


SERVICE OF GRADUATES IN THE CIVIL WAR.

By Major W. E. BIRKHIMER,
Artillery Corps, U. S. Military Academy, 1870.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.




INFANTRY PRIVATE
CAMPAIGN DRESS,
CIVIL WAR, 1861-
1865.

WHEN the American civil war broke out in 1861, fifty-nine years after the founding of the Military Academy, no graduate of that institution had ever served except by virtue of brevet rank as a general officer in the line of the U. S. Army. Mr. Jefferson Davis alone of its graduates had been appointed to the full grade of brigadier-general therein, which, however, he declined.

The circumstance did not indicate want of faith in the value of military education to the soldier. Evidence of this everywhere appeared; the Academy had grown constantly in public favor; all the generals who commanded during the Mexican war, several of whom then were appointed from civil life, cheerfully bore testimony to the great obligations they were under to their educated subor-

ordinates. It was seen that those fitted for future command were coming to the front in the ranks of the latter. An opportunity soon was offered of giving practical expression to this appreciation. In 1855 the line of the Army was increased one-fifth. Of the 16 field officers thus newly provided for, 15 were graduates of West Point. While, therefore, down to the beginning of 1861 no graduates had attained the grade of general officers in the line of the Army, they were in a position to step forward at once whenever those who so long had filled those stations should vacate them.



Map of the
SEAT OF WAR

1861-1865.

Scale of Miles.
0 20 40 80 100

93 91 89 87 85 83 81 Longitude West 79 from Greenwich. 77 75

93 91 89 87 Longitude West 85 from Greenwich. 83 81 79 77

The truth is that the benefits of the Academy upon the military establishment came soon to be acknowledged not only in the Army, but throughout the country, and especially in the Congress of the United States. This commenced to be manifested in the proceedings of Congress soon after the war of 1812, and simply reflected the public conviction that education was essential to the best type of soldier, and although assaults were made from time to time in the national legislature upon the institution, the latter truly may be said to have gathered strength with the growth of the nation. During the forty years subsequent to the reorganization of the Army in 1821 most of the officers appointed to commissions were graduates. If they had not risen to highest command they were the trusted advisers of those who had. Quietly, but certainly, through the six decades from its establishment down to 1861, and with augmenting power, the vivifying and strengthening influence of the scientific military education imparted at the Academy had been doing its salutary work of building an army and a public sentiment upon an intelligent basis, strong in that from the foundation stone it was constructed upon correct military principles.

During this time the careers of the graduates, both in the Army and out of it, gave their alma mater great prestige. It was, therefore, not a matter of surprise that at the beginning of September, 1861, within a few months of the commencement of the civil war, 6 of the 11 generals in the Regular Army were graduates,^a and of the other 5, mostly superannuated, it is no disparagement to say that they were wholly incapacitated from age and infirmities to cope with demands of the gigantic struggle now precipitated, and, with the sole exception of the gallant first commander of the Second Army Corps, proved wholly unequal to the duties of their stations in the field. The principle was soon adopted of making the appointment of general officer in the Regular Army a reward for conspicuous success in the exercise of a general's command in operations against the enemy. At the conclusion of the war 16 of the 17 regular general officers of the line were graduates,^b the 16 including all the more prominent commanders.

^aArmy Register, p. 3.

^bArmy Register, 1866, p. 3.

There is but one desideratum in a military commander and that is fitness. This fitness is due to many causes. Many who bear commissions can never possess it. It will be found to consist of numerous elements. One of these is a correct understanding of the principles upon which military operations should be conducted. The foundation for this is attempted to be given at schools such as the Military Academy. Another, the very central idea of such schools, is discipline, its true nature and necessity. Another is the knowledge, gathered from experience, of the minutia of service and the application thereof to soldiers singly or in mass. Another is fortitude and courage. This is only a partial list, but all these elements are necessary.

It needs no extended demonstration to show what an advantage the West Point education, if properly utilized, is to those who enter at the foot of a profession where, to attain success, the before-mentioned elements are fundamental. On the other hand, the circumstance of having received this education places them under peculiarly heavy obligations. The candidate for military honors from that institution can not relax his exertions at the first step of the ladder, or he will fail, as unfortunately frequently has been the case, thus bringing reproach not only upon himself, but also upon the academy that gave him so many preliminary advantages, and lending a color to the assertion that such education is of little benefit.

Besides, the enumerated and other necessary elements may be acquired by one who has not enjoyed such early educational facilities, but who, cultivating assiduously the talents that nature has given him and strenuously utilizing the opportunities that experience places in his way, forces himself to the front by dint of sheer worth alone and through success becomes recognized as one who can be safely intrusted with important commands. The civil war furnished numerous instances of this kind. Such men should, and they always will, rise above those who can do no more than boast of early superior advantages, but whose lives present them to the world as lacking both the character and earnestness of

purpose even to endeavor adequately to make return to the Government for the favors they have enjoyed.

Of the living graduates when the war commenced, including the classes (two) of 1861, 89 per cent served in either the Union or Confederate army. The 11 per cent remaining seem to have been deterred principally by physical infirmities, some by business relations, and a small number from an apparent desire to remain neutral upon the political issue mainly involved.

Of the 89 per cent who served actively, over 73 per cent—nearly three-fourths—were in the Union Army.

Of the graduates in civil life 55 per cent now reentered the Army on one side or the other, the actual number on each side entering from this class being almost identically the same.

During the war 1 graduate rose to the grade of lieutenant-general, specially revived for him; 6 to that of major-general, and 11 to brigadiers in the Regular Army; 66 to major-general, and 112 to brigadier-general of volunteers, or more than one-third of those engaged rose to the grade of general officer. Nine received the thanks of Congress for conspicuously gallant and important service in battle.

It has been the experience of the United States in all wars that at the commencement political expediency powerfully influenced appointments to military office. The great crisis of 1861 furnished no exception. Of the 5 major-generals of volunteers appointed during that year, 4 were prominent politicians without recognized special military capacity; but, as if to balance the scale, of the brigadier-generals of volunteers appointed about the same time, three-fourths were graduates, a large proportion of these entering from civil life. It apparently was desired and expected that the experience of the Mexican war would be repeated—that politicians would be put in at the head of the volunteer forces to gain whatever of credit flowed from that source, while, to furnish that military experience and knowledge which these political generals notoriously lacked, competent and trusted subordinates were placed close around and under them.

As the war progressed the idea of subordinating military

measures to political considerations was modified, but could not wholly be ignored. Compliance with them furnished in time an awaiting-order list of which President Lincoln remarked that the generals without commands, by whom nobody wanted to be commanded, constituted one of the most onerous burdens of his sorely tried life.

Before the expiration of 1861, however, the true nature of the war became apparent to the Government. Strenuous efforts then were made to discover and place in the higher and more responsible commands those officers who by their antecedents gave promise of being most competent. While high-ranking political generals were not ignored, they were given commands where, it was hoped, their anticipated errors would do the least harm. By the 1st of January, 1863, two-thirds of the major-generals—the highest grade at that time—in the vast army called into the service of the Union were graduates, which proportion was fairly well maintained throughout the war. Under this policy, which was a complete “about face” from the original before commented upon, the command of large bodies of troops was, with few exceptions, given into the hands of experienced and trained soldiers. The position of general officer in the Regular Army was made a reward for command successfully exercised against the enemy.

At the beginning of the last year of the war (1865) the names of graduates alone appeared in the list of generals of the line of the Regular Army.^a It is true that the military capacity of some of these had been anticipated, they having been appointed for what they were expected to do; the rest had been appointed for great fitness actually shown while in command and for success achieved; and it furnishes a curious and instructive lesson to examine the names in these two classes and contemplate what each class accomplished toward the successful prosecution of the war.

It would be comparatively easy perhaps to account for the services of the nearly 300 graduates who during the civil war rose to the grade of general officer in the Union Army.

What were the other 500 or so doing? In the first place be it remembered that one in five of the whole number engaged

^a Army Register, January 1, 1860.

in all grades laid down his life as an earnest of devotion to the cause he maintained; and secondly, one-third of the whole number was wounded more or less severely. Thus in the most highly honorable manner the full extent of the possible field service was impaired. Those who did not secure the coveted star on the shoulder were mainly engaged in the administrative bureaus and in the staff, where their services were indispensable to the maintenance of efficiency in the troops. Moreover, in a war on that scale, when every resource of government was put in requisition, there was everywhere a demand for officers who had a knowledge of ordinary military affairs, and who in addition could be useful in conducting various new departments which the diversity and immensity of military operations brought into existence. Sick or disabled officers were, until recovery, temporarily placed upon any duty that their physical condition would justify. This was the practice in all grades, but necessarily more so in the lower, where, with the greater numbers, casualties were the more numerous.

The plan worked admirably. It enabled these officers, skilled in routine military affairs, especially office work, to serve the Government while they were convalescing, almost if not quite as acceptably as if commanding their troops in presence of the enemy. Not only was this important at the time, but having regard to individual rights and not only present but future governmental pecuniary responsibility, nothing could exceed the importance of the record work thus done. Graduates of experience, convalescents or otherwise, were mainly relied upon to systematize this class of labor; and because it had three times as many graduates at its disposal, it followed that the National Government was much better off in this respect than the Confederacy.

Then there was the class of graduates who, due to various causes, occupied subordinate positions in the field, either in staff duties or commanding troops. To take in the whole military situation we must glance not only toward the top, but down the line. There was not room for all in the upper grades, consequently many were consigned to the lower. That

they served there was nothing to their discredit. Many graduated after the war commenced, when the upper grades were filled, not always with good commanders to be sure, but having been placed on the lists it was difficult to get rid of the inefficient; consequently it often happened that abler and better soldiers were compelled to remain in the lower ranks. Here they constituted a substantial and well-recognized element of strength by reason of professional accomplishments, their imbued discipline, and knowledge of military details.

It was the fortune of this class to labor in a field of duty where the rewards, if not conspicuous before the country, were yet those dear to the heart of every true soldier; a consciousness of service faithfully rendered, and of return made to the full extent of ability and opportunity for that education which the wisdom and beneficence of the Government had given them at their beloved alma mater. It is a proud fact that, in the roll of honor of the glorious dead, of the wounded, and of brevets for gallant conduct on the battlefield, this class stands preeminent.

Turning now to the Confederate army, it is rather curious to observe, considering how closely sectional lines were drawn in those days, that of the 296 graduates who entered that army over 13 per cent were born in and over 11 per cent were appointed Cadets from the free States, a fact which gallantry has attributed, and no doubt justly, to the gentler sex. Over 50 per cent became general officers. The rest were employed, as were corresponding subordinate grades in the Union Army, just remarked upon, and they there rendered, to the extent that their numbers permitted, and the internal affairs of their government made possible, equally acceptable military service. Only 14 per cent, or one in seven, of the 296 referred to, were over 50 years of age. With two exceptions, however, those who rose to the full rank of general were over 50, and to this older class of generals belonged all those in whom greatest confidence habitually was reposed and who have left in history reputations as great commanders.

After the first few weeks of the civil war it was recognized by the Confederacy as a struggle to the death. If success

were to be had, it was to be only through the triumph of their arms.

The arts of diplomacy, from which so much at first had been hoped, were soon given their true and secondary place. Promptly the principle was acted upon. Military necessity became at once supreme. Every resource at command of government, or which could be appropriated, was utilized to the utmost to the accomplishment of the one supreme end to be attained. A powerful instrumentality was a properly organized military establishment. It had to be created anew, though some of the more important elements were known, tried, and at hand. Here then was a field where, undeterred by prejudice and errors grown hoary and sanctified by age, an army could be brought into existence with the rank of officers appropriate to the command they were to exercise. At that period, in the councils of the Union, the full grade of lieutenant-general seemed to be regarded as too sacred for any of our officers, because General Washington had held it. The Confederacy was not bound by memories of this character, but went straight to the creation and filling of grades from general down, with an eye single to military efficiency. Graduates alone were appointed to the full grade of general. Of the West Pointers in the Confederate service, 8 were made full generals, 15 lieutenant-generals, 40 major-generals, 88 brigadier-generals. Two only of the Confederate lieutenant-generals were not graduates. The commands appropriate to these grades were, respectively, army, corps, division, brigade.

Above all stood the Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, as constitutional-commander in chief. Nor with him was this an empty military power. He believed that it wisely had been intrusted to his discretion, and he exercised it accordingly. Two ideas seem to have dominated him in this regard: First, that he was entirely competent to pass upon any military exigency when it arose; second, that superior knowledge acquired in the exalted station from which he viewed the whole field of contest rendered it peculiarly appropriate that he should interpose at will his supreme military authority. That he should entertain these sentiments can not be matter of surprise when

his character and previous public service are considered. His was a nature that could not brook a superior, and barely tolerated an equal; and his ability enabled him successfully to practice this rôle. While in the Congress of the United States, both House and Senate, he ever was treated with respect approaching deference by his associates. After the Mexican war, where a brief but brilliant service, joined to political considerations, secured him the tender of a brigadier-generalcy in the Regular Army, his influence as Secretary of War and as Senator became, in all military matters, very great—indeed, in a measure, determining almost without question the military policy of the nation.

When, therefore, he left the Senate, soon to become president of the revolted States, it was not to be wondered at, however much his subordinates might regret the circumstance, that he could not leave unused, when occasion seemed to render it expedient, that military authority with which the constitution of the struggling Confederacy had invested him. Indeed, the existence of the power in his hands was a necessity: the great problem for him to solve, each step big with fate, was when, where, and how to use it wisely.

Careful study of the events of this momentous period leaves no doubt in the mind that the result, upon the whole, of his interference and exercise of military authority was greatly prejudicial to the cause he had espoused.

Under these circumstances good organization was the more necessary to the Confederate army. The one aim was successfully to direct the military resources and energies of the Confederacy. A powerful mean to that end was an appropriate distribution of command from top to bottom. In this way the military power of the Confederacy, with a devotion, energy, and singleness of purpose unsurpassed, was directed toward the attainment of the sole object of its existence—the defeat of the armies of the Union. It was an unequal contest; but proper military organization enabled the Confederacy to make the most of its resources.

The military policy here adopted for selection of commanders is worthy the careful consideration of those to whom, in any government, the supreme appointing power

may be intrusted. It illustrates, in the clearest instance known to recent times, choice of military leaders on the principle of fitness alone. As a condition precedent to an officer being intrusted with important military command it was necessary either that evidence be forthcoming from which his qualifications fairly might be inferred, or that he demonstrate his fitness in operations against the enemy. As on the side of the Union, the appointment of mere politicians to command soldiers could not at first be avoided, but they collapsed at the first blow, and thereafter little consideration was given them as commanders. Thus, the Confederate armies were organized, led, and fought. Failure was due solely to the fact that, happily, the resources of the National Government were too great for those of the rebellion. In the words of the great soldier who led the conquering hosts against the final citadel of Confederate power, let us "hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor." Nor was the invocation uttered in vain.

OPERATIONS, 1861.

For some months after the first hostile shot was fired, the contestants to the civil war, the National and the so-called Confederate government were maneuvering for position, each hoping, with gradually diminishing confidence, that the bitter cup might not be pressed to the lips of an anxious and reluctant people, who dimly appreciated what was meant by this dread trial of arms, yet who felt instinctively that the question at issue was one which could not be compromised, and that the sword alone could settle.

The area of the Confederacy was 733,144 square miles; the interior boundary line, 7,031; coast line, 3,523; shore line, 25,414 miles.^a The white population was 8,289,953; blacks, about 4,000,000.

The population of the States that remained loyal to the Union was about 20,000,000. The war soon assumed the

^a Civil War in America: Draper, vol. 2, p. 138; vol. 1, p. 508.

aspect of this area of 733,144 square miles, with its population, roundly, of 12,000,000, being reduced to the attitude of a beleaguered vast fortress, shut off from supplies by sea, except as occasionally relieved by blockade runners, assailed at the most vital points on the interior line by the armies which the patriotism and resources of 20,000,000 people could muster.

Under these conditions the total of fighting powers which each side could and did put into the field to serve its own necessary purpose were by no means unequal. The Confederates were concentrated and chose their positions to await assault. In three notable instances, namely, Bragg's invasion of Kentucky in 1862 and in Lee's movements north of the Potomac in 1862 and 1863, terminating in the battles of Perryville, Antietam, and Gettysburg, respectively, the besieged attempted sallies for moral effect, to relieve the ravages about their own firesides, and to carry the war into the enemy's country. In each instance the result was disastrous, teaching the lesson that the Confederacy, while well-nigh invincible on its own ground, was too weak successfully to attempt to carry its armies beyond its own territorial limits. This conclusion was disagreeable to the Confederacy. It was natural for the Confederate authorities to avoid coming to it as long as possible; but, the necessity having been demonstrated, it remained only for their armies to settle down again in selected and carefully prepared lines of defense and await the adversary's attack. On the other hand, it was necessary for the National Government to pursue constantly a campaign of invasion. Its armies had to seek and overcome those of the adversary within the territorial limits which the latter had appropriated, amidst a bitterly hostile population, in positions of the enemy's selection, strengthened by every resource known to military art.

While, therefore, it is true that the loyal population greatly exceeded the other, that the warlike resources of the National Government were immensely greater than those of its adversary, that it had the prestige of permanent establishment among the nations of the world which the other lacked, still

the task which its military power on land and sea had to perform was greater, compared with that of its antagonist, in degree duly proportioned to these enumerated advantages. Fortunately patriotism and national power were sufficient for national preservation. Both were tried to the utmost limit.

We have the assurance of one of the foremost statesmen of those trying times that in the fall of 1862 such was the feeling of despair throughout the North at military reverses and sacrifice of lives of the bravest of the land, such the misery brought to every household, that had the cause been any other than the preservation of the Union, any Administration which would not have secured peace by compromise would have been hurled from power, and one of the great soldiers who led the Union armies finally to victory has expressed the opinion that had the Confederate commanders been able to prolong the war another year the loyal States, worn out by the struggle, might have consented to separation. Great, therefore, as were the military resources of the National Government in the patriotism of the people and in warlike implements and materials of all necessary kinds, they were none too great for the task imposed.

The military conflicts during 1861 were confined mostly to the harbors of Charleston, S. C.; Pensacola, Fla.; irruptions on the Atlantic coast, to Virginia and Missouri. Those at the harbors mentioned were to determine the question of occupancy of the splendid local forts which the Government, pursuant to its early adopted system of seacoast defense, had constructed for the protection of the adjacent bays and cities. The conflicts in Virginia and Missouri were the results of the first movements in which the opposing forces in earnest essayed each to test its own and the adversary's metal in a trial at arms. Two of these rose to the dignity of battles and, by the stubbornness with which they were contested and the casualties inflicted, presaged the strenuous character of the struggle that now commenced.

On the night of December 26, 1860, acting under discretionary orders suited to the emergency which he now deemed to have arisen, Maj. Robert Anderson, First U. S. Artillery, commanding in the harbor of Charleston, S. C., moved his

command from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter.^a This being sanctioned by the President was regarded by the secessionists, under the conditions actually existing, as an overt act of war. The old forts around the harbor were occupied by hostile troops, new works bearing on Fort Sumter were constructed, the steamer conveying reenforcements and supplies to its garrison was fired upon by the enemy January 7, the fort itself was attacked on the 12th and surrendered on the 13th of April, 1861, after a bombardment of thirty-four hours. As a purely military affair the incident of Fort Sumter was of little importance. But its effect upon the nation could not be overestimated. The people were electrified. They sprang to arms with a spontaneity not witnessed since the days of Lexington. Although those in authority, the chief officials especially, as well as the cautious and prudent private citizen might hope still for peace, it was felt by all now to be almost impossible, and preparations for war at once earnestly began.

The casualties inside Fort Sumter were few. Its defense was not of that desperate nature which characterized some subsequent incidents of the war. For this reason criticism has been directed at the commander for vacillation and want of staying qualities. But these reflections seem undeserved. He acted well under the circumstances. Indecision had, down to that time, characterized all branches of the National Government. In consequence of this he had been left unsupported, the enemy gathering in constantly greater force around him, while he was in no way succored. When, therefore, "the quarters were entirely burned, the main gates destroyed by fire, the gorge walls seriously impaired, the magazine surrounded by flames and its door closed from the effects of heat, four barrels and three cartridges of powder only being available, and no provisions remaining but pork," he felt justified in putting an end, by favorable capitulation, to the contest.

Of the graduates engaged in this defense, Major Anderson was soon appointed brigadier-general, U. S. Army; Capts. John G. Foster and Abner Doubleday rose to the grade of

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 1, pp. 542-547.

major-general, Capt. Truman Seymour to brigadier-general, and Second Lieut. Norman J. Hall to colonel of volunteers. First Lieut. George W. Snyder and Second Lieut. Richard K. Meade both died soon afterwards, the latter having first joined the Confederate army, where he attained the rank of major of engineers.

On the Confederate side the graduates were represented in about equal numbers. Brig. Gen. P. G. T. Beauregard commanded the provisional forces. His services here gave him great eclat, and, August 31 following, he was raised to the full rank of general. Capt. Stephen D. Lee, aid-de-camp, rose to lieutenant-general January 23, 1864, and succeeded to the command of Hood's Corps when Gen. John B. Hood relieved Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, July 27, 1864, of command of the Army of Tennessee before Atlanta. Maj. David R. Jones, assistant adjutant-general, attained the rank of major-general, dying January 19, 1863. Capt. J. H. Hallonquist was subsequently lieutenant-colonel of artillery. All these officers had resigned from the U. S. Army. Capt. W. R. Calhoun had come into service from civil life. He rose to the grade of colonel of artillery in the regular service of the Confederacy, and was killed in a duel with a subordinate in September, 1862.

The circumstances attending the bombardment and surrender of Fort Sumter brought all the military actors engaged into favorable prominence. Each Government approved the conduct of its own officers. The disposition of each was to mete out promotions and military appointments to a degree greatly in excess of what the real professional merit of services performed could be held to justify.

The conduct of First Lieut. Adam J. Slemmer at the mouth of Pensacola Harbor, Fla., was similar to that of Major Anderson at Charleston. The First Artillery at that time were stationed in the South. On January 10, 1861, Lieutenant Slemmer, accompanied by Second Lieut. J. H. Gilman and Company G, First Artillery, with assistance of the Navy, abandoned Fort Barrancas, Fla., and moved, with all impedimenta that could be so hastily transported, to Fort Pickens, a work of great strength, and which, controlling

the entrance to the bay, completely dominated that important harbor, deemed the best on the Gulf coast. Although beset by difficulties, including a threatening enemy vastly superior in numbers, Slemmer's little garrison held bravely on until reinforced, February 6, by a company under Capt. Israel Vogdes, and on April 17 by five companies under Col. Harvey Brown, U. S. Army. It was in securing the reenforcement and supplying of Fort Pickens that Capt. Montgomery C. Meigs rendered the specially valuable service which led to his appointment, May 14, to colonel, and the next day, May 15, 1861, to the responsible position of Quartermaster-General, U. S. Army.

Later in the year, October 9, the Confederates made a night attack on the United States forces near Fort Pickens, with some success; but the fort itself never was captured, a circumstance leading within twelve months to the abandonment by the enemy of all the surrounding district, possession of which they had rightly deemed of great importance because of the inclosed spacious harbor with easy entrance.

Of the graduates on the Union side who were prominent in these transactions, Lieutenant Slemmer was appointed, as he deserved, major Sixteenth Infantry, and later, together with Colonel Brown and Captain Vogdes, brigadier-general of Volunteers; while Lieutenant Gilman was given one of the new captaincies of Regulars. Among the Confederate commanders the graduates were Col. William H. Chase, subsequently major-general of Florida State troops; Braxton Bragg, promoted general April 12, 1862; Richard H. Anderson, lieutenant-general, June 1, 1864; Samuel Jones, major-general, and Thomas M. Jones, brigadier-general, 1862. The character of these officers indicated the importance which the Confederate authorities attached to the retention of Pensacola Harbor, but Fort Pickens holding it by the throat, it ceased to be of value to the Confederacy.

The incidents at Forts Sumter and Pickens were mere outpost affairs of the war about to open. Their importance is due to the fact that they inaugurated the struggle.

On June 10, 1861, there fell at Big Bethel, Va., in an ill-judged combat, First Lieut. John T. Greble, Second Artillery,



From a Photograph by Brady

Jefferson Davis,

U. S. M. A., 1828.

the first graduate and regular officer to be killed during the civil war. His sacrifice was part of the price that had to be paid in order that the raw commanders now entering service should gain the necessary experience to make them reasonably prudent in attacking an enemy in position.

The State of Kentucky seeking to occupy for the moment the attitude of neutral ground, Maryland and the District of Columbia having been placed by the prompt action of the National authorities behind the line of loyal bayonets, the armed opponents commenced to marshal themselves mainly in the important States of Virginia and Missouri.

The removal of the Confederate seat of government to Richmond plainly indicated that the territory between that city and the National capital would be a principal theater of conflict. It was felt by the Administration that the city of Washington must be protected at all hazards; not only would national military prestige suffer by its capture, but, in the then condition of foreign relations, such an event it was appreciated might prove fatal to the Union cause. The nations of Europe had so often seen the occupation of the opposing seat of government followed by the submission of the vanquished, that it had become a military maxim to press forward to a peace dictated in the enemy's capital; and it was earnestly felt that, with the ill-will so widely manifested across the Atlantic, the excuse to interfere because of this contingency must at any sacrifice be obviated. Nor was there mutuality in the relative importance of the two capitals: The Confederates might recover from the loss of theirs; it was doubtful if the National Government at that period could have done so. Hence from the first there was always the deepest solicitude felt that, whatever else happened, the capital of the Union should be rendered secure. Until nearly the close of the war this consideration powerfully influenced the movements of the Union armies in that theater of operations.

