadron commanders, who were ably assisted by troop commanders. Every officer was keenly intent on the work before him and watchful for his opportunity and the moment he might strike with vigor. The victory had far-reaching effect. It relieved Tien-Tsin of the near presence of a considerable body of the enemy, which was daily increasing in numbers and threatened the security of our base of supply and line of communication to Taku Bay.

He recommended Lieutenant-Colonel Wint, Captains Blocksom and Forsyth, and Lieutenant Marshall to be brevetted "for gallant conduct in battle."

The strength of the American force in China was further augmented in August by the arrival of headquarters and one battalion of the Fifteenth Infantry, under command of Colonel Edward Moale, Fifteenth Infantry, and a battalion of the Third Artillery, equipped as infantry.

The graduates with the Fifteenth Infantry were: Major Edgar B. Robertson ('74), Captain James A. Maney ('77),

Captain Samuel E. Smiley ('85), Captain Edmund Wittenmyer ('87), First Lieut. John McA. Palmer ('92), First Lieut. George McD. Weeks ('92), First Lieut. John K. Moore ('97), Second Lieut. Arthur S. Cowan ('99).

With the Third Artillery: Captain Charles H. Hunter ('80), Captain Charles A. Bennett ('81), First Lieut. Archibald Campbell ('89), First Lieut. William S. McNair ('90), First Lieut. George H. McManus ('93), Second Lieut. Henry B. Clark ('99).

Brigadier-General Thomas H. Barry, U. S. Volunteers ('77), arrived with the Fifteenth Infantry battalion for temporary duty in China, proceeding to Manila early in September. Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, U. S. Volunteers ('60), accompanied by his aid de camp, First Lieut. James H. Reeves, Second Cavalry ('92), arrived the first week of September, reporting to General Chaffee at Peking on September 7. General Wilson's former residence and travels in China fitted him especially for service there, and he had been selected by the President for duty as second in command of the United States forces.

General Chaffee organized his troops into two brigades on September 4, the First Brigade comprising all troops at Peking, General Wilson commanding; the Second Brigade, all troops at and in the vicinity of Tien-Tsin, Colonel Moale, Fifteenth Infantry, commanding. The third squadron, Sixth Cavalry, had previously been brought to Peking and was included in the First Brigade.

During the months succeeding the relief of Peking the allies sent small expeditions from time to time into the country surrounding Peking and Tien-Tsin to gain information, suppress marauding Boxers, and repel Chinese regular troops, but the Americans experienced no losses, and their encounters with the enemy were of minor importance.

Lieutenant Hyer, commanding Troop L, Sixth Cavalry, while reconnoitering with 63 men of his troop, September 3 to 6, displayed marked courage in attacking and routing a force of about 500 imperial troops at a town 25 miles from Peking. He succeeded in making a surprise, killed 27, wounded 40, captured 150 rifles, and secured the personal

flag of the military governor of the Province. For highly gallant conduct in this affair he was recommended by General Chaffee to be brevetted major, and Second Lieut. Wallace B. Scales, Sixth Cavalry, was recommended to be brevetted first lieutenant.

September 9 to 13 Companies C and D, Fifteenth Infantry, commanded by Major Robertson, joined a force of allies marching from Tien-Tsin to operate against a force of Boxers at Tu-liu, 22 miles distant. The place was occupied without opposition and the command returned to Tien-Tsin.

September 17-18 a force of about 2,000 allies was organized at Peking to drive the Boxers from the vicinity of the Hun-ho River and the Pa-ta-chow temples west of Peking. The British and American contingent operated together under the command of Brigadier-General James H. Wilson. First Lieut. Charles D. Rhodes, Sixth Cavalry, who had previously been detailed as adjutant-general of the First Brigade, acted as adjutant-general of the expeditionary force, and Captain Martin, Fourteenth Infantry, as quartermaster. The American contingent comprised two battalions of the Ninth Infantry, one battalion of the Fourteenth Infantry, a platoon of artillery, and a detachment of cavalry. The Boxers were believed to be in considerable force and occupying a strong position, but they were easily flanked out and put to flight, offering slight resistance.

Captain Forsyth, Sixth Cavalry, commanded several scouting expeditions from Peking, consisting of one, two, or three troops of cavalry. His command usually came within close range of the enemy and experienced brisk encounters, but, as usual, without casualties, owing to the poor marksmanship of the Chinese.

A number of staff officers and officers assigned to special duties of observation reported to General Chaffee in August and September, having been sent to China in contemplation of a largely increased force and much more extended operations.

Among the staff officers were Major James B. Aleshire, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain, acting quartermaster) ('80); Major John T. Knight, quartermaster, U. S.