Early in July the Confederate forces menacing Washington were concentrated at Manassas Junction, Va., about 30 miles in advance of that city, where a branch railroad to the Shenandoah Valley joins that running from Richmond to

the national capital. This force was connected on the left with another at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley. Other Confederates were in West Virginia; but they were too far away, with means of communication too difficult, to aid in case of conflict the main armies before mentioned. Brigadier-Generals P. G. T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate service, commanded at Manassas and Winchester, respectively, while Maj. Gen. Robert E. Lee, of the Virginia State troops, was conducting the western Virginia campaign.

On the night of May 23-24 the Union troops moved in three columns to the south bank of the Potomac under Brig. Gen. Joseph K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, commanding the Department of Washington, and intrenched in position from Alexandria to the Chain Bridge, above Georgetown.^a On the 27th Brig. Gen. Irvin McDowell, U. S. Army, was placed in command south of the Potomac. He therefore was the antagonist of his classmate Beauregard. Maj. Gen. Robert Patterson, a veteran of the war of 1812 and of the Mexican war, confronted Johnston. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Volunteers, maneuvered against Gen. Robert E. Lee's lieutenants in western Virginia.

The sentiment of the loyal States demanded decisive victory before the terms of enlistment of the volunteers expired. If possible, the contemplated assembling of the Confederate congress at Richmond was to be prevented by the capture of that city. To accomplish all this it was necessary to seek and defeat the Confederate forces. Those under Beauregard were first to be dealt with, as they lay directly athwart the route to the Confederate capital. The attempt to do this resulted in the battle of Manassas Junction, or Bull Run, July 21, 1861.

General Beauregard's army was protected by the stream of Bull Run, which, though fordable in many places, yet constituted a formidable obstacle to the advance of the Union troops, most of whom, like their adversaries, possessed nothing beyond the merest rudiments of military discipline. It consisted of the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Theophilus

^a The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 2, p. 112.

H. Holmes, M. L. Bonham, Richard S. Ewell, David R. Jones, James Longstreet, Colonels P. St. George Cocke, Jubal A. Early; unattached, three infantry regiments, one regiment and three squadrons of cavalry, and six light batteries. It was reinforced from Johnston's army on July 20 and 21 by the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Thomas J. Jackson, Barnard E. Bee, Edmund K. Smith, Col. F. S. Bartow; unattached, two infantry, one cavalry regiment, and five light batteries. Every officer mentioned, except Brigadier-General Bonham and Colonel Bartow, were graduates, as also were Colonels N. George Evans and George H. Stuart, who subsequently became brigadiers, Colonels Arnold Elzey and J. E. B. Stuart, afterwards major-generals, Col. A. P. Hill, afterwards lieutenant-general, and Capt. William N. Pendleton, who, having left the pulpit for the field, became brigadier-general and chief of artillery Army of Northern Virginia.^a The combined Confederate force was about 31,340 men available on the field of battle; but of these Ewell's, Holmes's, and Longstreet's brigades, besides a few regiments, were not very actively engaged.

General McDowell had advanced a step further in organization than his opponent, having his army arranged in divisions, of which he had five. The mass of officers, from colonel down, being wholly inexperienced, it was hoped, by the organization of brigades and divisions and placing in command of them as a rule Regular Army officers or graduates, to utilize to the utmost the experience of the latter not only in the discipline of the new troops, but in the administration of important matters of returns, accounts, and supply. Drill exercises were assiduously practiced; but the power to maneuver in large masses, being based on discipline, in which the troops were very imperfect, was wholly lacking. The First Division, commanded by Brig. Gen. Daniel Tyler, embraced the First Brigade, commanded by Col. Erasmus D. Keyes; Second Brigade, Brig. Gen. Robert C. Schenck; Third Brigade, Col. William T. Sherman; Fourth Brigade, Col. Israel B. Richardson. Second Division, Col. David Hunter; First Brigade, Col. Andrew Porter; Second Brigade,

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 195.

Col. Ambrose E. Burnside. Third Division, Col. Samuel P. Heintzelman; First Brigade, Col. William B. Franklin; Second Brigade, Col. Orlando B. Willcox; Third Brigade, Col. Oliver O. Howard. Fourth Division, Brig. Gen. Theodore Runyon; four militia and four volunteer regiments. Fifth Division, Col. Dixon S. Miles; First Brigade, Col. Louis Blenker; Second Brigade, Col. Thomas A. Davies.^a Of these commanders all were graduates except Col. Andrew Porter of the Sixteenth Regular Infantry, and Brigadier-Generals Schenck and Runyon.

Of the other graduates present, Isaac F. Quinby, Henry W. Slocum, Henry Whiting, William R. Montgomery, and Thomas A. Davies, all had returned from civil life to colonelcies of Volunteers; Capt. Alexander McD. McCook commanded the First Ohio Volunteers, Maj. George Sykes a battalion of Regular infantry, Maj. Innis N. Palmer a squadron of Regular cavalry, while Captains Josiah H. Carlisle, Henry J. Hunt, Romeyn B. Ayres, Charles Griffin, James B. Ricketts, Richard Arnold, John C. Tidball, First Lieutenants John Edwards, Edmund Kirby, and Oliver D. Greene represented the Regular artillery on the field. Many of these officers afterwards rose to high rank. Col. William T. Sherman became one of the most distinguished officers that the war developed. Burnside commanded at one time the Army of the Potomac, while both these officers, together with Keyes, Richardson, Hunter, Heintzelman, Franklin, Howard, Slocum, McCook, Sykes, Griffin, reached the grade of major-general, and Willcox, Davies, Quinby, Palmer, Ayres, Ricketts, Arnold, Hunt became brigadiers, the latter the distinguished Chief of Artillery of the Army of the Potomac.

General McDowell's available force was about 35,000 men. About 18,000 men on each side were actively engaged.^b

On the afternoon of July 16 McDowell moved toward the enemy from his position on the south side of the Potomac, the troops carrying three days' rations. On the afternoon of the 18th the army was concentrated in the vicinity of Centerville, 6 miles east of Manassas Junction.

The enemy guarded all fords across Bull Run, a stream

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 194.

^b Ibid, pp. 194-195.

with rugged banks, 3 miles distant. On his right, at Union Mills, was Ewell's Brigade, and joining hands thence toward the left were in succession, ascending the stream, Jones's Brigade at McLean's Ford, Longstreet's supported by Early's Brigade at Blackburn's Ford, Bonham's Brigade at Mitchell's Ford, thence up to the stone bridge Cocker's Brigade was posted; while Evans with a mixed command was guarding this bridge—the extreme left of Beauregard's line.

General Scott's orders were to turn the Confederate right and seize the line of communication with Richmond.^a The 19th and 20th of July were employed by McDowell in examining the country toward the enemy, with the result that, because of natural obstacles presented, it was not deemed advisable to attempt the execution of this movement. While this reconnoissance was going on rations were issued to the Army. An advance of part of the First Division toward Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords on the 18th had brought on a sharp engagement, without result except that each party gave the other assurances of belligerent good will.

Meanwhile the enemy had not been idle. Eluding General Patterson, whose special duty it was to detain him, General Johnston, now a full general and therefore ranking Beauregard, had arrived at Manassas from Winchester with some of his brigades, two of which, Bee's and Bartow's, were placed in reserve between McLean's and Blackburn's fords, and Jackson's in reserve between Blackburn's and Mitchell's fords. Holmes's troops having arrived from Aquia Creek, supported Ewell at Union Mills. Thus the possession of interior lines was utilized by the Confederate commander to every advantage.

Although McDowell suspected that Johnston had joined Beauregard, he did not know it, and, after the reconnoissance mentioned, changed the original contemplated plan of attack on the enemy's right to a turning of his left, thereby maneuvering him out of his strong position behind Bull Run. By seizing the railroad leading from Manassas to Winchester it was hoped to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces. The strategy of this plan of battle was excellent. On the

^a Johnston's Narrative, p. 43.

19th it might have proved successful; on the 21st it was based upon an erroneous supposition regarding the position of Johnston's army—a vital element. Yet had the tactics of the battlefield equaled in merit the strategy of the movement projected victory still might have rested with the National arms. The plan of attack was an entire surprise to the enemy, who himself had planned a movement by his own right against McDowell at Centerville before Patterson could join, and he was only diverted from this when he found his left, supported by Johnston's troops, in danger of being overwhelmed two hours after the first hostile contact there.

The disposition and movements of the Union forces ordered on the morning of the 21st of July were: Fifth Division, with Richardson's Brigade and considerable artillery in reserve, at Centerville; Fourth Division 6 miles in rear guarding the line of communication with the Potomac; Tyler's Division, minus Richardson, to attack the Stone Bridge at daylight by way of diversion, drawing the enemy's attention from the turning movement of Hunter's Division, followed by Heintzelman's Division, short Howard's Brigade, by way of Sudley's Ford, upon the left and rear of the enemy. When the turning movement developed, the First Division was vigorously to attack the enemy's flank. The difficulties of handling new troops and the disadvantages attendant upon lack of correct knowledge of the terrain at once became manifest. The movements of all the troops were slow beyond all calculation, and the number of miles to march involved in the turning movement was twice what was expected. The result was that the Union forces were two hours late in commencing the action, and meantime the enemy on the left had discovered the character of the attack upon him.

Evans, with the eye of a soldier, parried the feint at the Stone Bridge, immediately in his front, by leaving a few companies there, and, informing Cocke of the threatened attack on the left, posted near Sudley's Ford his remaining troops to meet it at right angles to his former position. Here Evans, joined by Bee's and Bartow's brigades, was attacked by Hunter's Division and one regiment of Heintzelman's Division. Hunter was seriously wounded, but the enemy after

two hours' fighting was driven back in great confusion, rallying at a point over a mile to the rear, under cover of Jackson's Brigade, in a strong position on an elevated plateau south of Youngs Branch of Bull Run. It was for his cool, resolute conduct at this instant that Jackson won the sobriquet of "Stonewall." Johnston and Beauregard, alarmed by the menacing character of this attack, ordered Ewell, Jones, and Longstreet to make demonstrations to their front beyond Bull Run, while, with Holmes's and Early's brigades, they moved with all speed to rectify matters on the left.

The battle was renewed upon the line held by Jackson. McDowell had at hand the brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, Porter, Palmer's squadron of Regular cavalry, and Ricketts's and Griffin's Regular batteries. Howard's Brigade, in reserve, got into action late in the afternoon. Keyes's Brigade was not engaged effectually, while Schenck's did not cross Bull Run. The lines of battle swayed back and forth with various fortunes. The enemy, by virtue of his interior lines, more readily sent his supporting forces to the front. About 3.30 p. m. Elzey's Brigade, from the Shenandoah, led by E. Kirby Smith, leaving the cars at the point nearest the sound of battle, struck McDowell's line squarely on the right flank and decided the day in favor of the Confederates.^a Sykes's Battalion, Palmer's Squadron, and Arnold's Battery, all Regulars, covered the retreat over Bull Run. The enemy did not pursue.

This battle was McDowell's opportunity, never repeated. However well he could plan, the issue was regarded, it may be unjustly, as demonstrating that he could not execute. Of thirteen available brigades he had but four present at the decisive moment. At that period success alone was the criterion of fitness to command, and McDowell was not again considered as a commander of armies, in spite of his well-known ability and professional qualifications in other respects.

To a degree the same fate overtook the victorious generals. They passed in time under a cloud that the military world has never understood, as their careers in the Confederate service seem to stamp them as commanders of great merit. Johnston

^a Johnston's Narrative, p. 51.

was criticised for not advancing on the heels of the retreating army and seizing Washington. There is reason to believe that this would have been impracticable. Those Confederates who had been actively engaged were as demoralized as were their fleeing foes; they were worn out by fatigue and consequently in no condition for pursuit. Nearly half of McDowell's army had not been engaged at any time. With these troops formed behind, if not even in front of, the Federal intrenched line south of the Potomac, the military chances were wholly in favor of the Confederates being repulsed had they advanced to the attack. Neither is there military reason to suppose that Johnston by crossing his troops higher up the Potomac in the days following the battle could successfully have invaded Maryland. Had he attempted it the chances were altogether that the same fate would have overtaken him that subsequently overtook Lee in similar efforts.

In the sum total of effects upon the war the battle of July 21, 1861, was far more disastrous to the Confederate than to the Union cause. This was a psychological fact not difficult to understand by the student of American history. The battle signalized the bravery of the peoples whose soldiers represented them on that field. The honorable roll of killed and wounded showed the staying qualities of each under fire. The South, however, was naturally elated beyond measure, taking victory certainly to presage the ultimate triumph of their arms. The Confederate Army wanted no further proof of superior prowess compared with their adversaries, and, under the impression that their work was done, many left their ranks for the endearments of home.

On the other hand, the defeat at Bull Run struck the military scales from the eyes of the National Government. Centerville saw the last concourse of picnickers accompanying its armies on the march. Congress rose to the occasion and made the safety of the Union the supreme law. Military necessity, against all tradition, came forward as the first consideration. With that consciousness of right and inflexibility of spirit which had placed geographical limits to the institution of slavery, thereby giving excuse for the war, the loyal millions without regard to party lines pledged themselves to



Gen. R. M. Callahan

U. S. M. A., 1846.

raise from their midst armies and furnish whatever of supplies might be necessary to maintain that Union which they determined should not be dissolved. Measures of all kinds were now taken to give these patriotic resolutions practical military effect.

Events were moving apace in other theaters. In western Virginia graduates likewise appeared as leaders on the opposing sides. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Volunteers, Brig. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, U. S. Army, Brigadier-Generals J. J. Reynolds, U. S. Volunteers, and Thomas A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, all now entering military service from civil life, together with Capt. Henry W. Benham, U. S. Army, directed generally the movements of the Union troops, while Gen. Robert E. Lee, assisted by Brig. Gen. Robert S. Garnett and Lieut. Col. John Pegram, principally opposed them. The results were favorable to the Union cause—Garnett being killed and Pegram surrendering with his command. As military events these were minor affairs. It by no means followed that success here certainly indicated capacity to command. Importance attaches to the campaign not because of the intrinsic military merit of what was done, but for the reason that as these successful combats culminated about the time of McDowell's defeat, the commanding general in western Virginia, McClellan, came forward with a glamor of success deemed worthy the thanks of Congress, as the proper officer to command the Potomac army, and later the armies of the Union. In this respect perhaps no campaign of the civil war was more important than the affairs dignified by that name in western Virginia in the early summer of 1861. The necessities of the nation were both great and grave. Small events swiftly raised the new commander to the position of leader in momentous ones.

The onerous duty now devolved upon General McClellan of organizing and leading the principal army of the Union. To the former task he addressed himself during the remainder of the year with energy and ability. He had at his command the utmost resources of the Government both in men and supplies. History pays him the tribute of having proved an able army organizer.

The State of Missouri guarded the left flank of the Southern Confederacy. Its people were sharply divided in their sympathies, the preponderance perhaps being on the side of the Union. Both parties reckoned in their ranks the wealthy and socially influential; but here the Southerners held the balance, including as they did nearly all the official world of the old régime. A struggle for supremacy was begun which for bitterness was nowhere else paralleled. The Union cause triumphed before many months. This was due to the fact that the National Administration, with a juster appreciation than the Confederates of the importance of Missouri, soon placed able generals there, and, by liberally supporting them, deprived the enemy not only of an abiding place in the State but also in Arkansas, in effect soon driving him from all territory north of Red River in Louisiana. The failure of the Confederacy to place an able commander west of the Mississippi, to rally its sympathizers to maintain, if possible, the line of northern Missouri, and the permitting itself easily to be forced back instead to the line of the Mississippi River, has been pointed out as one of the most serious mistakes of its military policy.

It is not possible to overestimate the value of the services of graduates who labored in the Department of Missouri securely to attach that quarter to the Union. No one appreciated this more than President Lincoln. Even the loyal there were divided into irreconcilable factions, as far from affiliation with each other as each was distant from the common enemy. It required address, unceasing vigilance, patience without limit, to reconcile all these differences, even to the point of preserving the loyal true to their allegiance. In this great work were involved in turn Major-Generals David Hunter, Henry W. Halleck, Samuel R. Curtis, John M. Schofield, and William S. Rosecrans. These labors were in a distant field, but slightly attended by excitements incident to the movement of armies and, therefore, little heeded by the world; yet, great as were the services of all these distinguished generals in various fields of activity during the civil war, it is not too much to assert that nowhere else were they more valuable to the cause than in the civil and military

administration of affairs in Missouri. General Schofield, then but 31 years of age, gave proof here of those qualities of mind which carried him not only to the head of the Army, but have given him distinction above all others as THE MILITARY STATESMAN.

Another graduate whose name, patriotism, and military fame are inseparably united with the early efforts of Missouri to place herself in the ranks of loyal States was Capt. (afterwards Brig. Gen.) Nathaniel Lyon, U. S. Volunteers. Having signalized himself by successful measures taken to prevent the city of St. Louis and the Government military property there from falling into the hands of the enemy, he was deemed worthy to be intrusted with the command of the army in that field. The military operations in Missouri were of rather a desultory character, but on August 10, 1861, Lyon found himself, with 5,400 men and 16 guns, confronting Brig. Gen. Ben McCulloch, with 10,175 men and 15 guns, at the point where the road from Springfield to Fayetteville, Ark., crosses Wilsons Creek. Lyon's army was composed of four brigades and some unattached organizations: First Brigade, Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis; Second Brigade, Lieut. Col. George L. Andrews; Third Brigade, Col. George W. Deitzler; Missouri Volunteer Brigade, Col. Franz Sigel.^a Besides Brigadier-General Lyon the graduates present included Maj. John M. Schofield, Missouri Volunteers, chief of staff; Maj. Samuel D. Sturgis, U. S. Army; Captains Gordon Granger, Joseph B. Plummer, James Totten, Frederick Steele, Eugene A. Carr; First Lieutenants Charles E. Farrand, John D. DuBois. Of these, Schofield, Sturgis, Granger, Plummer, Steele, and Carr subsequently rose to the grade of general officer.

McCulloch's army was organized into brigades and divisions, but without symmetry, the Missouri and Arkansas troops acting rather as cooperating forces than as integral parts of the same army. The former were divided into four divisions, the latter into two brigades. The graduates present included Lieut. Col. James P. Major, Colonels James McQueen

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 306.


McIntosh and Louis Hébert, all of whom became brigadiers subsequently, and Brig. Gen. N. Bartlett Pearce.

This battle illustrated the determined character of Brigadier-General Lyon. Not only did it involve assailing an enemy twice as strong as himself in a well-chosen position, but by detaching Col. Franz Sigel, with one-fifth of his command, to make a long detour and attack the enemy in rear, he deprived himself of even the full effective fighting power of the force at his command, and subjected his troops to the danger of being beaten in detail. General Lyon fell killed while bravely leading his troops. After furious fighting, in which the Union troops lost 17.5 per cent and the Confederate 10.4 per cent killed and wounded, of the total forces, the former ceased the attack and retreated, leaving the field in possession of the enemy. The latter, however, had been so shaken by the severe contest, the attack had been so bold, and the face presented by the retreating forces so undaunted that there was no pursuit.

General Lyon was brave to the verge of rashness. He held command at a period of the war when it was necessary for officers to lead their troops in order to inspire the latter with courage. The percentage of killed and wounded in the Union army at Wilsons Creek was twice what it was at Bull Run. Notice here was served on the enemy of the desperate character of their undertaking permanently to enroll Missouri in the cause of the Confederacy.

Kentucky was not permitted long to indulge the unworthy dream of neutrality. Not only was such an attitude preposterous in the war now being waged, but it was repugnant to the chivalric spirit which always has characterized its people. Party spirit ran high, but the people were all arrayed unmistakably on one or the other side. Fortunately this was not attended by the implacable resentments, approaching savagery, exhibited in Missouri.

Brig. Gen. Robert Anderson, promoted for services at Fort Sumter, was appointed in May to command the Department of the Cumberland, which included Kentucky. At his request Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman was assigned to duty with, and, in November, succeeded him in command of that



A. S. Johnson

U. S. M. A., 1826.

department. General Sherman himself was relieved, November 15, 1861, by Brig. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, U. S. Volunteers, commanding the Department of Ohio.^a

In the eastern part of the State Brig. Gen. George H. Thomas was maneuvering with an eye directed toward the loyal district of Tennessee, defeating the enemy January 17, 1862, in a spirited engagement at Mill Springs, Ky. This action derived importance solely from the newness of the war and the exhilaration following a limited success to either party on even a small field. General Thomas had among his commanders but one graduate, Col. Horatio P. Van Cleve, who afterwards became brigadier-general of volunteers. The Confederates were commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. Crittenden, C. S. Army, who, with Capt. Arthur M. Rutledge, afterwards chief of ordnance of Lieutenant-General Polk's army, were the only graduates present commanding troops. It was at this fight that the Confederate Brig. Gen. F. K. Zollikoffer was killed.

In the western part of Kentucky Brigadier-Generals U. S. Grant and Charles F. Smith commanded, the former with headquarters at Cairo, Ill., the latter at Paducah.

Opposed to these was the Confederate general, Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding Department of the West. He had under him the Confederate Generals Leonidas Polk, at Columbus, where fortifications blocked the Mississippi, William J. Hardee and Simon B. Buckner in the interior of the State, and Humphrey Marshall in the eastern part. They were his principal lieutenants, and, like himself, all graduates. Such was the rectified military line in Kentucky at the close of 1861.

From his headquarters at Cairo, Brigadier-General Grant, November 7, moved a Federal force of about 3,000 men, in two brigades, commanded, respectively, by Brig. Gen. John A. McClernand and Col. Henry Dougherty, to attack the Confederates opposite Columbus. It encountered at Belmont, Mo., Confederates to the number of 4,000 men, which resulted in a very severe engagement. Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk commanded the Confederate troops, with Brig. Gen. Gideon

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 385.

J. Pillow and B. F. Cheatham commanding brigades. This affair was important mainly through the experience gained in maneuvering troops and as indicating the character of the fighting that might be expected on larger battlefields. On the Union side Col. Napoleon B. Buford, afterwards brigadier-general of volunteers, was, besides General Grant, the only graduate; while, besides Polk, Capt. Melancthon Smith, who afterwards was colonel, chief of artillery, Hardee's Corps, Brig. Gen. John P. McCown, afterwards major-general commanding a division in the same corps, together with Maj. A. P. Stewart, later lieutenant-general, were the graduates on the Confederate side.

While the losses in killed and wounded at Belmont showed how the troops would fight, a little incident that occurred evinced how wholly lacking they then were in appreciation of military discipline. The Confederates were at first driven from their camps in great disorder. Instantly the Federals broke ranks to pillage, while the Federal officers commenced making speeches as at a political meeting, dwelling upon their prowess and the lack of it in the enemy. That enemy, however, soon rallied, and, reenforced, attacked in his turn, with the result that the Federals sought safety on board their transports. This was a lesson which, properly taken to heart, was worth all the lives it cost. Unfortunately it appears to be well nigh impossible to teach new troops the necessity for discipline and vigilance except by such experiences.

The various expeditions on the coast of North and South Carolina during 1861 and early in 1862 had for their principal object effectually to blockade the coast where practicable, cutting off supplies to the enemy from abroad. They inaugurated that starving policy which, consistently and relentlessly pursued as the facilities of the National Government increased, ultimately resulted in wholly isolating the Confederacy from the outside world. The expeditions all involved cooperation between the Army and Navy, and, thanks to the patriotic impulses that inspired all concerned, were eminently successful. In the councils that originated and perfected the plans for these movements, graduates

appeared almost exclusively, as they were then coming forth in all other fields of military leadership. Lieutenant-General Scott called to his assistance in these consultations Col. Joseph G. Totten, Quartermaster-General Meigs, Brig. Gen. T. W. Sherman, U. S. Volunteers, Capt. Horatio G. Wright, and Lieut. Col. George W. Cullum, aid-de-camp.

The expedition against Port Royal, S. C., was led by Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman, his three brigades being commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Egbert L. Viele, Isaac I. Stevens, and Horatio G. Wright, the latter becoming subsequently major-general. The expedition of August, 1861, led by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, against the enemy in the vicinity of Hatteras Inlet, North Carolina, although successful in making a lodgment on the coast, was not of sufficient strength decisively to assert the national authority; and, although Brigadier-Generals J. K. F. Mansfield, U. S. Army, and Thomas Williams, U. S. Volunteers, were later sent there to command, another and stronger expedition under Brig. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, U. S. Volunteers, was fitted out to more thoroughly reduce the enemy's strongholds in that vicinity. The three brigade commanders were Brigadier-Generals John G. Foster, Jesse L. Reno, and John G. Parke, all selected by the commanding general because of their recognized military merit. These officers, except General Butler, were West Pointers; as, on the other side, were, in North Carolina, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Huger, and Col. Charles C. Lee, the latter soon afterwards killed at Gaines Mill; and, at the Port Royal, S. C., defenses, Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Drayton, C. S. Army, and Col. William C. Heyward, Twelfth South Carolina.


In the extreme southwest the Confederate attempt to invade New Mexico proved equally disastrous to their armies, as did similar efforts east of the Mississippi. The former led, January 21, 1862, to a sanguinary struggle at Valverde, N. Mex., between the Union forces commanded by Col. E. R. S. Canby and Lieut. Col. Benjamin S. Roberts, and the Confederates commanded by Gen. H. H. Sibley. The forces on each side were in the vicinity of 2,000, and the result was that Canby, after the loss of some of his artillery,

withdrew in considerable disorder from the field.^a The Union forces lost 11.4 per cent of their total strength in killed and wounded, among the former being Capt. Alexander McRae and First Lieut. Lyman Mishler. These officers were graduates, as were Captains David H. Brotherton, Charles H. Ingraham, and Henry R. Selden, with First Lieutenants Robert H. Hall and Ira W. Clafin. Among others who distinguished themselves in that remote part of the Union, and assisted to drive the enemy back into Texas never to return, were Col. Gabriel R. Paul and Capt. John F. Ritter. Colonel Paul was appointed brigadier-general of volunteers, suffering total loss of eyesight by wound in the battle of Gettysburg. Captains Selden and Ritter were subsequently appointed colonels of volunteers. All these officers performed their duty out of sight of those who then guided the nation's destinies. In a measure they also were out of mind, due to the overshadowing importance of events taking place in the east. Yet they proved worthy of the confidence reposed in them by their countrymen and by the officers duly appointed over them. The Confederates did not a second time attempt to invade that portion of the Union.

October 21, 1861, there occurred at Balls Bluff, Virginia, just above Washington City, that disaster to the Federal arms which resulted in the death of Col. E. D. Baker, Senator from California, the officer in command of the troops on the spot.^b The loss of this eloquent and popular Senator caused intense excitement, and led to the arrest of Brig. Gen. Charles P. Stone, U. S. Volunteers, commanding the division of which Baker's Brigade formed part, and his confinement for some months without trial in one of the military prisons. In fact, however, the disaster is easily explained by contrasting the lack of military experience on the part of Colonel Baker with the military knowledge, ability, and experience of Brig. Gen. N. George Evans, of the Confederate service, who was opposed to him. It was a repetition of our experience in the attack on Queenstown Heights, Upper Canada, October 10, 1812. But it was at a time when suspicion stalked abroad in the

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, pp. 106-108.

^b The Civil War in America, vol. 2, p. 251. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 123 et. seq.



Yours obedient
R. E. Lee

U. S. M. A., 1829.

land; when smothered whisperings were taken as conclusive proof; when no one felt certain of the loyalty of his neighbor or perhaps members of his own family. It always is an incident of this condition of society during war that great injustice is done to individuals, and justified by the necessities of the times. Thus it was that General Stone was unjustly treated. It is not too much to assert that he in no way forfeited the esteem of his associates in arms. Evidence of this is found in the fact that General McClellan applied for him after he was released; General Hooker, on taking command of the Army of the Potomac, asked for his services as chief of staff; General Banks applied for and made him chief of staff; General Grant assigned him to command of a brigade in the Fifth Army Corps. Through his mistaken treatment an unjust aspersion was attempted to be cast upon the Military Academy. It is fitting that this be removed at the same time that the long-suffering, loyal, and accomplished general is vindicated.

OPERATIONS, 1862.

The assignment of General McClellan to the command of the Division of the Potomac July 27, Department of the Potomac August 17, Army of the Potomac August 20, and as general in chief of the armies of the United States November 1, 1861, marked the determination of the Administration to attempt to avail itself of the best military elements at its disposal in the further prosecution of hostilities. The principle was right; but, as might be expected, it proved that experience in command alone could develop successful leaders. This desire, in a government such as that of the United States, always will be modified by the necessity that exists for placating those who control in political affairs. But, this reservation being understood, the disposition now seemed to be in military matters to give greater heed than heretofore to the advice of professional or educated soldiers. The defeat at Bull Run helped to dispel the illusion that service in the Army was the short and easy path to political preferment. It further was observed that, in the enemy's army, while political generals were not unknown, the sentiment was

against them, and the disposition was to put them almost without exception in unimportant places. Looking along the entire defensive line of the Confederacy every vital point was seen to be defended by a general specially selected for his professional fitness.

The events of 1861 confirmed President Lincoln's Administration in the belief that the only hope of national success lay in pitting against such formidable adversaries commanders equally skillful with themselves. One by one the political generals, in spite of party pressure, became discredited through self-demonstrated unfitness; and when the war ended not one was left in a position of responsibility. This refers only to those who came into service at one bound with rank suited to the command of an army, and not to those gallant generals and others of less degree who entered the Army from civil life in the lower military grades, and rose through meritorious service in the field to great and deserved distinction; officers who proved an honor to their instructors—those graduates in superior command who taught them the elements as well as the higher branches of their profession.

This change in the national military policy did not escape the watchful eye of the enemy. Mr. Jefferson Davis sent a warning note to his subordinates that they in consequence must double their vigilance and energy and prepare to meet a foe numerous, well-equipped, determined, but, above all, skillfully commanded. If on the one side were Beauregard, Joseph E. Johnston, Robert E. Lee, Bragg, Albert Sidney Johnston, Hardee, and Polk, they were confronted at the close of 1861 by McClellan, Rosecrans, Buell, George H. Thomas, Charles F. Smith, William T. Sherman, U. S. Grant, and Henry W. Halleck.

It seemed evident that thereafter the war was to be prosecuted in the most scientific manner of which each side was capable. With each it was a simple question of how certainly to bring its most competent military men to the front.

The first problem to be solved related to the strategy of the war. The theater of operations in its entirety had to be considered, and the method of attempting successfully to solve that problem determined.

Having accomplished this, what remained to be done was to place the armies, properly fitted for their task, upon the lines of operations thus strategically determined, there to decide through wager of battle alone with which banner victory finally should rest.

For the Confederates the strategical problem was easy. Politically their demand was to be permitted to pursue undisturbed their assumed right peaceably to secede from the Union. This attitude solved that problem for them. They stood on the defensive; and although at a later day this course was temporarily departed from, the waiting policy was, upon the whole, adhered to, and this almost from necessity, as the Confederacy proved too weak for any other. It had the advantage of affording interior lines for easy and quick intercommunication of armies, and of conducting movements in a country where every ford, road, and path was known, and where the inhabitants were intensely sympathetic. The disadvantage was that the initiative of the enemy had to be awaited, the blows parried wherever he chose to deliver them, and should the Confederate armies be driven back, the constantly diminishing area of the States which they guarded would permanently be subjected to ravages that always attend hostile occupation.

The national commanders found their strategical problem much more complex. Their task was to crush a rebellion embracing several States, sustained by armies aggregating hundreds of thousands of troops, energetically supported by a brave, devoted people prepared for every sacrifice.

One of the first strategic national measures was to cut off the enemy from outside supplies by sea, and this important duty, admirably performed, was accomplished through joint efforts of the Army and Navy. It remained thereafter only to seek and destroy the armies of the Confederacy wherever they might be found within its vast territory.

At first it was the tendency of both parties to pay too willing an ear to every call for protection, thus uselessly disseminating the forces and wasting their energies in futile vigils or combats. The first year, however, dissipated these views. Thereafter the great mass of the troops, organized

into main armies, were directed upon the vital points, those troops not so assembled being used in such manner as would facilitate or render more decisive the principal operations.

The Confederate left flank in Missouri was in the air. It was overlapped by the loyal State of Kansas, and to have held it to the Confederacy would have demanded a large army directed with consummate generalship; but the dominating needs of the Confederacy elsewhere soon caused this relatively less important section to be neglected, and after a few spirited contests, practically abandoned.

In the study of the strategical problem presented to the Federal authorities the States forming the Confederacy were seen to be divided into three parts by natural boundaries. One was west of the Mississippi River; one thence to the Alleghenies; the third extended from these mountains to the Atlantic. Consideration of these areas, and the boundaries limiting them, led to the selecting of the lines of operation along which in a general way the National armies must advance. East of the Alleghenies, near the seaboard, were the capitals of the two governments, and, as has been pointed out, this circumstance plainly indicated one line of advance. The opening and retaining unobstructed the Mississippi not only would cut the Confederacy in two, isolating the territory west of that river, but, by facilitating transportation of troops and supplies, would add immensely to the fighting power of the Union armies. The district between the Mississippi and the Alleghenies was a vast granary, covering several States, whose people generally had cast their fortunes with the Confederacy, and were to be found in battle array by their own firesides prepared to vindicate the cause they had espoused.

The campaign of 1862 was mainly directed upon lines of operations determined by these strategical considerations. After a struggle for three years along them the armies of the Union triumphed.

Before considering the main operations of the armies upon the strategical lines just indicated, some minor but coordinate movements must be noticed.

The Confederate Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn having, January 29, 1862, been assigned to command of the district

including Missouri and Arkansas, it was not long until the opposing forces there confronted each other. March 7 the National troops were concentrated at Pea Ridge, in the north-west corner of Arkansas, under Brig. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis, U. S. Volunteers. The division commanders were Brig. Gen. Franz Sigel, Colonels Jeff. C. Davis and Eugene A. Carr. There were four divisions and seven brigades, with a number of unattached regiments; total strength, 10,500, with 49 guns.

Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn commanded the Confederates. The subordinate commanders were Maj. Gen. Sterling Price and Brig. Gen. Ben. McCulloch, with numerous brigade or division commanders under them, the whole number being 16,200 infantry and cavalry and about 50 guns. The battle lasted two days, and was of almost as sanguinary a nature as that of Wilsons Creek, a few months before, in which many of the same troops had been engaged. Brigadier-Generals Ben. McCulloch and James McQueen McIntosh were among the slain.

The Confederates were defeated, and never in that quarter recovered from the blow received.^a Thenceforth the holding of Missouri and wresting Arkansas from the Confederacy gave the National authorities little trouble. In this battle the Federal loss was 11.2 per cent and the Confederate 5.5 per cent killed and wounded of all the forces, the killed including an unusual number of officers. On the Union side the graduates were Brigadier-General Curtis and Colonel Carr, while among the Confederates were Major-General Van Dorn, Brigadier-Generals James McQueen McIntosh and Daniel M. Frost and Col. Louis Hébert. General Curtis remained west of the Mississippi during the war, but many of his troops were sent east of that river, as also were the forces of Van Dorn and Price when it was seen that the struggle for the trans-Mississippi was to be fought out on the great central strategic line of operations. Price afterwards returned to his native lair, but without power to do more than make raids through Arkansas and Missouri, notably in 1864, but they were wholly without effect upon the general results of the war.

An incident following the capture of the forts at Port

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 314, et seq.

Royal, S. C., was the reduction April 11, 1862, of Fort Pulaski, built near the mouth of the Savannah River, and intended to defend the city of Savannah, 18 miles above.^a Movements to that end were instituted by Brig. Gen. Thomas W. Sherman, U. S. Volunteers, commanding at Port Royal, and carried on subsequently under the orders of Major-General Hunter, U. S. Volunteers. The siege operations incident to the capture of Fort Pulaski were interesting as throwing light upon the effect of modern rifle guns, then little tried, in breaching forts of the strongest kind at that time known. Several young graduates were engaged in this work—Capt. Quincy A. Gillmore, Lieutenants J. H. Wilson, P. H. O'Rorke, Horace Porter—all afterwards highly distinguished. Gillmore and Wilson became major-generals of volunteers; O'Rorke fell leading his regiment at Gettysburg; Porter became aid-de-camp to the general commanding the armies of the United States. The reputation which Captain Gillmore here laid the foundation for as a conductor of siege operations, augmented subsequently by successful attacks on the Confederate forts guarding the entrance to the city of Charleston, S. C., in 1863, gave him just preeminence as a skillful commander and military engineer. The other graduates present on the Union side were Brigadier-Generals Henry W. Benham and Egbert L. Viele, the former as division the latter as brigade commander. On the side of the Confederates Brig. Gen. Alexander R. Lawton, afterwards quartermaster-general, C. S. Army, a graduate, commanded the enemy's forces in that district, though not immediately those stationed at Fort Pulaski. The capture of this fort closed the Savannah to blockade runners. The city of Savannah itself remained in possession of the enemy until December 21, 1864, when it was found to have been abandoned by General Hardee and was taken possession of by Gen. W. T. Sherman, who had approached the city from Atlanta.

The movement along the strategic line of the Mississippi River was to be prosecuted at once, both from its mouth and downstream from Cairo, Ill. Both movements involved the

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, pp. 1-12.

cooperation of the Army and Navy.^a General McClellan reported that the Army to accompany the attack at the mouth of the river, pushing thence upward, would be ready to embark by January 15, 1862. It was to be composed of about 20,000 troops—sufficient to occupy and hold all strong places on the river as high as and including Vicksburg. It was intrusted to the command of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, U. S. Volunteers, an able administrator and zealous officer. Before, however, the expedition sailed the army accompanying it was cut down to about 15,000.

Both of General Butler's brigade commanders, Brigadier-Generals John W. Phelps and Thomas Williams, and also Col. Oliver P. Gooding, Thirty-first Massachusetts, were graduates. It was here that General Phelps conceived the idea of organizing negro troops, which caused him to be outlawed by the Confederate authorities. Neither were the Federal authorities at that time ready for this innovation, which led to General Phelps tendering his resignation.^b The circumstance is interesting in the light of the change of heart later in both the National and Confederate councils on this subject; the former raising such troops in large numbers, the latter finally looking with favor upon similar measures as their military necessities became more urgent.

On the Confederate side Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell commanded. As at Savannah, the enemy seemed to rely upon the fortifications guarding the river as their main element of security. These consisted of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the former on the west the latter on the east side, facing each other. The Confederate navy assisted the land defense. Brig. Gen. Johnson K. Duncan commanded the coast defenses. Lieut. Col. Edward Higgins, C. S. Army, formerly of the U. S. Navy, commanded at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, and Brig. Gen. Martin L. Smith the Chalmette lines immediately in front of the city of New Orleans. All the Confederate commanders named, except Lieutenant-Colonel Higgins, were graduates.

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 2, p. 327. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 22 et seq.

^bThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 18.

The garrison of the two forts aggregated 1,100 men. And the confidence of the Confederate authorities in the entire sufficiency of their joint fort and fleet defense is evidenced by the fact that General Lovell had at New Orleans but 3,000 ninety-day troops.

The United States flotilla, under Capt. David G. Farragut, forced the way, spite of all opposition, sinking or capturing the enemy's war vessels, and, running past his forts, landed General Butler's army at New Orleans May 1, 1862.

General Lovell was powerless to avert this calamity. It can not be denied that both the Confederate fleet and forts made a determined and gallant defense. The National flotilla was too powerful to be resisted, and was commanded by a sailor whose motto was "Victory or death." Yet so fickle is military fortune that the Confederate commanding general, Lovell, because he had not accomplished impossibilities, passed permanently under the cloud of blighting official disapprobation. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston states that, in the winter of 1863-64, after he had relieved General Bragg of the command of the Army of Tennessee, he repeatedly but vainly applied for the services of General Lovell as commander of one of his army corps.

General Butler proceeded at once, in conjunction with the Navy, to clear the enemy from the river up to and including Vicksburg. The command of the troops was intrusted to Brig. Gen. Thomas Williams, U. S. Volunteers. Baton Rouge was taken possession of on the 12th of May. The advance of the fleet anchored below Vicksburg on the 18th, when the joint demand of General Williams and Commander Lee of the Navy for the surrender of the place was refused. By June 28 the Navy, together with General Williams's force, had been largely increased. That day the flotilla attacked the defenses and was repulsed.^a General Halleck at Corinth was earnestly appealed to by Farragut to assist with a land force; but this being impracticable at that juncture, and the enemy being reinforced both on land and water, nothing remained for the flotilla and troops to do but to fall back to Baton Rouge. At the latter place, on August 5, General Williams's force, about

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3, p. 582.

2,500, was attacked by the Confederate Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, with the same number of troops. After a spirited combat the attack was repulsed. In this engagement the Union troops were aided materially by the vessels of the flotilla. The skillful and gallant veteran, General Williams, fell at the head of his troops." Breckinridge had two graduates with him, Brigadier-Generals Daniel Ruggles and Ben. Hardin Helm, the former commanding a division, the latter a brigade.

The Confederates now commenced, under Van Dorn's orders, strongly to fortify Port Hudson, south of Vicksburg, and 135 miles above New Orleans. General Butler withdrew the Union troops from Baton Rouge, and, for that year, practically ended all energetic efforts from that direction to loosen the enemy's grasp on the river. With the routing the Confederates out of the district on the west side of the Mississippi, opposite New Orleans, by Brig. Gen. Godfrey Weitzel, U. S. Volunteers, General Butler's operations ceased, he being relieved December 15, 1862, by Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks.

The progress of the National forces down the Mississippi was facilitated by the abandonment of Columbus, Ky., by General Beauregard's order, immediately after the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson by General Grant on February 6 and 16, 1862, respectively. In truth, the capture of these forts and the carrying of General Grant's army up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers into the State of Tennessee had completely turned the enemy's upper Mississippi River position. General Beauregard directed that the Confederates fall down the river to Island No. 10, directly west of Fort Donelson, resolving to make the stand for retention of the Mississippi there and at Fort Pillow, Tenn., 100 miles farther down, and about 50 miles above Memphis. The latter was a place of great strategic importance. It was commercially the most important city between St. Louis and New Orleans. It was the western terminus of the railroad thence to Charleston, S. C., spanning the Confederacy; besides other railroads ran both north and south from here that it was important for the Confederates to hold.

Following up the retreating enemy a combined Army and Navy movement was made against Island No. 10, with such energy and hearty cooperation that, by April 8, the Confederate works were abandoned and nearly their whole force captured.^a The Union Army at Island No. 10 was commanded by Brig. Gen. John Pope, a graduate, whose success here seemed to have had an important bearing upon his selection subsequently during the same year to the command of the Army of Virginia. The former was organized into five infantry, one cavalry, one artillery division, some unattached troops, and a flotilla brigade to help man the gunboats.

Of the graduates present, Brigadier-Generals David S. Stanley, Schuyler Hamilton, Joseph B. Plummer, Gordon Granger, and Eleazer A. Paine commanded divisions; Col. J. L. Kirby Smith an infantry; Col. Napoleon B. Buford the flotilla brigade; Col. J. K. Mizner a cavalry regiment, and Capt. George A. Williams six companies of the First U. S. Infantry, acting as heavy artillery. On the side of the Confederates the graduates were Maj. Gen. John P. McCown, commanding until March 31, when he was succeeded by Brig. Gen. W. W. Mackall, Brigadier-Generals A. P. Stewart, and Lucius M. Walker, the latter of whom was killed in a duel September 19, 1863, by Maj. Gen. John S. Marmaduke.

General Pope proceeded, convoyed by the flotilla, to follow up the enemy and drive them from Fort Pillow. On April 14 he landed 6 miles above Craigheads Point, on the west bank. At this time, however, he was recalled, and his army transferred to the more pressing field of Corinth. A detachment of 1,500 men was left behind with the Navy. Thereafter the fighting at Fort Pillow and Memphis was almost wholly between the opposing flotillas. On June 4 the Confederates, who could not themselves spare many troops to defend these places, destroyed their works as far as possible, and carrying off public property fell back from Fort Pillow to Memphis. Thus the river, fighting step by step, was gradually being reduced into the hands of the Union authorities, who ever afterwards retained it. On June 6 Memphis

^aThe Civil War in America, vol. 2, p. 273. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 439.

succumbed, the Confederate river defense fleet being either captured or driven off. Here for some months the attempt to open up this strategic line came to an end. Practically the Confederates still controlled from Memphis to Baton Rouge; but later in 1862 the Union troops and flotilla forced their way down to a point just above Vicksburg. It required the struggle of another year, the Army and Navy working together, to loosen permanently the grasp of the Confederacy upon the Mississippi.

The enemy employed this time in strengthening their defensive works at both Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Never was energy more unfortunately directed for the defenders. These fortifications proved to be death traps to those who constructed them. The grave question for the Confederate garrisons became in time, not how they could hold these works, but how they could get away from them. This they only succeeded in doing by the surrender, not of the fortifications alone, but of the armies defending them.

In truth, considering alone the purpose they were intended to serve, these works appear to have been constructed on a faulty plan. The vital point to the Confederacy was to destroy the Union armies. To accomplish this their true policy was to put every available soldier into the field and to the spot where his presence would tell most. All else was of secondary importance. It was therefore a grave mistake to establish immense intrenched camps on the Mississippi River, absorbing the troops for garrisons which were needed in the mobile field armies, and which garrisons, like those at Vicksburg and Port Hudson, were destined to be captured with the works they defended. If, instead of such large camps, strong forts had been constructed in lieu of them, with armaments bearing upon selected points of the river channel of weight of metal sufficient, with assistance of the Confederate fleet, to sink any flotilla attempting to pass, there is reason to believe that the river might have been more securely held. Besides, by turning footloose the large garrisons, since the forts would have required relatively small ones, the chances of Confederate success in the field would have been greatly improved,

and if success against the national armies could be but attained it mattered but little what temporarily became of the posts on the Mississippi.


By contrast, an illustration of the proper use of an intrenched camp was, as the war progressed, seen at Washington City. Here a circle of strong earthworks enabled a comparatively small force, or one largely undisciplined, to render the capital fairly secure, thus permitting the great body of troops that otherwise would have been required to defend the city to join the active army against the enemy.

In January, 1862, Brig. Gen. U. S. Grant, commanding western Kentucky, obtained permission to visit General Halleck, commanding the Department of the Missouri, at St. Louis, and laid before the latter a plan of campaign up the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.^a This would carry the Union army against the center of the line occupied by Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston, turning his forces on the Mississippi River as well as at Bowling Green and Nashville. If in addition the Confederates were defeated wherever they might be found, the Union army penetrate to and seize the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, the enemy would be deprived of the advantage for concentration that this road gave him. The proposed line of advance was in fact one of the three strategic lines along which with greatest advantage the National forces could be carried forward to overwhelm and destroy the armies of the Confederacy. Its utilization as here indicated doubtless occurred to many others.

At this time General Johnston had the advantage of being supreme in that quarter, while the Federal armies were independent, only united through the War Department at Washington, and the people generally were friendly to Johnston, thus practically relieving him from all anxiety about the safety of his lines of communication. He had established for his advanced line of defense a small force at Fort Henry and a larger one at Fort Donelson, on the lower Tennessee and Cumberland rivers.

On February 2, 1862, the advance against Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston commenced. On the 6th the Fort Henry

^aPersonal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 286.



U. S. GRANT.
U. S. M. A., 1843.

garrison, commanded by Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman, a graduate, killed May 16, 1863, at Bakers Creek, Miss., surrendered. He previously had sent his entire command, except the few men left in Fort Henry to cover its retreat, to Fort Donelson, 11 miles distant. Tilghman, by sharing the fate of his surrendered troops, set a chivalric example in striking contrast to that of some generals in that section a few days later.

Brigadier-General Grant now moved, in conjunction with the flotilla, against Fort Donelson.^a His army was in three divisions, ten brigades, and some unattached organizations. The divisions were commanded by Brigadier-Generals John A. McClernand, Charles F. Smith, and Lew Wallace. Of these, Charles F. Smith alone was a graduate. The other graduates in the Union army besides General Grant were Colonels J. J. Woods, Twelfth Iowa, badly wounded at Shiloh; Crafts J. Wright, Thirteenth Missouri; Charles Whittlesey, Twentieth Ohio. On the Confederate side the graduates were Brigadier-Generals Simon B. Buckner and Bushrod R. Johnson, and Lieutenant-Colonels Hylan B. Lyon, afterwards a brigadier-general of Forrest's command, and James M. Wells, subsequently colonel Twenty-third Mississippi.

The Union army numbered about 17,000, the Confederates about 15,000 men. The former had the assistance of the flotilla. In the important matter of commanders the Confederates, however, labored under their principal disadvantage.

It is supposed that General Johnston, or the Confederate Administration, felt impelled by political considerations to give to Brigadier-Generals John B. Floyd and Gideon J. Pillow the very important command at Fort Donelson, which events proved they did not know what to do with, otherwise such a mistake would not have been made. The result was the first grave disaster to the Confederacy, with corresponding elation of the friends and armies of the Union. This was the direct result (the adverse indirect consequence to the Confederacy was far more important): It brought prominently into professional and public favor that Union commander who, possessing those qualities of mind out of which great

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 398 et seq.

soldiers are made under the trip hammer of experience and appreciating the true character of the fighting to be done, pressed with relentless persistency the advantage thus gained until the brave armies of the Confederacy lay in succession prostrate at his feet.

Having passed from the 6th until the 12th of February in examining the country between Forts Henry and Donelson, General Grant was before the latter on February 13—at the same time the every faithful Navy was preparing to act its part.

The Confederates were protected by well-located and thoroughly constructed fieldworks, with heavy batteries bearing on the river approaches. Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner's Division was on the right; thence six brigades under Pillow completed contact to the left, with the river above. Gen. John B. Floyd, by virtue of seniority, was in command, with Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson as chief of staff.

On February 14 the Confederates were completely invested—McClelland's Division on the Union right opposite Pillow, Smith's Division on the left opposite Buckner, Wallace's Division opposite the Confederate center. The naval attack on the land batteries that day was repulsed.^a A council of war having, however, advised it, on the early morning of the 15th the enemy made an heroic attempt to fight his way out by his left; but after partial success, due in great degree to General Grant's absence to consult Flag-Officer Foote, of the Navy, at the latter's request, the Confederates were repulsed, and the original right of the Union lines not only reoccupied, but advanced, while Gen. Charles F. Smith charged and captured Buckner's line of works on the Union left. It was then that, both Generals Floyd and Pillow fleeing, the former carrying his Virginia troops, Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner surrendered unconditionally.

Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston now realized that his only hope of success lay in concentrating his troops; otherwise Donelson might be repeated, and they be beaten in detail. He had able lieutenants sent to assist him—General Beauregard

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 414.

and Major-Generals Van Dorn had arrived from Virginia and Bragg from Pensacola. He resolved at once to unite his forces at Corinth, Miss. To this place he transported those he had been able to collect at Murfreesboro, Tenn., whither he had fallen back from Nashville after the Donelson disaster.

At Corinth every available soldier was placed. Bragg brought 10,000 from Florida; Lovell sent 5,000 from Louisiana; Van Dorn was ordered from west of the Mississippi, though he did not arrive in time for the ensuing battle at Shiloh. Other troops from all directions were brought in, so that, April 3, the Confederates had 40,335 effective troops ready for battle.^a It was a grand army; its principal officers were tried soldiers, in whom the Confederate authorities rightly had confidence, and this feeling was shared by all subordinates. All were ready to do or die; but they expected, as they hoped, that the Confederate Army would triumph. It was well organized, and a better officered army never marched to battle. Major-Generals Leonidas Polk, Braxton Bragg, and William J. Hardee commanded the three army corps. Brig. Gen. John C. Breckinridge (not a graduate) commanded the reserve corps. There were, besides, a few unattached troops. General Beauregard was second in command. Besides the graduates mentioned, there were present, commanding divisions, Brigadier-Generals A. P. Stewart, Bushrod R. Johnson, Daniel Ruggles, and Jones M. Withers. There appeared as colonels Charles Wickliffe, Joseph Wheeler, John C. Moore, John S. Marmaduke, Lucius L. Rich; as lieutenant-colonel R. H. Brewer of the cavalry, and, in the artillery, Capt. Melancthon Smith, subsequently Hardee's chief of artillery. Colonels Wickliffe and Rich were mortally wounded in the ensuing battle. Many of these subordinate officers afterwards rose to high command—Stewart and Wheeler to lieutenant-generals; Johnson, Withers, Marmaduke, and Brown to major-generals; Moore to brigadier-general, and Smith to colonel of artillery.

One of the pivotal battles of the civil war was now imminent. In pursuance of the plan necessarily adopted by the

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 539.

National Government of seeking the enemy wherever the latter chose to locate himself, the Union army, first under Maj. Gen. Charles F. Smith, and later under Major-General Grant, had taken up position at Pittsburg Landing near Shiloh Church, on the west side of the Tennessee River, about 20 miles, by the road, in advance of Corinth. Upon the retreat of General Johnston after the surrender at Donelson, General Buell had occupied Nashville. He had about 40,000 good troops. His orders were to join General Grant in his advanced position; the combined force thence to advance against the enemy. It was vainly hoped that this could be effected before the Confederate troops could be concentrated at Corinth. General Johnston had two courses open: First, to fortify at Corinth and await attack; second, by moving swiftly before the junction of the Federal forces, try to beat them in detail. He chose the latter. In the nature of things the motives that impelled him never can be known; but, taking into account all the attending circumstances, his decision seems to have been a wise one. Confronted by a less determined opponent than the commander actually pitted against him, he might have been successful.

On the morning of April 6, 1862, the Union army at Pittsburg Landing numbered about 33,000 effectives; at Crump's Landing, on the same side of the river, Gen. Lew Wallace had 5,000, who arrived on the field of battle after dark that day.^a It had been the habit of the Union troops to advance upon the enemy in position. Their attitude of attackers compelled them to do this. Covering by earthworks the front of lines taken up by those troops to ward off possible attacks was almost unknown. Hence it was in conformity with previous practices of Union troops that General Grant's army lay at Shiloh without such artificial cover, depending for security upon the vigilance of the outposts and the general state of preparedness of the troops to meet attack. The matter of throwing up temporary intrenchments was broached, but as the chief engineer reported that the proper line would run in rear of the position then occupied by many

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 1, p. 538.

of the troops nothing was done toward constructing them. The Federal commander did not, however, expect an attack. He imagined the Confederates would await his assaults behind elaborate and carefully prepared field works at Corinth.

The 33,000 effective men of the Army of the Tennessee at Shiloh were divided into six divisions and some unattached regiments.

The division commanders were Major-Generals John A. McClernand and Lew Wallace; Brigadier-Generals W. H. L. Wallace, Stephen A. Hurlbut, William T. Sherman, Benjamin M. Prentiss. Of these, Brig. Gen. William T. Sherman alone was a graduate; another, the brave Maj. Gen. Charles F. Smith, who had acted so distinguished a part at Donelson, had been taken sick just before the battle, and died April 25, 1862. The other graduates of this army commanding troops were Colonels J. J. Woods, Crafts J. Wright, and Charles Whittlesey, who were at Donelson; Thomas Worthington, and Alexander Chambers, the latter afterwards a brigadier-general.

On April 7 Gen. Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio arrived. The division commanders were Brigadier-Generals Alexander McD. McCook, William Nelson, Thomas J. Crittenden, and Thomas J. Wood. The remaining division, commanded by Gen. George H. Thomas, was absent. Of the division commanders present, McCook and Wood alone were graduates. But General Buell had an eye to securing as many Regular troops as possible with his Volunteers, for disciplinary purposes. This brought more graduates in the subordinate grades than were found in the Army of the Tennessee, where, at this time, there was no organized fighting unit from the Regular Army. In Buell's Division, present on April 7 at Shiloh, were the following graduates, besides the division commanders mentioned: Colonels B. F. Smith, Jacob Auman, William B. Hazen, William Sooy Smith, Charles G. Harker, E. F. Townsend, and Maj. Stephen D. Carpenter; commanding light batteries of the Regular Artillery were Captains William R. Terrill and John Mendenhall.

Of these, William Sooy Smith, Auman, Hazen, Harker, and Terrill became general officers; and Carpenter, Terrill, and Harker died on the field of battle.

The Army of the Tennessee was in line in front of Pittsburg Landing. The right was 3 miles, the left $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles in front of the landing, with the flanks protected by streams that recent rains had rendered impassable. Thus attack could only be made in front. Sherman's Division, lacking Stuart's Brigade, held the right in the vicinity of Shiloh Church; Stuart's Brigade held the extreme left; McClelland's Division was next on Sherman's left, and Prentiss's Division on McClelland's left; Hurlbut was in rear of Prentiss; Charles F. Smith's Division, temporarily commanded by Brig. Gen. W. H. L. Wallace, was in reserve in rear of the right. Sherman's, Prentiss's, and Hurlbut's divisions were raw troops; the others, together with Lew Wallace's Division at Crump's Landing, were veterans for that period, having been in severe fighting at Donelson.

The onset of General Johnston's army, at first directed by that officer in person, carried back the Federals with varying fortunes to both sides, until at the close of the fighting of the first day their line was one mile or so in rear of its morning position. Here the Union troops inflexibly held their ground. Like McDowell at Bull Run, Johnston here found a Stone-wall. On the left the two gunboats *Tyler* and *Lexington* aided to repel the assault. The enemy were defeated that night; the Union army held a stronger line than ever; Lew Wallace's Division arrived after dark and went into position. But this was not all. On the morning of the 7th Buell's army was present and therefore the desperate attempt, conforming to correct military principles, to crush Grant's army before Buell could join, had failed. To have continued the battle on the part of General Johnston's successor, Beauregard, would, under the circumstances, have been unjustifiable; and, commencing on the morning of the 7th, his principal solicitude was to extricate his army from its precarious position. This he accomplished.

The losses in this battle show the character of the fighting. On the Union side one-quarter of the effective strength were

killed and wounded in the Army of the Tennessee. The Confederates suffered a corresponding loss. The Army of the Ohio lost one-tenth of the effectives. Many officers of promise fell on both sides; but in the death of Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston the Confederates suffered a loss from which it seems their army in the West never recovered, and this for the reason that there apparently never was a leader thereafter in that section who had at once the full confidence of its people and of the Confederate government.

General Beauregard fell back and heavily intrenched at Corinth. Thither he was leisurely followed by General Halleck, department commander, who, after the battle of Shiloh, had taken the field in person. Pope, as has been seen, was brought from before Fort Pillow in the Mississippi River descent. With these and all other troops that could be collected General Halleck soon had not far from 100,000 men before Corinth trying to envelop the enemy. Beauregard, however, had no idea of having his army captured by the slow process of the siege. He abandoned the place, and May 30 the Union army entered Corinth without opposition^a

The seizing of the important Memphis and Charleston Railroad at Corinth and Memphis practically at the same time, in the advance of the Union military and naval forces on two of the main strategical lines of operation, with the destruction wrought upon that road from Corinth east, thereafter permanently depriving the enemy of its use to concentrate troops and carry supplies, and the placing the National armies securely in the midst of the enemy's territory, marked a decided advantage thus far gained by the former. Although it was several months before further important advance could be made along these lines, the Union armies never receded from the positions they thus had gained.

General Halleck contemplated pushing forward toward Chattanooga and Mobile, supposing that, the latter successfully accomplished, the opening of the Mississippi would necessarily follow.^b Events determined otherwise.

Because of sickness, General Beauregard transferred the command of his army to General Bragg, and this was made

^a *The Civil War in America*, Draper, vol. 2, p. 306.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 310.

permanent. The new commander concentrated his troops at Chattanooga before Buell, whom Halleck had ordered to march there, could seize that important point. In justice to General Buell it should be remembered that his slowness of movement was caused by orders to repair the destroyed railroad as he advanced.

Important changes took place among the Union commanders. Major-General Pope was transferred to the Army of Virginia, to be succeeded in command of the Army of the Mississippi by Maj.-Gen. William S. Rosecrans. July 11 General Halleck was promoted to general in chief of all the armies of the United States, and repaired to Washington City.^a This restored Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant to command of the forces at and in the vicinity of Corinth and along the railroad.

Major-Generals Earl Van Dorn and Sterling Price, who arrived soon after Shiloh from west of the Mississippi, confronted Grant, the former after September 11 being in chief command. In September Van Dorn was south of Grand Junction, Tenn., while Price was at Iuka, Miss. Corinth was between them. This seemed to be a dangerous separation of the Confederate forces, but was explained by the fact that Price was to move northeast into Tennessee to help Bragg should Rosecrans have moved to the assistance of Buell. Grant resolved to strike Price at Iuka while thus isolated. To this end Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, U. S. Volunteers, was directed to move upon Iuka from the northwest, while Rosecrans, marching from his position south of Corinth, would attack from the southeast. Ord was not to attack until he heard Rosecrans's guns; but these he did not hear owing to the prevailing wind, and consequently did not join in the ensuing combat.

On September 19 a very severe action took place, in consequence of these movements, at Iuka.^b The Federal troops, commanded by General Rosecrans, were organized into two infantry and one cavalry division. The division commanders, Brigadier-Generals D. S. Stanley and C. S. Hamilton and

^aThe Civil War in America—Draper, vol. 3, p. 311.

^bBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 734.

Col. J. K. Mizner, were all graduates, as also were Colonels J. L. Kirby Smith, Forty-third Ohio, and Alexander Chambers, of the Sixteenth Iowa.

The Confederates were organized into four infantry and one cavalry brigade, commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Henry Little, Louis Hébert, Martin E. Green, John D. Martin, and Frank C. Armstrong. Of these Hébert was the only graduate; Brig. Gen. Dabner H. Maury, commanding a division, another graduate, was confronting Ord and therefore not engaged. The fighting at Iuka was very hard, the brunt of it, as the losses show, falling on a single Union and two Confederate brigades. Commencing a short time before dark, it lasted long into the night. When the Federals moved to renew the attack, September 20, the enemy was gone.

Iuka was but the prelude to the fierce battle at Corinth, October 3-4 following.^a Neither Van Dorn nor Price had taken part in the battle of Shiloh. In the east Lee had felt strong enough to invade Maryland, and Bragg had done the same thing in Kentucky, where his army now was. The forces under General Grant alone remained as far advanced in the Confederacy as their original movement had carried them, all others being taken to the rear by a counterstroke of the enemy. Van Dorn resolved that the condition of affairs in his front should no longer, if he could help it, form an exception to this general rule of Federal retrogression, and, by crushing Rosecrans at Corinth and seizing that important point, he hoped to do good service for the Confederacy and gather laurels for the army with the command of which he had been honored. He moved with confidence and attacked with vehemence, but found an enemy prepared for and equal to him. The actual forces engaged on both sides were nearly equal, each being in the vicinity of 20,000 men.

Van Dorn's Army consisted of three divisions and a few unattached troops. Two of these divisions belonged to Price's Army of the West, the same that were engaged two weeks before, at Iuka, and were commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals Louis Hébert and Dabney H. Maury. The remaining division present, from the District of the Missis-

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 737 et seq.

issippi, was commanded by Maj. Gen. Mansfield Lovell. Hébert had succeeded Brigadier-General Little, killed at Iuka, in command of the First Division Army of the West. Besides Van Dorn and the three division commanders, Hébert, Maury, and Lovell, the graduates present commanding troops were Brigadier-Generals John C. Moore, William L. Cabell, J. B. Villepigue, and Col. William H. Jackson, all commanding brigades.

Rosecrans's Army was in five divisions—three of the Army of the Mississippi, two of the Army of West Tennessee. The division commanders of the former were Brigadier-Generals David S. Stanley and Charles S. Hamilton, and Col. John K. Mizner; of the latter, Brigadier-Generals Thomas A. Davies and Thomas J. McKean—all graduates. The other graduates present commanding troops were Capt. G. A. Williams, with six companies, First U. S. Infantry, acting as heavy artillery, manning the siege guns, and Col. John V. D. Du Bois, commanding brigade.

The fighting was of the same character as at Shiloh, the Confederates, with persistency and reckless bravery, charging time and again, in places penetrating the town; but all to no purpose. The loss on both sides was great, especially among officers of high rank; but after maintaining the attack from 10 a. m. of the 3d until past midday of the 4th Van Dorn withdrew his shattered army, its object unaccomplished, therefore defeated. He was soon afterwards relieved by Lieut. Gen. John C. Pemberton, C. S. Army.

The issue at Corinth had been watched by both North and South with intense interest. This was more especially so perhaps at the North. The importance of the battle was out of proportion to the forces involved. The outcome of Bragg's invasion of Kentucky had not yet been determined adversely to him at Perryville, while in Virginia, after a sanguinary campaign, the Confederates were as far north as at its commencement. Corinth showed that at one vital point, at least, after having penetrated far into the enemy's territory, the Union armies could and would maintain themselves. Here, at this time, in this campaign were being developed the commanders who ultimately were to carry the Union standards to

victory. From the position held at Corinth and those immediately depending upon it as a vantage ground those generals, gaining with experience strength as commanders, were destined to move forward in a series of successful campaigns to the final triumph.

Fired with the idea of rallying around the Confederate standard its friends in Kentucky and Tennessee, General Bragg, August 28, 1862, moved north from Chattanooga.^a It was hoped, also, that the Federal troops in advance of Shiloh would by this movement be compelled to retrace their steps. The result was bitterly disappointing to the Confederacy. By this time its sympathizers in these western States, as Lee found them in Maryland, were commencing to calculate the costs and also the chances of success, a mental and moral condition fatal to enthusiasm; and the Confederate ranks received recruits in numbers barely sufficient to make good the desertions. Again, though Buell marched back to meet the irruption, not one foot of territory in advance of Shiloh was abandoned by those armies whose blood had won it. In the meantime, however, General Bragg's advance was regarded at the North with deepest solicitude.

The right wing of the army of invasion, under Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, numbered 13,537; the left wing, under Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, numbered 13,763; total, 27,300 effectives—that is, men who would take their places in line of battle. By the national system of computation this would mean 40,000 at least.

About September 12 Polk and Hardee united in the vicinity of Glasgow, Ky. Buell was now moving on Bowling Green from the south. At Mumfordsville the question was presented to a council of Bragg's ranking generals whether he should continue moving toward the Ohio or take the offensive against Buell. It was decided to adopt the former course, Bragg remarking that the campaign must be won by marching, not by fighting. He pushed on to Lexington, Buell passing by his left flank, between his army and Louisville. Bragg was at Frankfort attending the inauguration of the secession governor of Kentucky when the booming of cannon

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3, p. 600.

informed him of the enemy's approach. On October 8 the battle of Perryville was fought.^a Here Bragg's marching campaign terminated except as he marched in retreat.

The Army of the Ohio, under command of Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, was composed of three temporary corps, with eight divisions present. Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas was announced as second in command, an anomaly due perhaps to the circumstance that, September 29, he had been assigned to the command of that army by the President. This order was revoked only at his request. The corps were commanded—First Corps, Maj. Gen. Alexander McD. McCook; Second Corps, Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden; Third Corps, Brig. Gen. (and acting Maj. Gen.) Charles C. Gilbert. The divisions were commanded by Brigadier-Generals Lovell H. Rosseau, James S. Jackson, William S. Smith, Horatio P. Vancleve, Thomas J. Wood, Albin Schoepf, Robert B. Mitchell, and Philip H. Sheridan. Of these, Gilbert, Smith, Vancleve, Wood, and Sheridan were graduates, as also were Brigadier-Generals William R. Terrill and Milo S. Hascall and Colonels William B. Hazen, Charles G. Harker, and William P. Carlin, all commanding brigades. Other graduates commanding troops were Colonels Curran Pope and Buckner Board, Capt. John Mendenhall, and Lieut. C. C. Parsons of the regular artillery.

The Army of the Mississippi, under Maj. Gen. Leonidas Polk, was divided into right and left wings, Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham commanding the former, Maj. Gen. William J. Hardee, the latter. There were, altogether, three divisions and twelve brigades. The divisions were commanded by Maj. Gen. Simon B. Buckner and Brigadier-Generals Daniel S. Donelson and J. Patton Anderson. All these officers except Cheatham and Anderson were graduates, as were also Brigadier-Generals A. P. Stewart, Thomas M. Jones, Bushrod R. Johnson, Colonels James A. Smith, and Joseph Wheeler, commanding brigades, with Col. Moses H. White, commanding the Thirty-seventh Tennessee.

As so often happened during the civil war, the heavy fighting at Perryville was done principally by a portion of the

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3, p. 29.

Union army. In this instance McCook's Corps stood the brunt, having nearly four times as many killed and wounded as the other two corps together. Among others who fell was the lamented Brigadier-General Terrill, captain in the Regular artillery.

After the battle Bragg took up a position at Harrodsburg, near by, but the attack not being renewed, he retreated first into east Tennessee, thence to Murfreesboro. Polk and Hardee were rewarded for their services at Perryville by lieutenant-generalcies.

Maj. Gen. Edmund K. Smith had also entered Kentucky from east Tennessee at the same time with Bragg, but their armies were independent, and therefore the Confederates derived a minimum of advantage to be expected from their large force except on Bragg's hypothesis that it was a marching not a fighting campaign. Buell pursued as far as London, Ky., whence he turned, about October 20, and directed his columns, via Glasgow and Bowling Green, upon the ground in Tennessee occupied about six weeks before. While this was going on, he was, October 30, relieved of his command by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, fresh from Corinth.

The campaign of 1862 west of the Allegheny Mountains, was now essentially closed. The total of advantages were greatly in favor of the Union armies. West of the Mississippi, although the Confederacy had many troops there, its military power as a serious element to be reckoned with in the conduct of the war had virtually been eliminated. The Confederates retained the strategic line of the Mississippi from some distance below Memphis to Baton Rouge; but the river to those points from each extremity was firmly held to the Union, and from these secure bases preparations were being made for the complete opening of the river during the next campaign. Substantial progress had been made on the central strategic line. The enemy had been driven out of Kentucky, never in force to return. Nashville, important both strategically and politically, had been permanently occupied. The defending Confederate army on this strategic line was at Murfreesboro, far in rear of its position at the beginning of

the campaign, with not only a stronger enemy in front, but another in the vicinity of Corinth on its left flank. Moreover, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, now in possession of the Federals, had ceased to be only theoretically valuable. The Union armies had learned how practically to utilize them to greatest advantage in pushing troops and supplies far into the interior of the enemy's territory, and they continued so to be used until the end of the war. On the other hand, the seizure and destruction of so much of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad had deprived the Confederates of a most important line of communication, compelling them to long detours when sending troops and supplies between the Mississippi and their armies in the eastern theaters of operations.

General McClellan had, November 1, 1861, in the Army of the Potomac, 134,285 effectives with 300 guns. It had been his desire to move against Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, at Manassas, where the latter had about 55,000 effectives, not later than November 25, but he found this unadvisable. By February 1, 1862, the Army of the Potomac was increased to 190,806 effectives.^a

Other important events had happened meanwhile. On January 13, 1862, Mr. Edwin M. Stanton was appointed Secretary of War. It was not long until evidence seemingly was given that the President or those who controlled his innermost military councils had not full confidence in the general in chief, and, to some extent at least, had determined to manage the conduct of the war independently of him. January 27 the President issued orders directing the general advance of all the armies on February 22 following—Washington's birthday. It already has been shown how this order was executed west of the Allegheny Mountains. January 31 the President further ordered that, having first amply provided for the safety of Washington, the Army of the Potomac should advance against the enemy at Manassas on or before February 22, details of the movement being left to the general in chief. March 8 the President organized the Army of the Potomac into four corps. The divisions of Banks and Shields formed

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 2, p. 372.

an additional one. These corps were commanded by Brigadier-Generals Irvin McDowell, E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, E. D. Keyes, and Nathaniel P. Banks.

On March 10 McClellan put the Army of the Potomac in motion against Manassas, only to find that the enemy had retired in the direction of Richmond. On the 11th McClellan was relieved of the command of all military departments except that of the Potomac. Whatever the real reason for this, the ostensible one was that, as he was taking the field in command of the main army of the Union, it was desirable that he be relieved from other similar responsibilities. It required two years of war, wherein hundreds of thousands of men in the aggregate contested on many fields, to evolve a commander who was to be intrusted with the active command at once of that army as well as of all others, thereby enabling the National forces to move with singleness of purpose and predetermined plan to the execution of their great work. Nor did this trusted general stand alone; other able commanders, his assistants, were evolved by the same process, whereas McClellan's principal lieutenants at the beginning of 1862 were inexperienced in high command; indeed, he was himself inexperienced.

More important measures than those here enumerated could not have been taken by the President by virtue of his constitutional power as Commander in Chief. If General McClellan was consulted, his wishes were not determinative; on the contrary, it was known that in some instances mentioned the measures taken had met with his decided disapprobation. The circumstance portended evil. It indicated a lack of that harmony in official circles which all realized was essential to success.

The time now had arrived for moving against the enemy in Virginia. The advance was to be directed against Richmond. The question of what line of operations should be taken became important. The President was willing to leave this to the military commander, on condition that such a force should be placed at Manassas and be left in the Washington defenses as would render the National capital secure.

An error was here committed of greatest moment. Having very properly ordered that the National capital should be rendered secure the President, or whoever had authority to speak for him, should have seen to it that the important matter was attended to in a manner wholly satisfactory to him before McClellan moved and while that general was in Washington to consult in person. The ordinary dictates of prudence counseled this. No other course could prevent misunderstandings. The troops thus to be retained, with the officers to command them, should have been designated and the President should have known who they were. Had this been done all cause for dispute as to matters of fact in connection with the safeguarding the city that subsequently arose, with deplorable consequences to the Army when in face of the enemy, would have been obviated. The incident, with its melancholy results, should serve as a warning to rulers and commanders in the future.

General McClellan chose to make Fort Monroe a base of operations, moving thence up the peninsula between the York and James rivers. March 17 the leading division embarked at Alexandria. McClellan arrived at Fort Monroe on April 2. On the morning of April 4 the movement up the peninsula commenced.^a Maj. Gen. John B. Magruder commanded the Confederate forces at Yorktown and vicinity, and made such resistance that the advance of the Union troops was slow. On April 5, when the army had advanced to the enemy's entrenchments, McClellan received a dispatch from Washington detaching McDowell's Corps from his command, although two of its three divisions subsequently joined him before the heavy fighting in front of Richmond commenced. By May 15 the army had been assembled in the vicinity of West Point, at the head and south of York River. On the 18th the Fifth and Sixth Corps were formed and the army partially reorganized, all corps being reduced to two divisions each: Second Corps, Sumner; Divisions of Israel B. Richardson, John Sedgwick. Third Corps, Heintzelman; Divisions of Joseph Hooker, Philip Kearny. Fourth Corps, Keyes; Divisions of Darius N. Couch, Silas Casey. Fifth Corps,

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 170.

F. J. Porter; Divisions of George W. Morell, George Sykes. Sixth Corps, Franklin; Divisions of William F. Smith, H. W. Slocum; all division, as well as corps commanders, being brigadier-generals. A depot of supplies was established at White House Landing on the Pamunkey, 25 miles or so by river above West Point.