Volunteers (captain, acting quartermaster) ('84); Major John C. W. Brooks, quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Fourth Artillery) ('85); Captain George C. Barnhardt, acting quartermaster, U. S. Volunteers (first lieutenant, Sixth Cavalry) ('92); Major Hugh J. Gallagher, commissary of subsistence, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Sixth Cavalry) ('84); Captain William H. Bean, commissary of subsistence ('86); Captain George Montgomery, Ordnance Department ('90).

The officers assigned to special duty, in addition to those already named, were Major Alexander Rogers, Fourth Cavalry ('75); Lieut. Colonel Joseph T. Dickman, Twenty-sixth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Eighth Cavalry) ('81); Major William E. Craighill, Fortieth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Corps of Engineers) ('85); Major Charles H. Muir, Thirty-eighth Infantry, U. S. Volunteers (captain, Second Infantry) ('85).

Two officers of the Ninth Infantry joined their regiment from detached service, viz, Captain Frank L. Dodds ('79), and Captain Mark L. Hersey ('87). Captain Thomas S. McCabb, Ninth Infantry ('75), was en route to join, but upon reaching Ta-ku was compelled to return to the United States on account of physical disability. First Lieut. Benjamin M. Hartshorne, jr. ('96), joined the Ninth Infantry from detached service in February, 1901, and First Lieut. George S. Simonds ('99), upon promotion in March, 1901. Captain Thomas Ridgeway, Fifth Artillery ('83), arrived to assume command of the battery upon promotion, vice Reilly. First Lieut. Julian R. Lindsey, Tenth Cavalry ('92), reported for duty September 7 as aid-de-camp to General Chaffee, and Lieut. Colonel Henry O. S. Heistand, assistant adjutant-general ('78), arriving in September, was announced September 27 as adjutant-general of the expedition.

The purpose of the United States Government to reduce the strength of the American force in China was published in orders September 29, and on October 21 the brigade organization was discontinued, the movement to the Philippines of all except the expeditionary staff, the Ninth Infantry, the Third Squadron, Sixth Cavalry, and Light Battery F, Fifth Artillery, beginning the same day. Thereafter the

force remaining in China was regarded as a legation guard, but it retained its designation as the China Relief Expedition until the 19th of May, 1901, holding forces at Tong-hu, Tien-Tsin, and Tung-chow, and guarding portions of the Tartar city and Chinese city, Peking. Then a further reduction was made, General Chaffee and his staff and all troops except one company departing to the Philippines. From May, 1901, one company (B, Ninth Infantry) was left as legation guard, Major Robertson, Ninth Infantry, remaining as commanding officer, Captain Byron as quartermaster, and Lieutenant Welborn, Ninth Infantry, as adjutant and commissary.

The service of the American officers during the period of occupation of the Chinese cities, October, 1900, to May, 1901, was characterized by its justness and moderation in the treatment of the people, so much so that the inhabitants of the American districts in Peking petitioned the United States forces to remain and retain control of their districts as long as any foreign troops occupied the city. These petitions were addressed, one to Major Robertson, who, upon transfer from the Fifteenth Infantry to the Ninth Infantry, remained in China upon the departure of the former regiment, having charge as provost-marshal in the American district of the Tartar city, and the other to Captain John C. F. Tillson, Fourteenth Infantry, who was detached from his regiment upon its departure, and had charge as provost-marshal in the American district, Chinese city. But the withdrawal of the American forces had been fully determined upon by the United States Government, and was carried into effect at the end of May, 1901, the transports *Sumner*, *Indiana*, and *Pak-ling*, having on board the squadron of the Sixth Cavalry, the battery, and the Ninth Infantry, except one company, sailing from Ta-ku for Manila on May 25 and 27.

By joining with so much promptness, strength, and effectiveness in the operations in China the United States of America demonstrated perhaps more decidedly than in any preceding incident of their history their position as a military power in the world and brought most distinctly to the minds of all

observers their readiness to take part in, and assert their influence over, the affairs of the Far East. Officers and enlisted men of the force who participated in the several expeditions and conflicts in the efforts to relieve the beleaguered legations exhibited to the soldiers of foreign nations the bravery, determination, resourcefulness, and intelligence of the American, and drew forth many expressions of admiration and esteem.

The graduates of the Military Academy were staff officers and commanders in subordinate positions. As such their places of duty were in the forefront of battle, leading their men or arranging and directing the details of administration, transportation, and supply. Everywhere they displayed intelligence, courage, and resourcefulness, maintaining honorably the good name of the Alma Mater.

[PREVIOUS](#)

[NEXT](#)