To this time the York River had furnished the means of transport for troops and supplies, but the destruction of the Confederate ram *Merrimac* on May 11 placed at McClellan's disposal the more direct route of the James River for this purpose, to which river he at once resolved to transfer the line of operations and depot of supplies.^a On the 18th of May, however, he received orders to extend a helping hand by the right to McDowell, who would advance from the direction of Fredericksburg. This McClellan continued to do until the night of the 27th of June, prepared every day to join with McDowell, or send to meet him should he advance, the army being in consequence astride the Chickahominy. At last, despairing of McDowell's arrival, he, under the heavy pressure that the enemy then was and had been bringing to bear upon his troops, cut loose on the night of June 27-28 from the Chickahominy and established his base on the James River.

The Confederates meantime had not been idle. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was in command of the troops confronting McClellan after Magruder had been driven back, with Gen. Robert E. Lee as the military adviser of the Confederate president. General Johnston advocated concentrating before Richmond all troops that could be made available from the Atlantic coast. But General Lee, having regard for the great disinclination of the States involved to be denuded of their defenders, and considering also the admirable defensive nature of the country over which McClellan was compelled to advance, advocated at this time the assembling a lesser force, and his views prevailed.^b The event showed that the lesser force was sufficient for all practicable purposes.

General Johnston first, and, after he was disabled May 31 by a wound, General Lee, sought to take advantage of the

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 173.

^b Johnston's Narrative, pp. 113-115.

condition of the Union Army, divided by the Chickahominy, and afterwards while marching by the flank to the James. The first evidence of this was on May 31 when, Keyes's and Heintzelman's corps having crossed to the Richmond side, or right bank, of the Chickahominy, they were attacked with vigor, but Sumner's Corps having come to their assistance, the enemy were repelled.^a This is known as the battle of Seven Pines. It was during its progress that General Johnston was wounded. General Lee, his successor, appeared to be occupied for some days following in getting his new command in hand. On the afternoon of June 26 Fitz John Porter's Corps, the Fifth, still on the north, or left, bank of the river, was attacked near Mechanicsville. The assault was renewed next day at Gaines's Mill. The fighting was very severe, necessitating the sending three divisions across the Chickahominy to Porter's assistance. Stonewall Jackson arrived in time to take part in the fighting of June 27, having eluded the Union commanders after a series of maneuvers and engagements in the Shenandoah Valley. But Porter by stubbornly holding his ground enabled McClellan to perfect all details and make all preliminary arrangements for the delicate and dangerous transfer of base now impending.

This transfer was successfully executed, and, judged solely as a military event, it must be conceded to have been a brilliant maneuver. No officer could have effected it under the circumstances actually existing who had not high qualities of generalship. Not only did it involve the flank march of a large army, with its trains and impedimenta, in presence of an able, vigilant, above all a fighting enemy, perfectly familiar with the country, but to be successful the James River must be reached, and in doing so a swamp directly crossed which the enemy probably regarded as impassable. It was not expected that this was to be done without fighting, but it was absolutely necessary so to fight that the main object, the establishment of the army on the James, should not be interfered with. All this was accomplished in spite of constant and vehement attacks, and July 1 the army was concentrated at

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 178. Johnston's Narrative, p. 131.

Malvern Hill, with the trains at Haxall's in rear. The Confederates attacked at Malvern Hill on July 1, but were repulsed. During the seven days' fighting, from June 25 to July 2, inclusive, the National Army lost 1,734 killed, 8,062 wounded; the Confederates, 3,286 killed, 15,909 wounded. The forests of the peninsula were draped in mourning.

Days of distress those were, but also days of glory. The Confederates, not to be behind their antagonists of the same blood, now stepped forth to brilliant acts.

On June 26, while the Confederate army north of the Chickahominy, including Jackson's troops from the Shenandoah, were assailing Fitz John Porter, the Army of Virginia was created out of the army corps of McDowell, 18,500; Banks, 8,000; and Frémont, 11,500 men; 38,000 aggregate. Maj. Gen. John Pope was placed in command.^a It was intended to operate this army so as to relieve McClellan by moving it toward Gordonsville and Charlottesville. McClellan's transfer to the James, however, rendered such movement on the part of the Army of Virginia useless. That change of base was, in this aspect, a marching away from what was intended by the Administration to operate as a reenforcement.

After McClellan was safely established on the James, and Lee had time to orient himself, the latter found his army between those of McClellan and Pope, which could not be united except by water transport. Quick of eye and swift of wing as the falcon he moved to crush Pope before McClellan could join him. The unfortunate lack of harmony between these two generals, rendering it seemingly advisable to appoint Halleck general in chief, favored Lee's movement. August 9 Stonewall Jackson's Corps, Ewell's, and Winder's divisions encountered Banks's Corps at Cedar Mountain, 8 miles south of Culpeper, and worsted it. Here Brig. Gen. Charles S. Winder, C. S. Army, a graduate, was killed.

Lee's decision accelerated the efforts being made at Washington, against McClellan's protest,^b to move back his army to join Pope's. Halleck believed that this union could be effected on the line of the Rappahannock, which Pope was ordered to

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 450.

^b *Ib.*, vol. 2, p. 548.

hold. In fact, however, McClellan's troops and Burnside's from North Carolina (Ninth Corps), landing generally at Aquia Creek and Alexandria, could not be gotten up soon enough on the Rappahannock line, and Pope by so long adhering to it jeopardized the safety of his army, but succeeded in moving it back before Lee interposed between him and Washington. The Confederate commander, having the initiative and operating in a country familiar to him and amidst a friendly people, moved with greater celerity and certainty than his opponent. He also had the inestimable good fortune to have subordinates whose relations with him were cordial.

After various movements of the opposing corps, during which Stonewall Jackson, having penetrated to Manassas Junction in rear of Pope's army, destroying many supplies, escaped by accident happy to himself, General Lee's army and all the forces that it had been found practicable to collect under Pope confronted each other August 29 upon ground but slightly to the west of that of the battle of Bull Run, giving, in fact, the name "Second Bull Run" to the sanguinary engagement now fought on the 29th and 30th of August, which resulted in such discomfiture to the Union arms that Pope directed the withdrawal of his forces to a new position at and near Centerville. It was in front of this, near Chantilly, in a severe combat on September 1, the last contact of Pope and Lee's forces, that the brave Generals Kearny and Stevens, the latter a graduate, fell.

General Lee had not crushed Pope before the Army of the Potomac could join him, but he administered what was felt to be a severe defeat to the Union forces almost within sight of the Capitol building, and so near that the sound of the cannon reverberated through its halls.

This was the flood time of Confederate prestige. The true value of what had been accomplished for the Union arms west of the Alleghany Mountains was not yet fully appreciated. The National Administration and the nation overlooked for the moment what had been done there, and could think only of this menace to the national capital, within whose sight flaunted the standards of a victorious enemy whose mission it was to sever with the sword the Union of the States.

The hopes of the Confederate government had risen with the course of events. It no longer was to restrain the armies within its territorial limits, but they were to go forth to rally their friends in the border States, and, by renewed victories within the enemy's territory, secure a peace upon their own terms. September 5, the same day upon which Bragg entered Kentucky, Lee crossed the Potomac into Maryland at Point of Rocks.

Inscrutable are the edicts of fate. From that moment, as though governed by the laws of the physical world, the flood tide of rebellion's success commenced to recede.

General McClellan was never formally reinstated in command of the Army of the Potomac after it was taken from him to reenforce Pope.^a But, as this army, as well as other troops, were brought within the sphere of his command under an order of September 2, intrusting him with the defense of Washington city, he marched forth at the head of all the troops assembled to turn back the tide of invasion.

The Federals, 14,000 strong, at Harpers Ferry were isolated. Lee sent Jackson against the place, which, with the troops, save 2,500 cavalry who escaped, was captured on September 15, Jackson instantly thereafter joining Lee. Meanwhile Lee, seeing the failure of his scheme of conquest, was moving to the higher Potomac fords to recross into Virginia. In doing this two sharp actions took place September 14, one at Cramptons Gap, where Howell Cobb resisted the Sixth Corps under Franklin, the other at South Mountain, where D. H. Hill and afterwards Longstreet disputed the passage through Turners Gap with Reno, Hooker, and Burnside. The National troops were successful in both cases, but mourned the loss of Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno, U. S. Volunteers, killed while leading his corps.

Pushing forward, McClellan, on the 15th, found the enemy in position behind Antietam Creek, a sluggish stream which enters the Potomac 8 miles above Harpers Ferry, his line in front of the town of Sharpsburg. Here on the 17th there occurred a battle characterized by desperate fighting on both sides. While it was in progress Jackson's troops arrived at

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 2, p. 551.

critical periods and helped Lee hold off the assaults of the National troops, but he was gradually driven back from the ground first occupied. On the 18th Lee retained his position unmolested. That night he retreated across the Potomac—a brilliant act, judged by its military features alone. But despite this and the other successful feat of arms against Harpers Ferry, the general results of all the engagements since two weeks before Lee crossed to the north of the Potomac had been decidedly favorable to the National arms and cause. The Confederate army trod the soil of Virginia on September 19, 1862, conscious of the fact, before in doubt, that the Potomac marked the northern limits of its theater of operations. “My Maryland,” petite coquette, wooed by chivalry and song worthy the proudest days of knight errantry, first grew reserved, then turned with heartless indifference or cold calculation toward a hated rival.

During the ensuing six weeks both armies were refitting. McClellan then crossed the Potomac, directed on Gordonsville on Lee’s line of communications, but having reached Rector-town en route he was relieved on the night of November 7 by Maj. Gen. A. E. Burnside.^a General Lee had moved to anticipate McClellan at Gordonsville. The new Union commander now essayed to seize Fredericksburg, on the direct line of operations to Richmond, but Lee having seized Fredericksburg before Burnside could reach it, the two armies confronted each other there on the opposite sides of the Rappahannock.

It is unfortunate that political or other cognate considerations entered so largely into the determining of military movements and policies while General McClellan commanded, and so interfered, as alleged, with his military schemes that he never was able to exert his full powers as he wished, and consequently there exists no satisfactory military standard by which to judge of his ability. There are some facts unmistakably in his favor. He organized the Army of the Potomac, which adored him, and to this day its members, now rapidly being depleted, treasure his memory. He gathered its remnants together after the disaster of August 29–30 and,

^a *The Civil War in America*—Draper, vol. 2, p. 468.

with other troops who never had been directly under him, organized them on the march and in two weeks gained a victory, not decisive but still leaning decidedly toward his side of the balance, over the recent victor at the second Bull Run. The change of base on the Peninsula has been commented on. All these facts stood immensely to his credit.

But there was another side to his character and military record. There was no excuse for his underrating the terrible earnestness with which the South conducted the war. Experience should have taught him that. It also should have brought home to him a consciousness of the only manner in which the war could be conducted successfully.

The sanguinary nature of the work to be done was well understood before he embarked for the Peninsula; the nation was reconciled to the sacrifice; the Administration was prepared to support him to the full extent of National resources, which would have proved sufficient; and, as the event demonstrated before the task was accomplished, generals had to come forth to conduct the war upon this basis. They were being educated for it in the less conspicuous if not less sanguinary campaigns of the west, where it was their good fortune, if they made errors of judgment, which ever is the lot of man, not necessarily to be deprived of their stations and novices substituted, but were permitted by their experiences, whether for good or evil, the better to prepare themselves for higher commands and larger responsibilities.

Burnside organized the army into three grand divisions, commanded by Sumner, Hooker, and Franklin.^a December 13 he moved forward to attack the enemy entrenched on the heights of Fredericksburg. The plan was to throw Franklin's grand division, reenforced from Hooker's, in the center forward from the left, and seize the road in rear of the enemy's right flank, thus rendering the latter's position untenable; this accomplished, Sumner and Hooker were to advance upon the enemy's left.^b Through a misunderstanding, Franklin's attack was not of the nature expected. When Sumner and Hooker advanced they were repulsed with great

^aThe Civil War in America, vol. 2, p. 468.

^bIbid., vol. 2, p. 470.

loss. On December 15 the army was withdrawn to the north side of the river, ending, essentially, the campaign.

Notice will now be taken of Stonewall Jackson's brilliant campaign in the Shenandoah Valley before attacking Fitz John Porter on the Chickahominy June 27, as previously narrated. By the division of the Confederate army after the battle of Bull Run the defense of the Shenandoah Valley was intrusted to Stonewall Jackson. As the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston fell back to the defense of Richmond against McClellan he detached Ewell to Jackson's assistance, who was to threaten Washington, thus preventing as much as possible the sending troops on McClellan's expedition. The ulterior part to be acted by Jackson's army was to be determined by the development of events. Jackson was encompassed by three Union corps, Frémont west of the Shenandoah Mountains, Banks near to, but south of the Potomac in the Shenandoah Valley, McDowell in the vicinity of Fredericksburg.^a Turning first upon Frémont, while Ewell held Banks in check, Jackson drove him back in confusion; rapidly retraversing the Shenandoah Mountains, he fell upon a strong post at Front Royal, capturing it; directing his forces upon Banks at Strasburg, now weakened by the detachment of Shields to McDowell, advancing to join McClellan, he drove him north of the Potomac, and caused McDowell's recall. Turning south, he eluded the troops of Frémont and Shields until at Port Republic they converged upon him, when, turning upon them, he beat off his pursuers, and destroying the bridge, made good his escape. His infantry here received the name of "foot cavalry," and the Federal commanders were unmistakably given to understand that if they hoped to cope with such troops on anything like equal terms they must be able at least to march with equal facility. It was seen that capacity to manoeuver was still one of the essential qualities of successful armies.

In the organization of the forces which thus contended for mastery in Virginia in 1862, graduates held almost exclusively the higher commands. In the Army of the Potomac

^a The Civil War in America, vol. 2, p. 391 et seq.



J. E. Johnston

U. S. M. A., 1829.

they commanded 5 of the 6 corps, 11 of the 12 divisions, 26 of the 36 brigades; also the cavalry, artillery, and engineers. Except in Frémont's, afterwards Sigel's Corps, the same proportion was found in the Army of Virginia. No graduates held high command in that corps. The Confederates followed the same rule, all commands, including divisions and upwards, being exercised by graduates; but in the brigades only 40 per cent were so commanded. Among those who fell on both sides were some of the choicest spirits that ever graced the Academy.

Such was the character of the fighting east of the Alleghanies in 1862, each army in turn doing its proportion of attack and defense. The losses in killed and wounded were doubtless about equal. They amounted to about 25,000 on each side. The dark winter of 1862-63 closed down with mourning in nearly every household in the land. At the front preparations were industriously being made to continue the struggle at the pleasure of nature's elements.

OPERATIONS, 1863.

The campaign of 1862 had convinced both parties that there could be but one test to the final issue, and this was which could wear the other out. And while each commenced to respect the other more, because of brave deeds and sufferings on the battlefield, there was no conciliation on the part of either toward the other regarding the principles maintained, but rather those principles were sanctified by the sacrifice which each had been called upon to make. Much, however, had been accomplished in clearing the doubts away which at first surrounded the conduct of the war. The leaders who were to command were coming now prominently to the front and their capabilities studied both by friend and foe. Regarding the main theaters of operations, there could be no essential future change. The Mississippi, the central, and the Virginia strategic lines, determined partly by the features of nature and partly by political policies, still remained those along which the armed hosts were to contend.

On the part of the Confederacy preparations were made for the ensuing campaign by placing Gen. Joseph E. Johnston in


command of all the armies from the Alleghanies to the Mississippi; in Virginia General Lee retained command; west of the Mississippi Holmes, with a large army, was isolated and unable to accomplish important results. The military preparations along the South Atlantic and Gulf coasts were wholly subordinate to those along the three main strategic lines.

Opposed to this front the National Government had, west of the Mississippi, Curtis and Schofield confronting Holmes. Grant at Memphis and Banks at New Orleans with the flotilla were to open up the Mississippi; Rosecrans was forcing Bragg south of Nashville; Burnside, soon superseded by Hooker, commanded the Army of the Potomac.

In this attitude the contestants prepared to renew the struggle. The Confederacy took no chances. It put forward for greatest responsibility only professional, tried, and approved commanders. Its political generals had long since ceased to receive consideration except for demonstrated military merit.

On the Union side, however, political generals were more favored, notwithstanding the fact the campaign just closed had demonstrated their unfitness to command against the leaders whom the Confederacy was putting in the field. Nothing was expected of them in the way of destroying the enemy's army. The Federal Administration seemed to have calculated that in order to secure the political influence supporting these officers it could afford to jeopardize to some extent National interests at comparatively unimportant places where they were assigned to command. And by placing under them subordinates who were competent it was hoped to reduce to the least possible the risks thus taken. This policy was continued until it broke down in spite of all the political support that could be given it. One by one these generals disappeared from active command, until, at the commencement of the final campaign, they all had been relieved.

The preliminary movements for the campaign of 1863 for the opening of the Mississippi River were taken in the fall of 1862. Lieutenant-General Pemberton, intrenched behind the Tallahatchie, opposed General Grant. Pemberton had a moderate force also at Vicksburg, which place the Federal commander planned to capture. To this end he dispatched



W. T. Sherman

U. S. M. A., 1840.

Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman down the Mississippi to attack the Confederate works at Chickasaw Bluffs, just north of that city, while Grant moved along the Mississippi Central Railroad to attack Pemberton in front.^a In pursuance of this plan Sherman had four divisions in position in front of the Bluffs on December 29, 1862. They were commanded, respectively, by Brigadier-Generals A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, G. W. Morgan, Frederick Steele. The Confederates in their front were commanded by Maj. Gen. Martin Luther Smith and Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Lee. The Federal attack failed, and, as the Confederates were being heavily reinforced, Sherman, with the approbation of Major-General McClernand, who had arrived with the President's authority to command the expeditionary force on the Mississippi, the troops were withdrawn, and moved against Arkansas Post, which was captured with its garrison.

The arrival of McClernand gave Sherman his first information of the condition of affairs on Grant's immediate line of operations and furnished the true explanation of the enemy in his front being so heavily reinforced. As General Grant had advanced Pemberton fell back and took up a defensive line behind the Yalabusha. Suddenly Van Dorn, commanding the Confederate cavalry, moving around Grant's left, captured and destroyed, on December 20, his depot of supplies at Holly Springs, Miss. The Federal commander at once saw that unless he could beat the enemy's cavalry and defend this long line of communication and supply he must solve the Vicksburg problem in a different manner. He took his measures energetically, abandoned the railroad, and moved his forces down the Mississippi River to join Sherman. This explained the reinforcement of the Confederates in Sherman's front at Chickasaw Bluffs.

The Confederates were greatly elated, and with reason. They had turned back the Federals on both lines, repulsing their attack on one. But the Holly Springs incident sank deep into the minds of the two principal Federal commanders, and the lesson it taught was subsequently turned by them to advantage. Prior to that time the proposition of living on

^a Personal Memoirs U. S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 429.

the supplies the country afforded had not seriously been considered during the civil war. When, however, the enemy's territory was so abundantly stocked with food, and one's own depots so liable to destruction, why not discard depots and live off the country? As will be seen, this question, of the greatest military importance, was soon answered by Grant in his march to the rear of Vicksburg, and by Sherman two years later in his march from Atlanta to Savannah, Ga.

By War Department orders, December 18, 1862, the troops under General Grant were organized into four corps—Thirteenth, McClernand; Fifteenth, Sherman; Sixteenth, Hurlbut; Seventeenth, McPherson. General McClernand's Army of the Mississippi was merged into the corps to which he here was assigned.

General Grant assumed personal command at Youngs Point, La., January 30, of the forces menacing Vicksburg.^a The problem was to secure a footing upon dry ground on the east side of the river from which to operate. After vainly attempting to find some vulnerable point through which the enemy's position in rear and north of Vicksburg might be penetrated, General Grant resolved to transfer his line of operations to a point below that city. Grand Gulf was selected as the new base of supplies, from which point one of Grant's corps co-operating with Banks would capture Port Hudson. This accomplished, the combined armies would move against Vicksburg.

The flotilla under Flag Officer D. D. Porter, convoying transports with supplies, ran past the enemy's land batteries. Captains and crews of the river steamers declining generally to take the risks involved in this, their places were filled by volunteers from the Army.

April 24 General Grant's headquarters were at Perkins's plantation, 12 miles below New Carthage, on the west bank of the river. Thence a movement was projected against Grand Gulf, but the enemy's batteries being strong and the gunboats unable to make any impression on them,^b the flotilla ran past, as it had done at Vicksburg, and on April 30

^a Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 441.

^b *Ib.*, p. 476.

McClelland's Corps and one division of McPherson's (Seventeenth) were landed at Bruinsburg, Miss., on the east side of the river. By May 7 the remaining division of the Seventeenth and the Fifteenth Corps under Sherman were united with the rest, and General Grant now had under him 33,000 troops.

Grand Gulf having been selected as the base of supplies for future operations, the first movement after the army was thoroughly established on the east side of the river was to capture that place. This was accomplished May 3, when news was received from Major-General Banks announcing that he could not arrive before Port Hudson for some days longer.

In consequence of this news the plan of campaign was immediately changed, Grant resolving to cut loose from the base at Grand Gulf, moving independently of Banks, attack the enemy's forces in rear of Vicksburg and assail that place from the rear.^a A new base would meantime be established at some point above that city.

The resolution here taken and the manner in which it was executed indicated a high order of generalship. This will appear from two facts—first, the cutting loose an army from its base of supplies was at that time unknown during the civil war, and it so completely deceived Pemberton, who did not think such a thing possible, that in the subsequent operations the latter futilely wasted his substance, time, and army in movements against what he regarded as Grant's line of supply, but which line did not exist; second, the total number of Confederates at and in the vicinity of Vicksburg, or who quickly could be collected at Jackson or other available rendezvous close in rear, greatly exceeded the Federal turning army, thus rendering it necessary for the latter to interpose successfully between these superior but detached forces of the enemy before the latter could be united.

Not only, therefore, did the new plan of campaign indicate originality in conception, but also boldness and confidence—the attributes of conscious military mental power which experience had developed in the Federal commander. Napoleon's

^a Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 491.


turning moving against Mack at Ulm, in 1805, was no more unexpected in plan nor daring in execution than that here undertaken; nor was it a greater surprise than the latter to both parties to the contest. In fact, Grant's resolution demanded the more nerve, as he was dealing with unknown elements far more than was Napoleon upon the particular occasion referred to. The character and real military capacity of the opposing Confederate commander, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, emphasized all this. The civil war did not produce his superior in clearness of conception of what practically was needed, under any conditions that arose, to insure military success. Yet General Johnston was compelled to witness this Pearl of the West, the "Gibraltar of the Mississippi," as it was styled, Vicksburg, snatched with its garrison from his grasp, not because of overpowering Federal strength, but because of the unanticipated movements of the Union army and his inability to concentrate his own forces for attack.

The sequel seems to have been anticipated intuitively by both parties. The mind which conceived and successfully executed the campaign now resolved upon never for one moment sought rest until step by step, marked by successive victories, the armies of the Union were led in triumph, the enemy vanquished, two years later through the streets of the National capital.

The first step in the turning movement was the occupation of Jackson, the State capital, also an important military point. This was done on May 14, McPherson having a successful combat on the 12th at Raymond. Johnston's troops being driven off, the various columns now were directed on Vicksburg, before which they arrived on the 18th, having en route defeated the enemy, May 16 at Champion's Hill, and on the 17th at the crossing of the Big Black. A base of supplies was at once established on the east bank above the city.

While the latter engagement was in progress orders were received by General Grant from Halleck in Washington ordering him to desist temporarily from his Vicksburg movement, join Banks against Port Hudson, and after its capture recommence the movement against Vicksburg.^a Compliance

^a Personal Memoirs U. S. Grant, vol. 1, p. 524.



B. BRAGG.
U. S. M. A., 1837.

would have arrested at the full flood of success the most brilliant and one of the most important campaigns of the war. Believing that the general in chief had issued the order under a misunderstanding, and that he would not have given it had he appreciated the facts, Grant exercised his inherent discretion as commander on the spot and disregarded the orders.

After two unsuccessful assaults on May 19 and 22 Vicksburg was reduced by siege operations, surrendering on the 4th of July. Five days later the Confederate commander at Port Hudson also surrendered.

Thus complete success had attended the progress of the Union arms on one of the three main strategic lines of operation. It was effected by the Army and Navy united.

Independence Day, 1863, was indeed one of rejoicing to friends of the Union—Vicksburg captured with its army; Bragg driven south of the Tennessee; Lee rolled back shattered and defeated and shattered in his last attempt at invasion.

Besides the commanding general, there were present in the higher commands in this army a large proportion of graduates—Sherman and McPherson, two of the three corps commanders; McClernand was relieved June 18 by Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, also a graduate. Of the ten divisions, four were commanded by graduates, namely: Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, and Brigadier-Generals A. J. Smith, Eugene A. Carr, Isaac F. Quinby.

After Grant effected a landing at Bruinsburg, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was ordered to command in person immediately against him.^a Previous to that he commanded the departments in which General Bragg, Lieutenant-Generals E. Kirby Smith and Pemberton operated. Besides Johnston the graduates exercising principal commands in the Confederate Army under him around and in Vicksburg were Pemberton and 4 of the 5 division commanders, Major-Generals Stevenson, Forney, Martin L. Smith, Bowen, and 10 at least of the 26 brigade commanders, namely, Brigadier-Generals Tilghman,

^a Johnston's Narrative, p. 172.

who was killed, Barton, Cumming, Hébert, Shoup, W. H. T. Walker, Maxey, Rust, and W. H. Jackson.

Banks organized his available force for moving up the Mississippi into 4 divisions, commanded by Maj. Gen. C. C. Augur and Brigadier-Generals Thomas W. Sherman, William H. Emory, Cuvier Grover, all graduates and tried soldiers.

Having pushed the Confederate General Taylor out of the way up Red River, General Banks, with assistance of the Navy, which had run up past Port Hudson, crossed the Mississippi on the night of May 23 and invested that stronghold, commanded by the Confederate Maj. Gen. Franklin Gardner.^a General Johnston had ordered Gardner to abandon the place and join him. This order, however, came too late; besides, it was disapproved by the Confederate President. The defense was maintained stubbornly, the garrison enduring every privation, until forced to surrender on the 9th of July. This event not only at last opened the Mississippi, but liberated the Union troops just in time to beat off Taylor at New Orleans.

Besides the division commanders, all of whom were graduates, Brigadier-Generals Godfrey Weitzel and George L. Andrews and Col. Oliver P. Gooding, commanding brigades, were West Pointers. Banks also had with him what was an unusual sight in the West, some light batteries of the Regular Army, commanded by Captains H. W. Closson and E. C. Bainbridge and Lieut. Jacob B. Rawles.

The Union advance along the central strategic line was inaugurated by the battle of Murfreesboro, fought December 31, 1862–January 2, 1863. Both parties had been preparing for this event. President Davis deemed the Confederate affairs here to be so prosperous that, contrary to Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's views, he detached Stevenson's Division and one brigade of McCown's Division from Bragg to reenforce Pemberton in Mississippi. This was Rosecrans's opportunity, and accordingly, December 26, 1862, he moved out from Nashville against the enemy.^b By an unusual coincidence both armies moved simultaneously to the attack, each intending first to

^a *The Civil War in America*, Draper, vol. 3, p. 249.

^b *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 3, p. 613 et seq.

strike the other with its own left. Bragg was the quicker, with the result that on the evening of the first day's fight Rosecrans had been driven back to the formation of a new line, where he was assailed in the most determined manner, but remained firm. January 1, 1863, both sides sought a breathing spell, but on the 2d Rosecrans, far from acknowledging defeat, felt out toward his left again, when a most sanguinary struggle with Breckenridge occurred, with results adverse to the latter. A storm prevented renewal of the battle on the 3d, and that night Bragg fell back to Tullahoma, carrying with him in this retrograde movement the impaired prestige of a defeated commander, notwithstanding his success in the first day's battle. So much was this felt to be the case that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was ordered to make a careful inspection of the army to ascertain whether its confidence in Bragg had been shaken seriously. A report favorable to the commanding general was made, but spite of this Johnston was soon ordered to relieve Bragg, a change only prevented by sickness of the former.

The graduates present in the Union Army included the commanding general, McCook commanding the right wing and Thomas the center; R. W. Johnson, Sheridan, T. J. Wood, Horatio P. Van Cleve, commanding divisions; Stanley commanding the cavalry; Brigadier-Generals Milo S. Hascall and Joshua W. Sill, Colonels Carlin, Harker, Hazen, Lieutenant-Colonel Shepherd commanding brigades. There was also a small regular brigade in which were a number of graduates, including Majors A. J. Slemmer, James N. Caldwell, and Stephen D. Carpenter; Capt. Elmer Otis, of the Cavalry; Capt. John Mendenhall and Lieut. F. L. Guenther, Regular Light Artillery. Brigadier-General Sill and Major Carpenter were killed.

The graduates in the Confederate Army of Tennessee included the commanding general; Polk and Hardee, the corps commanders; Withers, McCown, commanding divisions; Donelson, Stewart, Bushrod R. Johnson, Pegram, commanding brigades, and Brig. Gen. Joseph Wheeler the Cavalry.

Rosecrans and Bragg remained facing each other, the latter lending a helping hand to Johnston in rear of Vicksburg by

detaching several thousand troops to the latter's assistance. This was inviting Rosecrans to attack, a contingency that Bragg seemed to anticipate. To distract attention the latter started Brig. Gen. John H. Morgan's cavalry north on a raid from which no part returned. Rosecrans now moved forward June 25, 1863, and, feinting with his right, turned all Bragg's fortified positions by the Federal left.^a By this maneuver, ably conceived and skillfully executed, Bragg was thrown out of Tennessee upon Chattanooga. Thus far Rosecrans had decidedly the advantage of his opponent; but this forward movement had been so long delayed that before he could strike Bragg a blow at Chattanooga the troops which the latter had detached to Johnston in the rear of Vicksburg had rejoined. The opportunity of the Federal commander to strike his opponent when weakened had passed.

It is impossible to withhold admiration for the desperate energy of the Confederate military power at this time. With the Mississippi River permanently wrested, Lee's army sent reeling for the last time from the soil of the North, Bragg driven south of the Tennessee the grip of the enemy tightening on all sides, the South, far from despairing, simply aroused herself to greater effort and took new resolutions of sacrifice.

It now was to be determined whether Bragg should be compelled to continue his retrograde movement farther into the recesses of the Confederacy. Incidentally, the question as to who should hold Chattanooga was involved. Each side exerted itself to the utmost for the approaching contest. To Bragg were sent Buckner from East Tennessee, Longstreet from Virginia, Polk from Alabama.

Rosecrans, sending Crittenden forward, feinted by his left, while he moved Thomas and McCook out from the center and right, threatening Bragg's communications with Dalton and the South.^b The movement involved great danger, in that Crittenden, Thomas, and McCook could not move laterally to each other's support, owing to mountains between them. Bragg abandoned Chattanooga September 8, threatened by the movement of Thomas and McCook, not, however,

^aThe Civil War in America—Draper, vol. 3, p. 61.

^bIb., p. 64.

to flee, but to concentrate for battle.^a The Union generals, alarmed at the resistance they were meeting, likewise commenced to concentrate. On the night of September 18 Rosecrans's army was near Rossville, west of Chickamauga Creek, McCook on the right, Crittenden in the center, Thomas on the left.

The battle of Chickamauga began on the morning of September 19, Bragg attacking and attempting to interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga by turning the Union left. Polk commanded the right. Polk's effort to turn Thomas's left failed. On the night of the 19th Longstreet arrived. He was assigned to command of the Confederate left wing. The attacks on the Union left, renewed on the 20th, failed to drive Thomas from his position. To maintain this, however, required heavy reenforcements from Rosecrans's right and center, which finally were driven back in confusion toward Rossville and Chattanooga. The utmost efforts of Polk and Longstreet were now combined against Thomas, but in vain. In allusion to this that general was thereafter called the "Rock of Chickamauga." That night he retired deliberately to Rossville, where, on the 21st, he again offered battle. This not being accepted, he drew off into the defenses of Chattanooga.

Rosecrans's army consisted of three army corps, an extemporized reserve, and a cavalry corps, the whole including 14 divisions and 36 brigades. The graduates present in command of corps were Thomas, McCook, and Granger; of divisions, Baird, J. J. Reynolds, R. W. Johnson, Sheridan, Thomas J. Wood, Van Cleve, and Crook; of brigades, Carlin, Harker, and Hazen.

Bragg's army, composed largely of detachments from other armies, was not systematically organized into corps. Although there were present Polk's, D. H. Hill's, Longstreet's, Forrest's, and W. H. T. Walker's (reserve) corps, there were troops present not belonging to either. There were 15 divisions and 46 brigades. The graduates present included the commanding general, the wing and corps and cavalry commanders, except Brig. Gen. N. B. Forrest; of division commanders,

^a The Civil War in America—Draper, vol. 3, p. 65.

Major-Generals Stewart and McLaws, Brigadier-Generals Bushrod R. Johnson and Pegram; of brigade commanders, Brigadier-Generals Deshler, Helm, Gracie, Bryan, Davidson. Of these, Deshler and Helm were killed. Col. E. Porter Alexander and Maj. Melancthon Smith, also graduates, were present with the Confederate artillery.

This shows how death, wounds, and disease were making themselves felt in thinning out the limited class of graduates available for high command. They had, however, done a great and indispensable work in training in practical details of military life a class of officers drawn from either the ranks of the Army or from civil life, to take the stations for which the smaller number of graduates could not continue to provide. There was another important consideration in this connection: these subordinate commanders, taught thus their first lessons in military duty by graduates, were apt, ardent, brave, receptive to warlike instruction. The seed sown by the Military Academy fell upon good ground. Division and brigade commanders and subordinates to them were being thus educated who were abundantly capable of taking the places of the graduates who had instructed them. These campaigns, like those of the First Empire, were developing a breed of first-class soldiers. It would not have been conducive to true military interests to deny to officers so instructed the stations they had fitted themselves for in campaign and battle. No one was more tenacious of this principle than graduates themselves. The policy therefore was adopted, as the war progressed, of rewarding conspicuously meritorious subordinate officers, no matter what their antecedents, with any command which they had been so fortunate as conspicuously to demonstrate they were capable of exercising.

The Confederates had reenforced Bragg to the utmost. Their interior lines greatly facilitated this. They were successful at Chickamauga, and the only question that soldiers have asked is why Bragg did not try to render victory more complete.

The star of the Confederacy, like the meteor's blaze, dazzled for a moment only to disappear.

Thomas had not yet moved from Rossville, where he

turned and defied the Confederates to renewed combat, when orders were issued moving the Eleventh (Howard's) and Twelfth (Slocum's) corps, the whole under Hooker, from the Army of the Potomac to Rosecrans's assistance.^a In seven days these troops, having traveled 1,192 miles, were established on the Tennessee in the vicinity of Stevenson and Bridgeport. This, however, was but a preliminary movement on the part of the National Government. General Grant was then at New Orleans, where he had hoped by concerting with Banks a movement against Mobile to take the pressure from Rosecrans. On October 16 he was ordered to repair to Chattanooga. On the 19th General Thomas was ordered to relieve General Rosecrans. In response to a dispatch from General Grant to hold on at all hazards, Thomas replied laconically, "I will hold the town till we starve." The 23d saw General Grant at Chattanooga. By the 27th he had established secure communication with Nashville by moving against and capturing the enemy's position south of the river above Bridgeport. The prompt and effective manner in which this was done was characteristic of the general now in command. It was the first in a series of movements to extricate the Army of the Cumberland from a state of siege. The entire confidence with which this first step was undertaken presaged well for the future. Its success showed that both officers and soldiers were no longer novices.

November 14 Gen. William T. Sherman arrived, followed by the Fifteenth Army Corps and Brig. Gen. John E. Smith's Division of the Seventeenth Corps, all which troops Grant had ordered to join Rosecrans in September from the Army of the Tennessee.^b

General Grant only awaited the placing of troops under Sherman on his left, south of the Tennessee River, to commence the forward movement. The plan of battle was to attack both flanks of the enemy, piercing Bragg's center when that was sufficiently weakened by detachments to support the right and left.^c Sherman was over the river early on November 24, when both, he on the left and Hooker on the right, advanced. The battle recommenced on the 25th, Hooker

^a The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 78.

^b *Ib.*, p. 81.

^c *Ib.*, p. 87.

sweeping forward, but Sherman, vigorously opposed, made less progress. The fight in Sherman's front, however, indicated what was desired—that Bragg's center had been weakened. Thomas now moved forward in the center, piercing the enemy's line—and driving him from the field. Pursuit was stopped at Ringgold, and Sherman hastily sent off to rescue Burnside, besieged by Longstreet at Knoxville. This signal victory enhanced General Grant's reputation as a skillful commander, and was soon rewarded by a lieutenant-generalcy. Soon after he was appointed general in chief of the armies of the United States.

Bragg made the capital mistake just before the battle of weakening his army by detaching Longstreet's Corps and one other division to Knoxville. He staked all on the chance of Burnside succumbing and lost. It was wrong in principle. The military commander should make the greatest effort he possibly can at the main point, knowing that victory there means victory in effect everywhere, while defeat there carries with it defeat at all collateral points. Bragg's fate illustrated the results that may follow a disregard of this.

The Confederates fell back to Dalton and vicinity, where, under orders from Richmond, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston relieved Bragg of command of the Army of Tennessee, December 27.^a Preparations on both sides were commenced for the grand campaign on the central strategic line which it was seen must follow in the coming spring. Bragg was placed on duty at Richmond as chief of staff to President Davis.

The characters of the two had many features in common. Both were absolutely devoted to the cause in which the Confederacy was embarked. Their views on all public and military questions apparently were identical. Both were better understood in the U. S. Army, where they had served as young officers, than anywhere else. Both had ability, Davis superior to Bragg; but the latter's intensity of purpose, and self-abnegation in the cause in which he had staked his fortunes and his life created between them a bond of sympathy and mutual appreciation.

^a Johnston's Narrative, p. 261.

The friends of the Union had every reason to feel encouraged with the results of the campaign of 1863 in the west. One of the three great strategic lines of operation had been reduced into permanent possession of the National forces; on the other the Confederates had been beaten back far into the interior of their own territory, while Chattanooga, an immense fortress on this line, grasping an important railroad, permanently held at last by the Union troops, projected as a salient far into the enemy's country.

On the third strategic line fortune had favored one, then the other of the armies which contended for mastery; and, while the actual geographical position held by each at the end was about what it was at the commencement of the campaign, the sum total of advantages gained leaned heavily to the side of the Federals. The Army of the Potomac had triumphed over its enemy, not in territory won toward the Confederate Capital, but in throwing back, defeated, and in utter confusion the legions of the Confederacy in their last desperate and despairing effort at northern invasion.

Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker relieved General Burnside of command of the Army of the Potomac January 26, 1863.^a His problem was to destroy Lee's army without uncovering Washington. His army was soon organized into seven corps: First, Reynolds; Second, Couch; Third, Sickles; Fifth, Meade; Sixth, Sedgwick; Eleventh, Howard; and Twelfth, Slocum. Stoneman commanded the cavalry, in four divisions, under Pleasonton, Buford, Averell, and Gregg. Lee had Stonewall Jackson's Corps, four divisions, under A. P. Hill, Rodes, Colston, Early, and two divisions of Longstreet's Corps under R. H. Anderson and McLaws. The cavalry was under J. E. B. Stuart, the artillery under Brig. Gen. W. N. Pendleton. Every officer named in both armies, except Rodes, Colston, and Sickles, was a graduate.

Fredericksburg had shown the dangers attending a direct attack on the enemy awaiting behind intrenchments, and General Lee had greatly strengthened these. Hooker's army largely outnumbered Lee's, and the former determined, by moving around the latter's left and rear, to flank the enemy,

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 105.

compelling him to come out from behind his works and either precipitately retreat or give battle in the open.^a It is seldom that a plan so excellent as this failed so utterly in the execution.

April 12 Stoneman started on a raid from the Union right against the railroads in the Confederate rear, but the rains rendered it abortive. The turning movement by the Federal main army began on April 27, when the three corps of Meade, Howard, Slocum, crossing both the Rapahannock and the Rapidan, wheeled toward Lee's rear, being joined in succession by Couch, Sickles, and Reynolds across United States Ford just below the junction of the two rivers. Sedgwick, assisted at first by Sickles and Reynolds, acted as a containing force to hold Lee to his intrenched position. By the afternoon of May 1 the turning corps were in position in Lee's rear, and communication with Sedgwick was established over Banks Ford. At this time all had gone well. The Federals had won in the first maneuver, and were advancing as prearranged to the attack. At this point Hooker was seized with doubts, the forerunner of disaster. The advanced corps had cleared the Wilderness, but, apprehensive that the difficulties of the terrain would prevent him from supporting them, he ordered them to retreat, and thus in a twinkling, and against the remonstrances of his advanced commanders, he changed the attitude of his splendid army from one of attack to defense. Although his forces greatly exceeded Lee's, he thus threw away the morale of assailant and gave it to the enemy.

General Lee acted with confidence and judgment. Leaving 10,000 men under Early to confront Sedgwick's Corps, he moved with the rest against Hooker. Here he divided his forces. Retaining himself scarcely enough to amuse the Federal left, he sent Stonewall Jackson, with A. P. Hill, Rodes, and Colston, to make a complete circuit of the Federal front. Howard's Corps, on the extreme Federal right, attacked by surprise, was completely overthrown. But in doing this the great soldier and leader, Stonewall Jackson, fell, dying on the 10th of May following. A new front drove back the

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 107.

Confederates and occupied the ground from which the Eleventh Corps had been driven.

On the 3d of May, while the battle was raging, Hooker, struck by flying timber impelled by a cannon shot of the enemy, was rendered insensible. Couch failed to assume command, with the result that the Federal center was broken, while the corps of Meade, Howard, and Reynolds lay at hand idle. At this juncture Sedgwick, advancing through Fredericksburg, menaced Lee's rear. The latter's success against Hooker enabled him at once to detach troops to Early's assistance against Sedgwick. The latter was roughly handled, but escaped by recrossing the Rappahannock on the night of May 4-5 at Banks Ford. Lee advanced again against Hooker on the morning of May 6, only, however, to find him gone, he having withdrawn the night before. Stoneman meantime had renewed his attempts with the cavalry on the Confederate rear, penetrating even to the works defending Richmond; but the damage wrought to bridges, railroads, etc., was so slight that traffic was scarcely interrupted.

The graduates present on the Union side included the commanding general, 5 of the 7 corps, the cavalry and the artillery commanders, 15 of the 24 division commanders, and 21 of the 66 brigade commanders. On the side of the Confederates the graduates embraced the commanding general, all army corps, the artillery and the cavalry commanders, 5 of the division commanders, and 5 of the 28 brigade commanders. In both artilleries the graduates were largely represented, especially among the higher officers.

It was only natural, with the experiences of Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville to animate them, that the Confederate administration again should aspire to dictating a peace upon Northern soil. If what the Union army had done in those battles demonstrated the best that it could do, the Confederate hope was by no means unreasonable. It was expected also that the opponents of the National Government in the free States would prove efficient allies of the Southern armies. At this time none of the fortunate events had transpired on the other two strategic lines which later during the campaign gave such a fortunate turn to the efforts of the Union armies

operating thereon. Whatever might happen elsewhere, it certainly looked, on the surface of things, as though the Army of Northern Virginia, under Lee's command, could select its own path to final victory. How superficial this view! How soon that gallant army again was to realize the vital difference between defending its own well-known territory, close to friends and its base of supplies, and marching into a hostile country where all these its habitual advantages now were operating in favor of the enemy.

Having resolved upon invasion the Confederate administration moved with habitual energy. The army was organized into three corps: (1) Longstreet, divisions, Pickett, McLaws, Hood; (2) A. P. Hill, divisions, R. H. Anderson, Heth, Pender; (3) Ewell, divisions, Early, Rodes, E. Johnson. Stuart commanded the cavalry. Pendleton the artillery.^a

The movement commenced on June 3, by way of Culpeper Court House, Hill's Corps being left as a screen in front of Hooker. On the 13th the latter moved north to protect Washington. Hill then joined Lee, who crossed the Potomac on the 26th at Williamsport and Shepardstown, directed on Chambersburg, Pa. Hooker crossed at Edward's Ferry that day, directed on Frederick, Md. On the 28th he was superseded by Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commanding the Fifth Corps.^b The army corps continued to be commanded as under Hooker, except that Sykes succeeded Meade in the Fifth and Hancock had the Second instead of Couch.

Meade acted with promptness, selecting a battlefield on Pipe Creek, 15 miles southeast of Gettysburg, Pa. But on July 1 the opposing forces came into collision at Gettysburg; a very heavy battle was fought, Major-General Reynolds was killed, and affairs assumed such shape that each army commander felt impelled to hurry forward all his troops to sustain those who accidentally had thus become engaged.

The great preponderance of the Confederates forced the Union army on the defensive on July 1, and that status remained after this preponderance was reversed throughout the battle. The situation of Lee's army was such that he

^a The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 126.

^b The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 132. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3, p.

was compelled to try conclusions with Meade, and the sooner the better for the Confederates. This threw upon him the burden of attack. The line occupied by Meade's army was in many ways admirable for defense—one part could support another, the flanks were strong, not easily assailed. Here during the 2d and 3d of July the battle continued to rage. Both sides were veterans from the commanding generals down, and all understood the tremendous consequences of the result. It may be said, too, that each side measured up fully to the highest type of soldierly conduct, and each proved worthy of the uniform it so proudly wore. At 3 p. m. on the 3d Pickett's division of Longstreet's Corps was launched against the center of the Union line. The slope up which it came was like a glacis. The head of the attacking column reached the opposing forces, a hand to hand conflict momentarily ensued, when all that was left—a mere remnant—of Pickett's division was hurled back defeated. Pickett's division was supported on the right and left, but the task set it was impossible of accomplishment. This was the supreme effort of Lee's army. Had it been twice as strong the only consequence, seemingly, would have been defeat twice as great, for Meade had at hand the necessary troops.

General Lee promptly accepted the consequences of defeat. His solicitation now was to recross the Potomac in safety. Preparations for this were at once begun, and on the morning of the 5th of July the Confederate army was in full retreat.

The Union army at Gettysburg was essentially the same as that which two months before had fought at Chancellorsville. All the army corps except the Third (Sickles's) were commanded by graduates, as were 15 of the 22 divisions, and 17 of the 58 brigades. The Federal light artillery, which played a great part in this battle, was also largely officered by graduates.

On the Confederate side all the corps, 8 of the 9 divisions and the cavalry, and 8 of the 39 brigades were commanded by graduates, who also, as in the Federal Army, largely officered the Confederate light artillery, especially in the upper grades.

Each army lost some of its most conspicuous graduates. On

the Union side this list included Maj. Gen. J. F. Reynolds, commanding the left wing, and who but recently had declined command of the Army of the Potomac; Brig. Gen. Stephen H. Weed, Col. Patrick K. O'Rorke; on the Confederate side Maj. Gen. William D. Pender and Brig. Gen. Richard B. Garnett. Pickett's Division acted a spectacular and heroic part in this battle, yet it lost in killed less than either of the other two divisions of Longstreet's Corps. This shows the sanguinary nature of the fighting generally in this great battle.

During the campaign of 1863 the Confederates were virtually eliminated from Missouri and Arkansas,^a Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith, at Shreveport, La., maintaining the only real army in that extensive section. Van Dorn had been succeeded in the Trans-Mississippi by Maj. Gen. T. C. Hindman; he, by Maj. Gen. T. H. Holmes, and he, finally, by Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith. Hindman had lost the severe battle at Prairie Grove, northwest Arkansas, December 7, 1862; Holmes had Arkansas Post wrested from him January 11, 1863, and was repulsed in an attack on Helena July 4, while September 10 Major-General Steele finally drove Price out of Little Rock. Thenceforth the Trans-Mississippi Department cut small figure in the civil war; the only exception being Banks's ill-starred expedition up Red River from New Orleans early in 1864. The ordering of Van Dorn to reinforce Johnston early in 1862, although conforming to correct military principles, was not unnaturally interpreted by the Confederate party in Missouri and Arkansas as an abandonment of that department. This, in effect, was what it implied, and almost of necessity was it so; if the Confederates triumphed at all it could only be through victories gained at the vital strategic points; this meant concentration of their troops at the latter, even at seeming sacrifice of less important territory. But the inevitable result was that even Confederate sympathizers, feeling themselves neglected by their friends, turned a more willing ear to the overtures of the Union authorities. The graduates who acted important parts in these transactions were, in the Federal Army, Major-Generals Samuel R. Curtis and J. M. Schofield, commanding

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 3, p. 441 et seq.

the Department of Missouri; Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele, Brig. Gen. John W. Davidson, and Col. William McE. Dye; on the part of the Confederates, of Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith, Major-General Holmes, Brigadier-Generals J. S. Marmaduke, Lucius M. Walker, and Col. James Deshler.

Military events of importance had taken place during 1863 immediately on the Atlantic coast. After the repulse of the naval attack at Charleston Harbor in April a combined land and naval attack was made with more success. Brig. Gen. Quincy A. Gillmore relieved Major-General Hunter of command there June 12, 1863. Admiral Dahlgren succeeded Du Pont in command of the naval force. Gillmore's work was largely in the nature of regular siege operations, resulting, September 7, in the capture of Fort Wagner, on Morris Island. In the meantime Fort Sumter was reduced to a most dilapidated condition, and only was maintained by the Confederates as an outpost to protect the channel obstructions near. On the night of September 8 Admiral Dahlgren ordered an assault on this fort by a landing party of about 400 men; but after more than a quarter of the whole number were killed, wounded, or captured the attack was abandoned,^a and thereafter the combined land and naval forces contented themselves with maintaining Charleston in a condition of strict blockade. The graduates in principal command, besides and under Gillmore, were Brigadier-Generals Truman Seymour, Israel Vogdes, and George H. Gordon; with the Confederates, General Beauregard, commanding, and Brigadier-Generals R. S. Ripley and N. G. Evans.

OPERATIONS, 1864.

The campaign of 1864 opened under brighter auspices for the Union armies than any previous one. This was due to the generally favorable issue of the campaign of 1863, in spite of Chancellorsville and Chickamauga, but more especially to the fact that President Lincoln at length had placed the entire conduct of military affairs under one commander, whose previous career inspired confidence. Moreover, this

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4, p. 65. The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 184.

was not a pro forma conferring of military authority. It was genuine, hearty, full, and placed in the discretion of the new commander of the armies authority to settle the plan upon which all should move for the accomplishment of the sole object in view—destroying the armies of the Confederacy. For the first time during the civil war the general in chief was given power commensurate with his office.

March 1, 1864, the grade of Lieutenant General was re-created by the National Government; on the 9th a commission thereto was conferred upon Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant,^a and on the 11th orders were issued placing him in command of all the armies. At the same time he was given to understand that all the resources of the Government—troops and supplies—were placed at his disposal to crush the military power of the Confederacy.

All his previous service having been west of the Alleghenies, it was his first wish to continue to direct affairs from there, leaving the able and experienced officers who commanded in the Army of the Potomac to contend against their old-time antagonist. A study of the condition of things at the seat of government led him to decide upon a different course. He became convinced that he must take his station either at the national capital or near it, to prevent interference with his plans.^b This led to his joining the Army of the Potomac, being succeeded in command of the Military Division of the Mississippi by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, the latter in the Department and Army of the Tennessee by McPherson, and he in the Seventeenth Army Corps by Maj. Gen. John A. Logan.

The main field of military operations now was more limited than before. The great armies of the Confederacy under its ablest generals were reduced to two, lying upon the central and the Virginia strategic lines, and against these the mighty efforts of the Union armies under Grant and W. T. Sherman were to be directed.

There were other movements of Federal troops, but they were wholly subsidiary to and in aid of the main ones.

^a Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 2, p. 116.

^b *Id.*, p. 146.

General Gillmore, commanding the Department of the South, sent an expedition into Florida under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, U. S. Volunteers. This command, of about 5,000 men, was ambushed at Olustee, February 20, and badly defeated.

West of the Mississippi a more pretentious expedition was directed by Banks against E. Kirby Smith up Red River. The real purpose of this expedition, which Banks disapproved of, was for political effect, having an eye to French intrigues in Mexico. Steele was to cooperate from the direction of Little Rock. Sherman from Vicksburg lent Banks 10,000 men under A. J. Smith. On April 8 at the battle of Sabine Crossroads the Federal troops were worsted; the expedition proved a failure not only politically but militarily, the latter being a contingency that the Federal Administration had not deemed possible; Steele was compelled to retreat to Little Rock in face of a superior enemy thus rendered available. Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby, U. S. Volunteers, relieved Banks, and at once started the Nineteenth Army Corps, under Brig. Gen. W. H. Emory, to join the forces operating against Richmond, Va.

Lieut. Gen. E. Kirby Smith was made a full Confederate general for his success in repelling Banks.

In February Gen. W. T. Sherman moved east from Vicksburg against Meridian, Miss., an important railroad center. Brig. Gen. William Sooy Smith cooperated from Memphis. Sherman had Hurlbut and McPherson, with 20,000 men. Smith had 7,000 cavalry. Sherman was eminently successful, breaking up the railroads by which the Confederates in the South were supplied, and enabling him to send 10,000 troops, as previously mentioned, to Banks and another 10,000 to Chattanooga. Smith was defeated at Okalona, Miss., and did not reach Meridian.

In August, 1864, a combined land and naval expedition, the troops under Maj. Gen. E. R. S. Canby, the navy under Rear-Admiral D. G. Farragut, captured and occupied the Confederate forts guarding the entrance to Mobile Bay. This closed the only port in the Gulf at this time open to blockade runners. It had been hoped, and Grant's plan of campaign

provided, that Banks, while Grant and Sherman were moving forward, should attack Mobile with 30,000 men. This not only on account of the importance of Mobile itself, but to act as a powerful diversion. The Red River expedition, however, confirming results of previous experience, showed that Banks could not command an army. His relief by Canby, and the transfer of the Nineteenth Corps following this, changed the plan as to Mobile to the simple capture and occupation of the forts guarding the entrance to the bay.

Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler commanded the Army of the James, with headquarters at Fort Monroe. His inability to command troops in action had not yet been sufficiently demonstrated to overcome the political power that supported him. Gillmore was sent to him with 10,000 men from the Department of the South. It was expected that he would attempt to capture Petersburg, Va., making the James River his line of water operations, while Grant, moving directly against Lee's army, advanced upon Richmond from the front.

Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel was to operate in Virginia to the west of Grant and strike the railroads in Lee's rear. He moved in two columns—one under Crook, the other under Ord and Averell. It was not long until he came to grief and was relieved.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had prepared Dalton, Ga., to resist any attack that could be made upon it. The protection of lines of communication was left to Lieutenant-General Polk, commanding in Alabama.

Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman moved against Dalton May 5 as Grant grappled with Lee in the Wilderness." His armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio were commanded by Thomas, McPherson, and Schofield, all educated and experienced generals. The Army of the Cumberland embraced the Fourth Corps, Howard; Fourteenth Corps, Palmer; Twentieth Corps, Hooker. Of the Tennessee, Fifteenth Corps, Logan; Sixteenth Corps, Dodge; Seventeenth Corps, Blair. Of the Ohio, Twenty-third Corps, Cox; Cavalry Corps, Stoneman. General Sherman's army

numbered about 100,000 men and 250 guns, and it was his constant effort to maintain it at this point.

May 5, Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had the two corps of Hardee and Hood, numbering 53,000 men and 144 guns. On that day Lieutenant-General Polk was ordered to join with all his infantry. As Johnston fell back reinforcements constantly arrived, until on the 16th he had about 67,000 men and 168 guns. As the army retired toward Atlanta these numbers increased.

It was not General Sherman's policy to attack the enemy at Dalton. His plan was to feint in front and, availing himself of his numerical superiority, move with a strong force to the enemy's left flank and rear, threatening his communications. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's plan was to cling so close to him as to induce Sherman to attack him behind his works—so close that Sherman could not detach to help Grant in Virginia; to keep reducing Sherman's army by partial engagements in which Sherman, being the attacker, was the greater loser; to try to break up Sherman's lines of supply and fall back only when necessary to protect his own line to Atlanta.

Such was the character of the military struggle on the central strategic line. The opposing commanders were well matched; each was entirely capable of commanding his own army; each had tried and competent subordinates, and, having such subordinates, the only solicitude of each was how most effectually to carry out his part in the higher sphere of commanding general. General Sherman had no discretion; he was compelled to press ever forward; somehow the Confederate army opposing him must be destroyed, and he essayed to utilize his numerical superiority to press it back by threatening flank movements until he could force it from its impregnable mountain fastnesses into the more open country and there force it to battle on terms more favorable to the Federal Army. General Johnston had perhaps more discretion; as Sherman sought to destroy, so it was to his interest to preserve his army, which he did by appropriately responding to the turning movements of his antagonist; but this course, at variance with the Southern character, was

fraught with danger of demoralization;" on the other hand, if he stood to fight, with the enemy in his rear, a great victory over a superior foe would alone save him from destruction. He chose the former course; and, although greatly to the delight of the Federals, he was relieved from command in consequence, the best military judgment has justified his conduct.

On May 9 Thomas threatened Dalton from the northwest through Buzzard Roost Gap; Schofield approached from the north, while McPherson, detached to the right, penetrated to Resaca through Snake Creek Gap.^b At this time Johnston had only one brigade guarding Resaca, a railroad station on his line of communication 15 miles in his rear. McPherson was imposed upon by the stand made by the Confederates and the seemingly formidable nature of the enemy's earthworks. Instead of seizing Resaca he reported that it was too strong for him to attack and, falling back to Snake Creek Gap, fortified.

Leaving Howard with the Fourth Corps to threaten Dalton from the front, the rest of the Army was moved through Snake Creek Gap on Resaca—Schofield on the left, then Thomas, McPherson on the right. They were opposed, respectively, by Hood, Hardee, and Polk, now prepared to receive them behind carefully prepared earthworks. Here during May 14 and 15 heavy fighting took place, the Confederates, protected by their intrenchments, losing less than the Federals; but, Sherman again threatening his line of communications, Johnston fell back over the Oostenaula to an intrenched position at Cassville, 4 miles east of Kingston. Here he proposed to make a stand, but the placing of some Federal artillery so as to enfilade portions of the lines caused some of his corps commanders to doubt the tenableness of their positions. Johnston therefore, not wishing to deliver battle contrary to their judgment, or, as he expressed it, unless their "hearts were in it," fell back over the Etowa on the night of May 19.

^a Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 6, p. 432.

^b Memoirs of General Sherman, vol. 2, p. 34; Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4, p. 247 et seq.

Leaving the Cassville lines without defending them was an act for which General Johnston was severely criticised by Confederate authorities and one which he always regretted.

Supposing that Johnston would stubbornly defend the difficult Allatoona passes, 4 miles south of the Etowa, Sherman, leaving garrisons at Rome and Kingston, marched with twenty days' rations on the 23d toward Dallas, seeking again to turn the enemy's right. Johnston now interposed across the line of advance, his left, under Hood in front of Dallas, Polk, and Hardee, extending off to the eastward north of Marietta across the Atlanta Railroad. Sherman felt toward his own left, seized and repaired the railroad through Allatoona and Ackworth, thus enabling supplies to be immediately delivered to his army. Allatoona was organized and intrenched as a depot. Johnston continued to contract his lines, letting go in succession Dallas, Pine Mountain, Lost Mountain, finally holding on from Little Kenesaw on the right to Nose's Creek on the left. The passing days were signalized by considerable fighting, Lieutenant-General Polk being killed on June 11. He was temporarily succeeded by Maj. Gen. W. W. Loring. On June 27 Sherman, departing from his usual rule, assaulted the enemy at two points simultaneously, one near Little Kenesaw, the other farther south. Both attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the Federals.

Not intending further to play into Johnston's hand, turning again was resorted to. July 1, Garrard's cavalry relieving him in front of Kenesaw, McPherson was put in motion toward Turner's Ferry, across the Chattahoochee, 6 miles from Atlanta. Johnston immediately met this movement. Making only a show of resistance at Smyrna Camp Ground, 5 miles in rear of Marietta, he surrendered all his strong works except the tête-du-pont west of the Chattahoochee, and on the night of July 5 took up a position on Peach Tree Creek immediately in front of Atlanta. Sherman, feinting by the right, crossed the Chattahoochee by his left. This movement was completed by July 9, when Johnston, releasing the tête-du-pont, drew his entire army into the defenses before Atlanta.

The unlimited supply of slave labor at his disposal, directed

by able officers temporarily without appropriate commands, enabled General Johnston to make phenomenally strong earthworks during the whole campaign, and they now had reached a stage of construction that was nearly if not quite perfect. They were worth many thousand soldiers to an army standing on the defense.

It was at this stage that, July 17, General Johnston was relieved by Gen. John B. Hood.^a It must be presumed that this was satisfactory to the Confederate authorities who ordered it, but the unusual circumstance was that it was hailed with delight by the Federal armies and Administration, who thus saw one of their most resourceful opponents cease to be further cause for anxiety.^b

It unmistakably indicated a change of Confederate army policy. Coming outside to fight instead of awaiting assault behind works was now to be the order of the day. By the 19th the Federal corps were closing in on the Atlanta defenses, Thomas on the Federal right, then Schofield; McPherson on the left. They were opposed, respectively, by A. P. Stewart, who had succeeded Polk; Hardee in the center, and Cheatham's (formerly Hood's) Corps on the Confederate right. On the 20th of July Stewart attacked suddenly Sherman's right center, with spirit and tenacity, but was repulsed. On the 22d Hood, having drawn Hardee's Corps from left to right, attacked Sherman's left flank in an impetuous manner, gaining at first some advantages, but making no permanent impression. In truth, fighting in the open was a losing game. The Federal troops were equally as good as his and more numerous. It was on the 22d that the lamented McPherson fell, the command of his army, by the President's order, devolving on Howard. About the same time Slocum succeeded Hooker, Gen. Jeff C. Davis relieved Palmer, and Stanley took Howard's (Fourth) Corps.

Direct attack on the defensive works at Atlanta was not advisable; it might succeed, but chances seemed decidedly against it. Kenesaw was not forgotten. The next course was to break up Hood's line of supply. These were two railroads,

^a *Memoirs of General Sherman*, vol. 2, p. 72. *Johnston's Narrative*, p. 348. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, vol. 4, p. 253.

^b *Personal Memoirs*, U. S. Grant, vol. 2, p. 167.

one east past Decatur, the other south past East Point. The first was soon destroyed. The future fighting around Atlanta now consisted of struggles to determine who should control the railroad south.^a Sherman commenced, July 26, a flanking movement, for the purpose taking the Army of the Tennessee from the direction of Decatur to a position west of Atlanta. The other corps followed, Hood making a vigorous attack on the Fifteenth Corps, July 28, but the flanking continued steadily, every step fought with great stubbornness. Sherman concluded at last to raise the siege of Atlanta and take the Army bodily on this turning movement against the enemy's remaining line of supply. The Twentieth Corps, Slocum, was sent back to the Chattahoochee to guard the Federal line of supplies. The other corps struck out for the Macon Railroad, and from this time, August 25, every effort was made to destroy it. The fighting was continuous. On the 31st it attained the dimensions of a severe battle at Jonesboro, where Hardee, with his own and Stephen D. Lee's Corps, assailed Howard, but was repulsed. This interposed Sherman's army between those two Confederate corps and Stewart's in Atlanta. Hood immediately abandoned the city, which was occupied by the Federal troops on the 2d of September—four months from the commencement of the campaign.^b

This event marked the success of the Federal army; the enemy's army was not indeed destroyed, but this great strategic point, hitherto deemed by the Confederacy unassailable, reduced at last into Federal possession, brought home to the minds and consciences of all, both North and South, that the government reared by rebellion was tottering to its fall.

The most remarkable feature of this campaign was that Sherman had been able to maintain a line of supply of 300 miles through a hostile country back to Nashville. The Confederates had it in their power, if not to destroy this line, at least very seriously to interfere with it. They had at their command a cavalry leader, Maj. Gen. N. B. Forrest, C. S. Army, who in that particular style of warfare has never had a superior. Fortunately, however, for Sherman he was kept

^a *Memoirs of General Sherman*, vol. 2, p. 87.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 108.

employed in other and, for the Confederates, relatively insignificant duties. At last, when too late, the enemy appreciated their error. They then turned attention to the destruction of Sherman's line of communication, hoping thereby to compel him to retrace his steps. At the same time it was arranged that Hood would, starting from Georgia, repeat Bragg's attempted invasion of the North.^a

If this programme could be carried out, then indeed would the National Government and the loyal millions supporting it have little cause to rejoice over the fall of Atlanta. The Confederate officers and the armies they commanded were not to be deterred by difficulties short of impossibilities. They set about their work with an energy and fearlessness which showed that nothing short of overwhelming defeat would stay their progress.

This bold policy placed Sherman in a dilemma. If successful, then indeed would his brilliant successes prove Dead Sea fruit. Hood collected his corps, commanded by Cheatham, S. D. Lee, Stewart, and Wheeler, with the cavalry at Palmetto covering the West Point Railroad. About October 1 his army crossed the Chattahooche and marching north struck the Federal line of supply.^b Sherman followed, hoping to bring Hood to battle. This he could not do. Hood's army was the more mobile of the two, knew the country better, and it was his new policy to make conquest in the North, not fighting Sherman in the mountains of Georgia.

The Federal commander now came to a determination which stamped him as a great general. He resolved to furnish Thomas, whom he had sent back to Tennessee, forces sufficient, with others poured into that country from all available sources, to meet Hood single-handed, while he, taking the rest of his army, would march to Savannah, establish a new base, and, moving thence north, cooperate with Grant against Lee's army in Virginia. This was a grand conception. In view of the easy success which attended its execution its real merit is liable to be underestimated. To fully appreciate this one must place himself in Sherman's position at that time

^a *The Civil War in America*, vol. 3, p. 309.

^b *Ib.*, p. 313. *Memoirs of General Sherman*, vol. 2, p. 146.



G. H. THOMAS.
U. S. M. A., 1840.

with all the doubts that beset him. His own part was easy; he took care of that by keeping nearly his whole army, but where Sherman showed his great military judgment was in his just estimate of General Thomas, whom he believed would, out of the troops Sherman sent him, joined to those picked up from all sources, far and near, improvise an army with which he could beat back Hood's invasion. Such was the proposition that confronted General Sherman in the mountains of Georgia, where unassisted he had to determine what course to pursue; he decided unaided, and with his great coadjutor, Thomas, is entitled to all the credit for the results that flowed from the brilliant and sound military conception.

To Thomas was sent the Fourth Corps (Stanley's), the Twenty-third Corps (Cox's), with other troops; and on November 12 he reported to Sherman from Nashville that he had force sufficient for the task assigned him.^a Really the main, and in fact only, dangerous feature in this plan of campaign was that assigned to General Thomas. The actual march to Savannah was easy. The idea of living off the country had by this time penetrated the military mind.

Sherman's immediate army was divided into two wings under Howard and Slocum. It will be remembered that these three officers had served as colonels at the first Bull Run. Howard's (right) wing was composed of the Fifteenth Corps (Osterhaus's), and Seventeenth Corps (Blair's); Slocum's (left) wing of the Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis's) and the Twentieth Corps (A. S. Williams's). The cavalry was separately organized under Kilpatrick. The strength of the army was about 60,000 aggregate. It was stripped of all possible impedimenta. The march was commenced from Atlanta on the 15th of November.^b No resistance worthy of note was met. On December 10 the army was before the land defenses of Savannah. A great load was now lifted from the minds of the loyal North, relieved of anxiety as to the fate of the troops thus buried for weeks in the Confederacy, and regarding which nothing had been heard except through grotesquely erroneous statements of the enemy. On the

^a *Memoirs of General Sherman*, vol. 2, p. 169.

^b *Ibid.*, p. 147.

night of December 20 Hardee abandoned the city and the next day the Federal army marched into Savannah.

Thus one part of Sherman's final plan of campaign had been crowned with complete success; simultaneously the Federals had triumphed in Tennessee.

Thomas had placed the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps and the cavalry all under Schofield at Pulaski, Tenn., confronting Hood at Florence, Ala. Meantime he was organizing the military odds and ends that were sent to him at Nashville, and was fortifying there. Even the quartermaster's and other staff employees were temporarily converted into semblance of soldiers. Hood had not succeeded in drawing Sherman after him—his main object. If he could not destroy Thomas's army thus improvised he could not invade Kentucky, and therefore his campaign would be a total failure. He resolved, therefore, to march against Thomas and destroy him. He did not believe that Thomas could spirit up from the heterogeneous elements furnished him an army which could meet his own in battle.

On November 20 Hood's army commenced to move forward from the vicinity of Florence, Ala.^a By the 30th Schofield was maneuvered back to Franklin on the south side of Harpeth River, 18 miles in advance of Nashville. Here Hood attacked with great vehemence, persisting till long after dark. It was in vain. The Federal veterans, equaling their antagonists in valor and experience, die they would, but they would not give back or flee.^b The knightly Stanley fell badly wounded; while on the side of the Confederates, 12 generals killed, wounded, or captured evidenced the desperate character of the persistent and oft-repeated assaults. Among the Confederate killed was Brig. Gen. John Adams, a graduate, who fell while in the act of grasping the National colors where they were planted on the crest of the Federal works from which his troops were repulsed.

Franklin was Hood's opportunity. If successful there he might beat Thomas's army in detail. But he failed to drive Schofield into the river, suffering in the attempt a loss that

^a Battles and Leaders in the Civil War, pp. 428-429.

^b The Civil War in America, vol. 3, p. 350.

visibly dampened the hitherto almost invincible courage of his army. That night Schofield fell back under Thomas's orders, and on December 1 Thomas's troops presented a united front to the enemy at Nashville. Here, on the 3d, Hood appeared, attempting to establish a partial siege—Cheatham on the right, Lee in center, Stewart on the left.

In this attitude stood the contestants who had faced each other on many fields, each side exerting itself to the utmost for the impending struggle. This the adverse elements for a few days delayed, but on December 15 Thomas, feinting by his left, moved out A. J. Smith, Schofield and Wilson on the right, rolling up the Confederate left. The Fourth Corps, under T. J. Wood, now advanced in the center, with Steedman on the Federal left, and the entire Confederate line was forced back. On the 16th the work thus begun was completed, the enemy utterly routed; and that night the proud Confederate Army of Tennessee, which never before had turned back to the foe, was in wild retreat, its dream of conquest forever vanished.^a

Hood was thus baffled at every turn. Sherman was safe at Savannah, while his own brave army, pursued by that which Thomas had raised as an apparition before his eyes, was seeking in flight the protection of friendly rivers and mountain passes far in the interior of the Confederacy. As on the Mississippi, the armies of the West, aided by their brave associates, the flotilla manned by the Navy, thus triumphed likewise on the central strategic line.

The grand character that looms out of these momentous events is Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas. He had promised General Sherman that he would take care of Hood, and he did so. The Confederate Army was more completely broken to pieces at Nashville than any other in a pitched battle during the civil war. On the central strategic line all eyes had for months been following the armies of Sherman and his opponent, and when the former turned his back upon his lieutenant and marched to Savannah the Confederate authorities were confident that their path of invasion across the Ohio River could not now successfully be disputed. Had this

^aBattles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4, p. 457. The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 353.

proved true the Atlanta campaign would have been fought in vain. That an army distinct from the one directly under Sherman could be organized in Tennessee sufficiently virile and powerful to impede Hood's march and destroy his army was as great a surprise to the Confederate administration as the appearance of the Spanish army on the fateful field of Baylen was to Napoleon.

Two incidents connected with this campaign deserve notice here. The first occurred in front of Atlanta, as a sequel to McPherson's death. The question arose as to his successor in command of the Army of the Tennessee. Sherman selected Howard, a junior, because he was a professional and educated soldier, without the political interests of some senior corps commanders, competitors for the command.^a The assignment was confirmed by President Lincoln. The other incident was in connection with Thomas's Nashville command. General Grant, in Virginia, was very anxious that Thomas should attack Hood. At length he gave peremptory orders to that effect. General Thomas, as was his wont, waited until he was prepared, and until conditions were, in his opinion, favorable. Grant first asked that Schofield should relieve him, and, this not being done, he next sent Gen. John A. Logan, but almost immediately started himself for Nashville, learning of Thomas's glorious victory at Washington while en route.^b General Logan was not sent to take command of General Thomas's army, but only the Army of the Cumberland.

Graduates acted a great part in this campaign. They embraced all army commanders on both sides. At the commencement, from Dalton to Atlanta, of the Eighth Federal Corps, including the cavalry, three were commanded by graduates—Howard, Hooker, and Stoneman. With General Thomas all the corps commanders except one were graduates, as likewise was true in Hood's army. However, under these splendid Army commanders, who had learned the fundamental principles of the military profession at the Academy and practiced them in the field, there had grown up in both

^a *Memoirs of General Sherman*, vol. 2, p. 86.

^b *Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant*, v. 2, pp. 382, 383.

armies, during this long and trying war, a class of officers competent for every duty placed upon them, from subaltern to corps commander.

The Army of the Potomac, in three corps, Second (Hancock), Fifth (Warren), and Sixth (Sedgwick) moved from Culpeper across the Rapidan on the 4th of May.^a Burnside commanded the Ninth Corps, Sheridan the cavalry. The whole force numbered about 118,000 men. The General-in-Chief was with the Army of the Potomac.

The Army of Northern Virginia, under Gen. Robert E. Lee, consisted of the corps of A. P. Hill, Ewell, and Longstreet. Stuart commanded the cavalry. The total effective force was about 61,000.

General Grant's plan of campaign was not unlike that of Sherman. He proposed to move direct against the enemy, and should the latter prove too strong behind his intrenchments then to utilize his numerical superiority to work to a flank, always feeling toward Richmond as Sherman did toward Atlanta.

Lee, as though inspired by recollections of Chancellorsville, moved on the 5th of May to strike Grant's columns in flank while in the entanglements of the Wilderness. Here the battle fiercely raged during the 5th and 6th, resulting in great losses, the burning forests, where many wounded lay, augmenting the horrors. Among those who fell were Brigadier Generals Wadsworth and Robinson on the Union and Lieutenant-General Longstreet on the Confederate side; the first killed, the two latter seriously wounded. Longstreet was succeeded by Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson.

Reconnoissance on the morning of the 7th showed that Lee's army was heavily intrenched. Grant therefore resolved to move immediately by his own left flank, with a view to interposing between Lee and Richmond. That night the march for Spottsylvania Court-House, 7 miles south, was commenced. Lee had failed in his attempt, by flank attack, to arrest the progress of the Union Army.

Lee discovered the movement on Spottsylvania, and, due

^a Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 2, p. 177.

perhaps to better knowledge of the country, Richard H. Anderson reached there before the head of Grant's column under Warren. Here on the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th bloody battles, similar to those of the 5th and 6th in the Wilderness, were repeated; but as was to be expected, Lee, having the interior lines of operation, was always found securely intrenched to receive attack. He was handling his army with great ability.

But it was not the policy of the National commander to fight an enemy behind fieldworks, amidst almost impenetrable thickets. Consequently on the night—21-22—rain and expected reinforcements causing the delay, a flank movement by the left commenced to the crossing of the North Anna by the railroad, distant in an air line about 20 miles.

Here again Lee was found intrenched on the south side of the river, and so skillfully that Grant could not reunite his forces after crossing. The experiences of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania were repeated, the Confederate lines being practically unassailable. Sheridan meantime rejoined the army from a raid upon the enemy's depots and lines of supply. Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, the Confederate cavalry commander, was mortally wounded at Yellow Tavern during this raid.

Another flank movement by the left having been determined upon, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth corps were silently recalled to the north bank of the river on the night of May 26, and started for the crossing of the Pamunkey at Hanover Town, about 20 miles in direct line below. The cavalry under Sheridan was skillfully used in masking this march, which, by June 1, placed Grant's army confronting Lee's at Cold Harbor. This was the last point at which the enemy could be attacked outside of the semi-permanent works of Richmond. Accordingly, on June 3, a very heavy assault was made here upon the enemy's position, but it was repulsed with loss. All attempts to interpose, so as to cut off the Army of Northern Virginia from Richmond had failed. But the battle of the giants was on, and was to be fought out on that line. Whatever might be done elsewhere, here the issue of union or disunion was to be settled.

A new phase of the campaign now was presented. The

Confederate army thus far had proved unassailable behind its field works. It was reasonable to suppose that it would prove equally so behind the heavier defenses of its capital, before which it had arrived and under cover of which it was about to take up its position. The situation in its vital aspects was not unlike that before narrated of Sherman confronting Hood at Atlanta. It had become absolutely necessary to cut the enemy's line of supply, destroy his depots, starve him, and so work and maneuver that he would be compelled to give battle without the protection of fortifications. This might occur either by the Confederates leaving those fortifications or the National army finding some vulnerable point in the fortified line through which it might be able to penetrate, thus giving the enemy no alternative except battle, uncovered, upon the restricted but open ground in rear.

From this time the campaign was conducted on these principles. Sheridan, Kautz, Wilson, Hunter—in fact, every general who could be spared—was sent out to destroy the enemy's lines of communication. Their efforts were supplemented and made really effective by movements of large bodies. Necessarily such a plan of campaign required a large army, much exceeding in numbers that of the enemy, but the superior authority of the General in Chief enabled Grant to bring to the vital point every available soldier whose services elsewhere were not indispensable, and as to this he was the judge. It was this authority alone which made ultimate success possible.


The protection of either Washington or Richmond as an indispensable matter was now scarcely thought of. It is true that the capture of either would prove inconvenient and was so undesirable that a reasonable effort should be made to avoid it. But such considerations now had assumed at this stage of the war an altogether secondary importance. The struggle had come down at last, after four years of fighting, to the ultimate and intrinsic principle of wars which can not be compromised—the destruction of the opposing armies. Upon this spectacle alone the attention of the interested governments and peoples now was riveted. Each appreciated

that this would prove determinative; each, scarcely breathing, watched those armies' every move.

In carrying this new plan of campaign into execution Grant resolved to cross the James River, making this his new base of supply, and, uniting the armies of the James and of the Potomac, have them better in hand. This was accomplished by the 16th of June, 1864. It involved, as did McClellan's flank march of two years before, a delicate movement in face of the enemy, but Lee was now in no condition to attempt to profit by it. Instead he drew his army into the fortifications of Richmond, which included, virtually, those of Petersburg, 20 miles distant. Here, as in the Atlanta campaign, a practically unlimited control of slave labor enabled the Confederates to raise earthworks as if by magic. Their engineers were of unsurpassed ability. Grant established his new base of supplies at City Point, and the siege of Richmond commenced by the siege of Petersburg, an assault on the defenses of the latter by a portion of the Army of the James, June 15-16, having been repelled.

The first substantial advantage was gained on the 18th of August, when Warren seized and held the Weldon Railroad, thus leaving Petersburg but one railroad fully communicating with the South.^a Heavy fighting and much cavalry raiding there was during the course of the summer and fall. On August 29 Fort Harrison and its connected works north of the James was captured and held permanently by the Federal troops. The next day Meade captured the works at Poplar Spring Church, in his front. Grant's tactics were to feint toward one flank and, the enemy having met that, fall upon the part thus weakened. He operated both north and south of the James River in this way, but the Confederates were vigilant and made their antagonists pay dearly for every misstep or error of judgment. In the presence of such a numerically superior and so determined an enemy the only hope of the Confederate army lay in its unexampled means of fortifying. Its resources in this seemed practically to have no limit. On October 27 Grant moved the Army of the

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 415.



P. H. Sheridan
General

U. S. M. A., 1853.

Potomac out toward the Southside Railroad with a view to seizing it. The country was examined 7 miles or so toward that railroad, but the enemy's intrenchments guarding Petersburg were everywhere found occupied. Not desiring so to extend his own lines at this juncture, the enemy occupying the chord while he held the arc of a circle, he marched back to the old stations in the fortified lines. These were improved, a railroad in rear of and along them built, and for the rest of this campaign the task of the army immediately under General Grant was reduced to siege operations. So the winter wore on, each side vigilant, aggressive; each preparing for the struggle, whatever phase it might take, which would be ushered in by the spring.

While this had been going on Sheridan acted a great part in the Shenandoah Valley. Sigel had failed in his raid. Hunter, who relieved him, had at first considerable success. This led him toward Lynchburg, a point of so much importance on Lee's line of communications that he sent a strong force to its relief. Hunter was obliged to retreat during the latter part of June into West Virginia, his army enduring great hardships. This left Washington City badly guarded. Lee resolved to take advantage of the circumstance to call off some of Grant's troops and thus relieve the pressure on himself. Hunter not being able to transport his troops in time, the Sixth Corps under Wright and the advance of the Nineteenth Corps from New Orleans were sent to meet Early's threatened attack on Washington. The Confederate general had approached from the north within 6 miles of the city on July 10, and the next morning advanced to feel the defenses at Fort Stevens. This consumed the day—a circumstance which illustrated the immense value to it of the capital's extensive system of fortifications. That night an assault of the works on the 12th was resolved upon, but the arrival of the corps just mentioned caused the plan to be abandoned. Instead, Early was now only concerned for the safety of his command, retreating with all possible speed into the Shenandoah Valley, whence he had come, and which now was to be the theater of a campaign in brilliancy eclipsing and in

substantial results obtained far exceeding in importance that of Stonewall Jackson.

It was at this time that Sheridan arrived upon the scene, relieving Hunter on the 7th of August.^a The Army of the Shenandoah consisted of the Sixth Corps, two divisions each of the Eighth and Nineteenth corps, two divisions of cavalry under Merritt and Wilson from Petersburg, one division of cavalry already in the valley, the whole of cavalry under Torbert.

September 19 Sheridan and Early confronted each other at Winchester. The former moved to attack the latter in position. His plan was to threaten the Confederate right, turn the left, and assail the center. Early's left being turned, the attack in front was pressed with vigor, and the Confederates were thrown into confusion, greatly augmented by the charge of the National cavalry under Merritt and Torbert. Early, driven from the field, rallied at Fishers Hill, 12 miles south, where on the evening of the 21st he was again attacked, Sheridan using the same tactics and with the same result. Sheridan pursued through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. In a week's time he had captured or destroyed half of Early's army, driving the rest out of the Shenandoah Valley, which he now proceeded to devastate, hoping that thereafter the enemy's army might not find sustenance there. A month was thus spent.

But Early was not easily to be disposed of. He was a veteran at the head of veteran troops who, though beaten in battle, had great recuperative powers. The Confederate Army had always been splendidly officered, especially in the higher grades, and now that fortune seemed to be going against them their courage, tenacity, and fortitude rose with adversity. Sheridan, having posted his army behind Cedar Creek, near Strasburg, went to Washington for consultation. Here, on the morning of October 19, Early attacked and defeated the Federals,^b but the Confederates, failing to follow up the success, and stopping to plunder the captured camp instead, the Union troops, under Wright, again formed in line. At

^a Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 2, pp. 320, 321; the Civil War in America, vol. 3, p. 408.

^b The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 412. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, vol. 4, p. 516.

this hour, 11 a. m., Sheridan arrived. Approving what Wright had done, he instantly took measures to attack the enemy. This was done about 3 p. m. with so much determination that Early was completely overthrown, and his army, taken by surprise, practically destroyed, forever terminating the Confederate attempt to hold the Shenandoah Valley.

This practically ended the campaign on the eastern or Virginia strategic line for the year 1864. Lee's Army, cooped up in the defensive lines adjacent to Richmond, had been rendered incapable of serious operations beyond them. On the other hand, Grant, in front of these works, ever was looking for opportunity for successful aggressive movement, while light columns and the cavalry were available and ready for operations against the enemy's lines of supply or wherever they could do him most harm. The contest was too unequal. At the close of 1864 it was apparent to reasonable men that the Confederate armed hosts could not much longer resist the assaults made upon them. The only question was how long the final catastrophe would be postponed.

Besides the general in chief, the graduates in high command during this campaign included Meade, Sheridan, all the corps and 12 of the 20 division commanders. The same was essentially true in General Lee's Army. These were propitious times for the development of soldiers. Under Grant and Sheridan they had opportunity to show what was in them, and received recognition in due proportion to the services rendered and ability shown. Such young graduates as Emory Upton, S. S. Carroll, Torbert, Gregg, Merritt, and Wilson were coming to the front. The Union cavalry was taking its appropriate place in battle and campaign; had already done so in 1863.

Gen. B. F. Butler moved on the same day upon which Grant's corps crossed the Rapidan. But he could not direct the components of an army—in other words, maneuver or fight it—and, except to act as a containing force to a much less number of Confederates behind their works south of Richmond, his troops did nothing worthy of notice until

they came immediately under Grant's supervision and the Army of the James practically coalesced with that of the Potomac.

OPERATIONS, 1865.

On January 1, 1865, there was but one formidable Confederate army in the field, the Army of Northern Virginia.

The Army of the Tennessee was so crushingly defeated at Nashville that it almost disappeared. Its organization was maintained, but it was a skeleton only of its former self. It yet was to be reckoned with, but only as formidable in case it could have joined to it all the Confederate detachments in the South Atlantic district.

February 5 Gen. Robert E. Lee was appointed general in chief of all the Confederate armies. This conferred the same authority within the Confederacy that his immediate opponent, Grant, possessed in the armies of the Union. On February 23 Gen. Joseph E. Johnston was directed to report to General Lee, and was placed in command of the Army of the Tennessee and of the Department of South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His orders were to unite all the troops and drive back Gen. William T. Sherman, who was marching northward from Savannah to join Grant in Virginia.^a

The plan of the Confederates was for Johnston to fall back only if this became necessary. Then Lee, escaping from Grant's grasp, would join him.^b If this could be done, Sherman first, then Grant, was to be crushed. It was a daring scheme. But it was recognized that if anything could save the Confederacy, which appeared impossible except to the most sanguine friends, it needs must be a desperate measure, attended in the execution by great good fortune. General Johnston indulged in no such hopes. When he was restored to command his belief was that it only remained for the Confederates to do battle longer to secure best possible terms of peace. In the mixed army which he now had were many notable officers come to rally the remnants of former commands. It was the expiring effort of the old guard. There were Bragg, Stewart, Hardee, S. D. Lee, Wheeler, of the Army

^a Johnston's Narrative, p. 371.

^b The Civil War in America, vol. 3, p. 564.

of the Tennessee; Beauregard, who launched the first shot at Sumter amidst plaudits of brave men and approving smiles of women; the sturdy D. H. Hill, of South Mountain fame; graduates were all these; while beside, elbow to elbow, stood Cheatham, Hampton, Hoke, Butler, Pettus, Law, apt pupils who had well learned from them lessons in leadership. But what gaps there were in the ranks. Where were former commanders and companions whose valor challenged the admiration not only of the National Army, but of the military world? As in the armies of the Empire, when their names were called came the response, "Died on the field of honor."

General Grant had anticipated so early as the commencement of the campaign of 1864 that the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston might possibly attempt to maneuver as here proposed, and, by uniting, try to beat in detail his army, then Sherman's. He warned the latter accordingly.^a His solicitation at the beginning of 1865 was to prevent at all hazards Lee leaving his works until Sherman approached from the south. When this happened Lee's army would be proceeded against.

The destruction of the Army of Northern Virginia was the one great object to be accomplished. The movements of the two large armies under Grant and Sherman went directly to this end. There were other and minor movements intended to aid the main ones either by crippling the enemy or distracting his attention.

The first of these secondary efforts was directed against Fort Fisher, at the mouth of Cape Fear River, in December, 1864. The land forces were under command of Maj. Gen. B. F. Butler, whose department embraced North Carolina. It was a failure. He was relieved, at Grant's request, of command of his department and of the Army of the James by Maj. Gen. E. O. C. Ord, U. S. Volunteers. The expedition returned in January, 1865, under command of Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry, one of Butler's subordinates, who had worked his way up from grade of colonel in active service. This time it was eminently successful. This closed the important blockade-running port of Wilmington, N. C., besides leading to the

^a Memoirs of General Sherman, vol. 2, p. 29; The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 535.

establishment of a secure Federal base of supplies on the flank of Sherman's expected line of march.^a

To establish this base, which was deemed most important, General Schofield, who had brought the Twenty-third Corps east and who had been put in command of the Department of North Carolina, captured Wilmington, N. C., February 22, and then pushed columns into the interior, seizing Goldsboro on the 21st of March.^b The object of establishing these bases of supply on Sherman's flank was fully realized during his march.

Another combined Army and Navy expedition was directed against Mobile. The land forces were commanded by General Canby. They embraced troops aggregating about 45,000, under Gordon Granger, A. J. Smith, Frederick Steele, and Eugene A. Carr. The forts guarding the city fell in succession. The enemy then evacuated the city, which was taken possession of by the Federals on the 12th of April.

Cavalry raids were made by Stoneman from East Tennessee upon the Confederate lines of supply and depots in Virginia and North Carolina in rear of Lee's army, and by J. H. Wilson from Eastport, Miss., through the yet unexplored districts of Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, Ga., and Macon. Great damage was done in all these raids and expeditions, but, due to the fact that every effort was being made to re-enforce the armies of Lee and Johnston, resistance was less than expected. Except in these two armies, there was little resisting power left in the Confederacy. It was fought out. Of the same general character as these was Sheridan's raid from Winchester up the Shenandoah Valley in February and March. At Waynesboro he again encountered and routed his old antagonist, Early, joining the Army of the Potomac on the 27th, after destroying as much as possible Lee's lines of communication.

Sherman's northern march through the Carolinas began on February 1 by Howard moving out the right wing from Pocotaligo.^c Slocum with the left wing moved from near

^a The Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 521 et seq.; Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 2, p. 607.

^b The Civil War in America, vol. 3, p. 530.

^c *Ib.*, p. 542.

Robertsville. The army was about 60,000 strong. The country to be traversed was difficult; but the enemy to be encountered was not formidable until their various detachments could be concentrated. Columbia was reached on the 17th of February. Charleston, S. C., was abandoned by the enemy on the 18th, Hardee escaping with 14,000 troops by railroad to Florence. The Union army moved with caution. The first serious encounter was at Averagesboro, March 16, between Hardee and Slocum. The next, near Bentonville, on the 18th, was more serious still, where Johnston commanded in person. There was here heavy and persistent fighting, the Confederates being the aggressors. But Johnston, fearful of being cut off by the forces concentrating in his front, fell back to Smithfield. A peculiar interest attaches to the battle of Bentonville. Here were seen arrayed against each other for the last time the armies which in the West for four years had contended for the mastery. Long since they had learned to respect each other. Their last contest was worthy of veterans.

On the day that Johnston retreated from Bentonville Schofield occupied Goldsboro. The armies of Sherman and Schofield were united, and Johnston was confronted with 100,000 veteran troops.^a April 10 Sherman moved against the enemy, who retreated rapidly.^b But events elsewhere decreed that the armies of Johnston and Sherman had fought their last battle.

March 24 Grant issued instructions for a movement against Lee, to commence on the 29th.^c The army was to move to the left, interpose between Lee and Johnston, the lines of supply of the former to be absolutely destroyed and he compelled either to surrender or come from behind his works. On the 27th Sherman visited Grant at City Point, immediately hurrying back to attack Johnston.

March 29 Sheridan moved out from the left with 9,000 cavalry under Crook and Merritt. On April 1, reenforced by the Fifth Corps, he encountered troops under Pickett at Five Forks, gaining a great victory, vigorously pursuing the Confederates and capturing many prisoners. Lee's right

^aThe Civil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 558.

^bIb., p. 559.

^cCivil War in America, Draper, vol. 3, p. 564; Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, vol. 2, p. 616.

flank was now turned, the Federals in his rear. The mortal blow now descended. April 2 the Union forces advanced upon the enemy's works, capturing everything before them. A. P. Hill, hastening to restore his lines like McPherson at Atlanta, fell in the same manner.

General Lee informed President Davis that Richmond must be abandoned and at once began measures for retreat. On the 3d the Union Army entered the deserted and burning Confederate capital. Its first mission there was one of mercy, extinguishing the conflagration kindled by its departing defenders and saving the city from destruction. The members of the Confederate Government now were fugitives.

The rest is told in few words. Lee's only chance lay in effecting a junction with Johnston. His army was immediately put in motion in that direction. Grant's army moved to head him off. Lee had somewhat the start, and, being better acquainted with the country, had prospect of first reaching Burksville, at the junction of the Southside and Danville railroads. But it was destined that his army should never reach there. At Amelia Court-House he found that the train with supplies for his almost famished troops had been diverted to the purpose of carrying the fleeing civil officers. Some delay for food was absolutely necessary. That sealed the fate of the Army of Northern Virginia and the Confederacy. Sheridan first interposed at Jetersville, across the line of retreat, with his cavalry, soon to be joined by the Army of the Potomac. The great Army of Northern Virginia, driven to bay, made one more effort. Sheridan, advancing on the 6th of April upon Amelia Court-House, found that Lee had escaped, passing around the Federal left, and moving on Farmville. He hoped by destroying the bridges there to gain a moment's respite. But the relentless Federal trooper pressed on. At Sailor's Creek Ewell and the remnant of Pickett's corps, cut off, were forced to surrender. April 6-7 the rest of the Army of Northern Virginia reached and crossed the bridges of the Appomattox at Farmville, pushing back the head of Ord's columns, which arrived from Burksville Junction. A running fight was maintained, the retreating army occasionally turning with telling effect upon its pursuers,

but upon the whole being gradually broken to pieces. The third and last of the main strategic lines had been won by the armies of the Union.

The hopelessness of the situation was apparent to all, and propositions looking to terminating it by the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia gradually took form on both sides. On the 7th General Grant opened communication with General Lee with this object in view. On the 9th Lee, having been cut off from his supply trains at Appomattox Station, and finding the Federal Army barring further progress toward any place of either safety or repose, favorably responded to those overtures. As a commander he had done his full duty toward both the Confederacy and its army. Formal terms of surrender were signed that day. Peace was all they were intended to accomplish. The arms, except side arms of the officers, artillery, and public property, were given up. Private property of whatever nature, including horses of officers and men, was retained by the owners. The personnel were paroled under an obligation not again to serve in the Confederate armies or in other military capacity until properly exchanged.^a

On April 14 Sherman received a communication from Johnston looking to surrender. The first memorandum agreed upon by the generals, April 18, was not approved by the Federal President, Mr. Johnson. Accordingly, another was drawn up on the 26th, almost in the language of Grant's terms to Lee. This being approved, Johnston's army duly surrendered, and the greatest civil war of history in numbers engaged, losses sustained, and resources expended was at an end.^b

Impartial history will record that the Confederacy was surpassed by no previous efforts in the gallantry with which it maintained the cause it had espoused. The valor shown by its armies, led by graduates, excited the admiration of soldiers everywhere. That the Confederates, failing in open combat, did not resort to vicious guerilla tactics, only to bring misery to noncombatants, gave further proof of their discipline and courage.

^aThe Civil War in America, vol. 3, p. 593.

^bIb., pp. 608, 611.

The integrity of the Union had been vindicated by the sword.

In the final scenes, as was generally true throughout the war, graduates were at the head of all armies. The names of graduates alone were attached to the articles of surrender. From start to finish they had acted a controlling and determinative part in campaign and battle. They commanded on both sides in every important battle and in nearly every engagement approaching the dimensions of a battle. They had been the mainstays of their respective governments in military affairs. Politicians whom it had been attempted to convert into army commanders by the easy plan of placing on their shoulder the general's stars had without exception proved their unfitness. It was seen that though these characters might act their assigned part in small affairs against small men, they were wholly incompetent to the strenuous demands of the civil war.

It often is said that the Regular Army in time of war is a nucleus about which gather the much more numerous volunteer forces then called into the service of the United States. This statement is true. But the suggestion often coupled with it, that the volunteers, from the fact of being numerically the more numerous, become therefore the more important element, in presence of which the Regular Army in time of war is dwarfed and sinks into comparative insignificance is not true. Mere excess of numbers is not the only nor necessarily the best test of relative importance in military operations.

The Regular Army furnishes all the important commanders, the substructure of all the great administrative departments, and, at the commencement all there is of correct knowledge throughout the whole armed force regarding the art and science of war. Gradually as the war progresses this knowledge is disseminated throughout the mass of volunteers; but the officers who are the instructors, exemplars, and the distributors come from the Regular Army either directly or they have served there before and now come in from civil life; and, in their turn, the Military Academy is the source whence they all, without exception, acquired information concerning and appreciation of the fundamental principles upon which

armies should be commanded, affairs of supply administered and campaigns conducted. Nucleus, therefore, as the word is used above, is only an apt term when it is understood in the sense that while the Volunteers furnish the great excess in numbers the Regular Army furnishes the technical knowledge, intelligence, and will power to command, the experience to direct, the professional stamina which serves as the vertebra of the entire military establishment. The Volunteers, though vastly outnumbering the Regulars, are superior to the latter in numbers only; in all matters of leadership and and soldierly knowledge they are both individually and in the aggregate inferior. Verification of this is found in the fact that at the end of this great civil war, which startled the world by its proportions and incidents, the only officers on both sides who successfully had commanded armies, conducted campaigns and fought great battles belonged to their respective regular armies and were graduates of the Military Academy.

It was fitting that graduates should have acted this leading and dominating part. To prepare them for this the Academy was founded. The field of danger is the post of honor. Its effort ever has been to qualify those intrusted to its care for acting up to this high—the soldier's only—standard.

The General Staff, recently created by statute, with encomiums of sanguine friends and the good will of the nation, commences its career of hoped-for improvement under auspices which the Academy has been the principal agency in establishing. Neither the Army nor the nation will take good results for granted in this behalf. Usefulness must be demonstrated before either will believe, and the degree of faith will be proportioned to the demonstrated usefulness. Mere details of service, which other agencies have both time and facilities the better to attend to, must be eschewed, and the attention of this corps d'élite directed to the more elevated problems of national defense, and, as these are seen from its more advantageous point of view, coordinating the important operations of the existing instrumentalities of the military system. The end to be attained is the development of commanders who can beat the enemy in battle. All other

considerations and all other agencies, how important soever they may be in themselves, are merely ancillary and incidental.

The incidents of the civil war are commended to the study of any nation which seeks a quarrel with the United States. The lessons there to be learned will perhaps be conducive to caution. In that war armies organized, supplied, disciplined, and commanded by graduates proved by their fortitude in campaign and their valor on the battlefield, as evidenced by the percentage of killed and wounded, that the Republic has in its own midst defenders equal to its every need.

It is due to the Academy alone that the scientific principles upon which military operations should be conducted are understood in the United States. Previously the Army, though brave, was technically uneducated, a circumstance which led Washington, with his great military experience, to favor such an institution. Its influence permeates every part and individual of the Army. From it those who are not graduates have drawn, indirectly, their knowledge of the art and science of war. Through the process of absorption, mental and physical, due to contact, all members of the military establishment for the past three-quarters of a century and upwards have assimilated in their daily experience the instruction here imparted and carried thence to the Army. The source whence has flowed an exposition of the true principles upon which wars should be waged has been the same for all. Those splendid officers, whether entering from the Army or private life during the civil war, who under the guidance of graduates learned to take a stand side by side with their instructors, have illustrated in their careers as much as graduates themselves the necessity for and inestimable value of the institution whence is disseminated in the first instance correct professional knowledge.

These are truths and principles long since appreciated by the people of the United States. And so well established were they within a half century of the founding of the Military Academy that the national polity was conformed thereto. It necessarily was so in a virile, progressive nation. It simply illustrated the march of intelligence directed by the light of education—that subtle but irresistible force which ever with

firmer tread is carrying the Christian world forward to a higher plane of refinement and civilization.

Among agencies leading upward peoples and their governments none is more potent than armies under competent commanders. Wars inevitably arise in the course of human events. Such commanders so conduct them that, while they best subserve the purposes of the State, they are rendered as brief as possible, with the least of human suffering consistent with success. It is the glory of the Military Academy that from amidst her sons have come forth when occasion demanded commanders who could successfully lead the largest armies recruited from citizens of the republic. The world has had a demonstration on the most extensive scale that the policy of the United States has produced and is perpetuating within its own limits every element necessary for self-preservation.

LIST OF THE PRINCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED IN WRITING CHAPTER .

Official Army Registers.

Twenty Years in Congress. Blaine.

Campaigning with Grant. Porter.

Battle of Chancellorsville. Bates.

Battles and Leaders of Civil War.

History of the Civil War. Draper.

Civil War in America. Comte de Paris.

Genesis of the Civil War.

Cullum's Register of Officers and Graduates of the Military Academy.

Four Years with the Army of the Potomac. De Trobriand.

Personal Memoirs. General Grant.

Military History of Grant. Badeau.

Reminiscences of Gen. W. S. Hancock.

Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. Hughes.

From Manassas to Appomattox. Longstreet.

McClellan's Own Story.

History of Military Operations. Johnston.

Rebellion Records. Moore.

Regimental Losses in American Civil War. Fox.

Memoirs of Gen. W. T. Sherman.

Memoirs of Gen. P. H. Sheridan.

From Chattanooga to Petersburg. Smith.

Volunteer Soldier of America. Logan.

War of the Rebellion, Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.

Memorandum: All of the above-named books are in the Library
U. S. M. A.

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